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THE MAKING OF MODERN ITALY



[Frontispiece

ITALY IN 1810

THE MAKING OF MODERN ITALY

By ARRIGO SOLMI

With an Introduction by
ARUNDELL del RE, M.A.(Oxon.)



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NOTE

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INTRODUCTION

. . . But when the glorious Queen
As erst is canopied with Freedom's sheen,
When I have prest, with salutation meet,
And reverent love to kiss her honoured feet,
I then may die,
Die how well satisfied !
Conscious that I have watcht the second birth
Of her I've loved the most upon the earth ;
Conscious beside
That no more beauteous sight can here be given :
Sublimar visions are reserved for heaven.

A. W. HARE, 1818.

MANY, in their writings, have echoed these words, which truly represent the feelings of an increasingly large number of English women and men, from Byron to Meredith. Yet to those who were most obsessed by the vision of a free Italy, who took an active part in its accomplishment and lived to see 1870, it appeared as a great and inspiring adventure, a dream come true. A man like the late Mr Hyndman, who quite apart from political bias understood the full meaning of the Risorgimento, confesses however that, "enthusiastic as I was for the emancipation of the country of Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cavour, modern bourgeois Italy has come upon me with something of a shock." And, while admitting material progress in certain directions, he also recognises in himself a feeling of disappointment that the illusions of his youth should have vanished. And he did not live to see the "black shirts" !

The war as yet has not destroyed the mid-nineteenth-century's idea of Italy, although the peace has forcibly modified or even given birth to a new idea of the Italians. Unwilling though one may be to do so, it is

necessary to view the making of Modern Italy coldly, critically, as a whole, and to realise that it was not accomplished by the taking of Rome but only in 1918. Without the Crimean War Sardinia would probably not have fulfilled—at least so rapidly—Bulwer-Lytton's prophecy of 1846 and become "the leading nation of Italy"; without the Libyan War, and still more without the World War, she would not truly have risen "to be a first-rate Power in Europe."

The task which the author of the present volume has set himself has been to show that "the history of the Italian Risorgimento is not only the record of those astonishing events which have led to Italian unity and national freedom, but it affords a typical example of the causes through which a nation may lose and regain her liberty and, at the same time, a solemn and convincing affirmation of the rights of nationality in the system of balance between European states . . . it makes us appreciate the importance of civil liberties, and helps to realise that international justice is a necessity."

It will at once be clear that Dr Solmi approaches his subject somewhat differently from the average historian of the Risorgimento. He is speaking to men as well as to students of history, and he constantly stresses the growth of the individual and national consciousness as the surest index of national and social development. This method inevitably tends to destroy the romantic fairy-tale element shrouding this period—to many, even now, a breathless sequence of incredible events—but in the end it attains a grander and more useful result: Italy—a People and a Nation, no longer Lamartine's unhappy "land of the dead" or Hare's "Sleeping Princess."

It is strange, yet by no means incomprehensible,

how, in the personal records of visitors to Italy—and others, throughout the century—that country appears either personified in a highly poetical manner, or as a land of bandits, beggars, bugs and beauty, or again as a museum of past glories, a vast gallery of paintings and sculptures and a succession of album-sketches and water-colours. A few it is true are superficially interested in her politics, but most visitors rarely if ever give a thought to the inhabitants save to remark on their picturesqueness.

Relations with individual Italians, in Italy, are numerous, but impersonally cosmopolitan, with such notable exceptions as Miss Berry's deep friendship for Antonio Canova. Shelley's letters from Italy are an extreme instance of this, and even in Byron, who loved Italy and the Italians without false romanticism, and got nearer to understanding them than perhaps any other Englishman of his day, there is always a hint, however slight, of condescension, never found in his French parallel, Henri Beyle. Shelley and Byron's attitude towards Italy is intensely selfish, and often coloured by practical considerations of a pecuniary nature. One may look in the former—be it in the poems or the letters—for some definite, personal allusion to political conditions other than very general diatribes against tyranny in the abstract, but one finds instead remarks such as these (in a letter to Peacock in 1819, in which Shelley alludes to the fettered criminals at work in the Piazza of St Peter's at Rome): "It is the emblem of Italy—moral degradation contrasted with the glory of nature and the arts"; or again (in another, written to Godwin in 1818): "The modern Italians seem a miserable people, without sensibility or imagination or understanding." Nor is the value of these opinions in any way diminished by Mrs Shelley's

suggestion that he altered them later on. Never does one find him bursting out against "those *Hun brutes*" like Byron did, or commenting upon the revolutionary movement of 1821 with the cutting irony of a Miss Berry. And how poorly they compare with Grey's and Lansdowne's defence of the *Carbonari* and of the Neapolitan revolution, and the impassioned assertion of the liberty of nations as against the rights of sovereigns echoed in the House of Lords in 1821.

Not until 1848, or shortly afterwards, did Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cavour stir the imagination of the people of England generally, not only politically and intellectually, as Foscolo, Pecchio, Santarosa and other refugees had previously done. This does not signify any under-rating of the latter's contribution to the romantic figure of the Italian patriot or, what is of far greater importance, of the *press-work* done by them at Holland House, Lansdowne House and elsewhere in this country to incite politicians and statesmen, such as Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell and Gladstone, to pull wires or to influence the Government in favour of Italian aspirations.

Henceforth the epic of Italy's struggle for freedom inspired an enthusiasm felt by nearly all educated young Englishmen. If Mazzini, with his marvellous personality, singleness of purpose and capacity for sweeping people away, often against their saner judgment, fired Swinburne (already since his Oxford days under the influence of "gentle" Aurelio Saffi) and George Meredith—Cavour, "by his great ability—as Mr Hyndman has said—alike as a diplomatist, as an organiser and as an administrator, conquered the confidence of the English middle class." But it was Garibaldi and his Red Shirts that moved the people of England, and largely made it possible for the supporters of Italy publicly to persist in a policy which

met with constant opposition from the Queen, and, as in the famous case of "Hurry Hudson" (Sir W. Hudson), to disobey the instructions of two governments—thereby, as *The Times* then said, fulfilling the wishes of the people of England.

To compare passages from *Vittoria* and *Sandra Belloni* or Swinburne's *Songs before Sunrise* or Hamilton King's *The Disciples* with Byron or Shelley is to see how different and more genuine are these new ideals of freedom, to realise the change that has taken place in the spirit of the time as regards Italy, and to trace in them the influence of Mazzini.

What better example of the passage from the narrow and national to the wide international ideal taught by Mazzini can be found than Mrs Browning's apostrophe to Italy (*Italy and the World*. 1860), "heroic and renovated," drawing mankind to hope in a new future in which nations will put away their foolish sins, and many self-loves will be merged into one centre of Love; when the patriot's desire "to better his land by egotist ventures" will fall into disrepute. Then there will be no more Jew nor Greek,

" But one confederated brotherhood planting,
One flag only, to mark the advance,
Onward and upward, of all humanity."

Notwithstanding the rich harvest of enthusiastic allusion and devotion to the cause of Italian freedom which may be garnered from the works of English poets, novelists, diarists and letter-writers of the period, and although the ideal of "Italy a Nation" is widely spread in the most varied circles, it is primarily romantic and picturesque. The Italian, apart from a handful of individuals, often appears in the garb of a conspirator or a brigand, a person out of a melodrama or, at best,

out of a heroic tragedy. As Bulwer-Lytton wrote to Mrs Baillie-Cochrane after the Roman catastrophe of 1849: "It is the broadest realisation of romance when we find one of the actual heroes of the Middle Ages in the midst of our modern civilisation. Cabrera and Garibaldi are both men who seem to stalk out of history, and it must be strange to find oneself standing face to face with them as if we had conjured up a captain who had fought with the Cid or an enthusiast who had dreamed with Rienzi. Amidst our child's-play between Radicalism and Conservatism there is something vast and grand in those earnest, antiquated types of the rough originals of the contest." And again, Lady Shelley's less sympathetic estimate of Garibaldi as "the leader of the people," "the *condottiere* of the Middle Ages" or "an honest Donald Bean."

It is not unnatural that Garibaldi, a man of action, a chivalrous and handsome figure if ever there was one, should appeal more widely than an ultra-idealist conspirator such as Mazzini. Maybe this was due in part to the survival of the Guy Fawkes prejudice against foreign intriguers, but except for those who came directly under his spell Mazzini was not really popular. Logically enough however, the Englishman appreciated the picturesqueness of the conspirator's figure—at a distance—preferably in novels such as Ruffini's *Lorenzo Benoni*. *Coningsby* and *Lothair* were possibly, to a certain degree, an English edition of the same type, duly modified to suit the national temperament. In any case Mazzini's seer-like personality, and his real or alleged approval of assassination as the *ultima ratio* in countries oppressed by tyrants, alienated many sympathies from him, yet not without some hesitation, as a passage in a Dickens letter of 1860 proves. After referring to the horror of the useless

massacres caused by ineffectual Mazzinian conspiracies, Dickens continues: ". . . again my blood runs hotter at the thought of the lives of the leaders safe and the instruments perishing by the hundreds, yet what is to be done? Their wrongs are so great that they *will* rise from time to time, somehow. . . . And is it not a little hard in us Englishmen, whose fathers have risen so often and striven against so much, to look on, in our security, through microscopes, and detect the motes in the brains of men driven mad? In a parallel position should we be so good? I should not, I am afraid, as I know myself. Such things would make of me a moody, bloodthirsty, implacable man, who would do anything for revenge." Constitutionalism to the middle class seemed jeopardised by Mazzini not by Garibaldi, and both appeared dangerous to professional statesmen, and to Catholics where the integrity of the Temporal Power was concerned. Here again is another picture of the Italian—more frequent in Ireland perhaps—as the rebellious son of the Church, the oppressor and the jailer of the Holy Father, which gave rise to Oscar Wilde's comic and witty-less lines about the Tricolour floating over the Vatican.

But what the æsthete could not understand Lord Acton saw—the real position of the Catholic with Liberal sympathies—and it may be questioned whether many realise to-day the broadmindedness and the courage of his articles, in *The Examiner* and elsewhere, upon this very difficult problem.

The reaction which set in and almost paralysed Italian life in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the weary fight against poverty, the practical difficulties of administering and governing the young nation, and the sense of hopelessness which weighed heavily on the Italians at that time, directly influenced

people in this country. A few—Mr Hyndman amongst them—though disillusioned, appreciated the new, unromantic but no less wonderful, struggle, but the majority sought to find in the past some compensation for the unpoetical present; many even regretted the unification of Italy. The tourist attitude prevailed. English historians, such as Trevelyan, Bolton King, Okey, writing about Italy tried to gloze over the present or, unfavourably comparing it with the heroic past, found it unworthy. But their judgment is certainly coloured by romantic liberalism. The truth is that the study of this period was more suited to an unbiased, scientific student of political economy than to an idealistic historian.

Meanwhile the Italians continued to be legendary, although slightly frayed and tarnished figures; the modern Italian however had yet to be conceived and realised, much less understood or appreciated. Politeness, good looks, a certain Don-Juan-like dash, artistic and social qualities to be found in any cosmopolitan society, be it in Rome or in London, made him personally acceptable, but scarcely trustworthy or an equal, quite apart from other unfortunate but not always undeserved criticism, due to traits exhibited not by Italian emigrants alone. This last disability however was shared with other Latin races.

On the other hand, there were in England and in Italy some—Edmund Gardner, Vernon Lee, Janet Ross, Helen Zimmern—who could and did appreciate the virtues as well as deprecate the errors of the new Italian. But the smouldering feeling of disappointment over the unpicturesqueness of modern Italy (covering disapproval of her foreign policy) was fanned into flame by the Libyan campaign of 1911. Even to-day, after the war, few can look at Italy from the Italian stand-

point, or at least accept it at her own valuation, and realise that the qualities they loved and admired in the country and in its inhabitants, in the past, have not been swept away but developed. Obvious though it may be, the link between the Italian of the past and the Italian of the present has never been broken, even during the periods of the worst apathy and slavery, although this truth often clashes with preconceived and largely false ideals. The "legacy of Rome" has been handed down and carried on, and it is something deeper, more intimate and far-reaching than a dead literary convention.

To-day many sincere friends of Italy smile indulgently or bitterly because of D'Annunzio or Mussolini. Often they express the fear that Italy will be modernised out of all recognition. But are they not thinking all the time of Italy as something immovable, unchanging, like a beautiful landscape or a creature of their imagination, rather than of a living Italy made up of men and women like themselves—a nation?

It must be admitted quite frankly that the Italian of to-day is still somewhat of an enigma. Englishmen are unable, as yet, to visualise him, except romantically, in a Garibaldian red shirt, but never—although some may affect to do so—in a Fascist black one. There is something too dramatically sombre—apart from any political implication—about the latter which reminds them of Captain Silver, although it might be added, with some truth, that Dickens's plea, for a milder judgment, could wisely be applied, with due modifications, in appraising some aspects of contemporary Italian life. So strong indeed is this tendency to idealisation that Marinetti's "destructionism," by the intellectuals at least, has been converted into something poetic, despite the fact that, on the surface, Futurism appears to be quite the reverse.

Nor does this refer to persons of the older generation alone, brought up on the Mazzini-Garibaldi tradition. Many young writers of to-day in England, who pride themselves on their hatred of prettiness and idealism, and set out to "understand" contemporary Italy, try to out-Herod Herod, while really they are trying at heart to deceive themselves into exalting what no Italian himself would dream of, and are romancing as much as their elders, but with less sincerity.

It must be Italy's "fatal gift of beauty" which blinds so many to what is real and sincere in the modern nation. But if this be a singular tribute to her powers, it also does lead them to misinterpret the history of her development as well as the significance for the world of the Italian Risorgimento.

ARUNDELL DEL RE.

OXFORD, *February* 1925.

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THE MAKING OF MODERN ITALY (1814-1918)

CHAPTER I

THE RESTORATION IN ITALY AND THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS (1814-1831)

Value of the History of the Italian Risorgimento

AFTER long centuries of dismemberment and foreign domination, through internal revolutions and international events, which can partly be ascribed to the ultimate result of distant and natural tendencies, and partly to extraordinary circumstances of an almost miraculous character, Italy became, during the course of the nineteenth century, a united and independent nation.

Possessing a clearly defined national territory, enclosed by the Alps and by three seas, Italy, long before the end of the Middle Ages, notwithstanding division into separate kingdoms and principalities, had revealed the maturity of her national elements—race, language, traditions, customs, laws, religion—and, partially, of her national consciousness. But through an error not unknown in the history of the peninsula, she had become incapable of any military defence, whereas about her the great nations of Western and Central Europe—Spain, France, Austria, England—less civilised but militarily well organised and powerful, had been founded and consolidated themselves. Thus Italy had suffered invasion, and became the battlefield of European rivalries, while her territory suffered the

terrible havoc wrought by misuse and foreign wars fought on her soil.

The changes introduced by the Napoleonic era, by overturning the old governments and creating vast territorial *nuclei*, had, however, been of service ; for although the old foreign yoke was replaced by a new one, they reawakened in Italy the desire for political liberty, strengthened the dormant energies of the race, renewed and extended the advantages of public education and, above all, made military virtues known and appreciated. But with the fall of Napoleonic despotism, which had threatened the existence and freedom of all the nations of Europe, Italy had been split up once more among her old rulers, under the strict supervision of the Holy Alliance controlled by Austria. Nor would it, perhaps, have been easy to regain independence and unity had it not been for the national revolution prepared by thinkers and martyrs, and for the successful wars of independence which, taking advantage of certain favourable contingencies in European affairs, suddenly shook and brought down the clever and many-sided edifice of the Holy Alliance. The new and powerful element in the balance of Europe thus created, was in its turn, at no very distant future, to help to save Europe from the threat of a new and more terrible despotism.

The history of the Italian Risorgimento is the history of the unification of the most ancient and perhaps, at least in an ideal sense, the noblest among European nations. It is the record of those astonishing events which have led to Italian unity and national freedom ; it affords a typical example of the causes through which a nation may lose and regain her liberty, and at the same time it is a solemn and convincing affirmation of the rights of nationality in the system of balance

between European states. Thus it has a very considerable educational value in so far as it makes us appreciate the importance of civil liberties, and it helps us to realise that international justice is a necessity.

Italy and the Fall of Napoleon

The foolhardy Russian campaign provoked by the overweening pride of the conqueror of Europe had badly shaken the vacillating foundations of the Napoleonic Empire. The Great Powers were reacting against the despot who had so many times down-trodden the liberty of states. The sudden revolt of Prussia and the cunning support of Austria swelled the forces of England and Russia. Napoleon, beaten at Leipzig (October 16th-18th, 1813), was surrounded and beaten at Paris and deposed (April 2nd, 1814).

Italy, who throughout the varied fortunes of French domination had felt the breath of liberty, hoisted the tricolour (January 5th, 1797). For a few years there had been a magnificent outburst of enthusiasm for public works, for legislation, for commerce, and for civil and military organisation. At what might, however, have been perhaps the propitious moment offered by that great cataclysm she was not able, or did not know how, resolutely to strike out a course of her own.

It is well known that the Napoleonic regime had substituted a much simpler organisation for the divisions created by the old rulers. Italy thus had only three governments. Besides the western provinces (Piedmont, Liguria, Tuscany and Rome), which were divided into departments directly subject to France, two great territorial units with independent organisation had been formed—namely, the Kingdom of Italy, stretching from the Sesia and Botzen to the Isonzo, to the

Apennines and to the river Tronto, with Milan for its capital, under the governorship of a Viceroy, Prince Eugène; and the Kingdom of Naples, which included the whole of southern Italy, under Joachim Murat. Of these two princes the latter, in order to try to keep his kingdom, betrayed his master and allied himself with the enemies of Napoleon, while the former, although possessing a brave army, hesitated and delayed to act. The Italians, tired of the long Napoleonic wars and unprepared perhaps for the great idea of independence, allowed old party antagonism to spring up again, protested against and accused their rulers, showing clearly that they preferred their new masters, and with their own hands undid what good the foreigner had done for them. The *Italici*—that is, the Italian patriots anxious for freedom—and the *Austriacanti*, or reactionaries, who were cleverly working in secret, united in a popular insurrection in Milan (April 20th, 1814) against Eugène Beauharnais. Thus Austria was able to re-enter Milan under the guise of a liberator, to abolish successively every form of liberty and to remove the badges of the national Italian army. As to Murat, he was paid back by the Allies with treachery. First he had returned to Napoleon, who in the meantime had attempted his "Hundred Days" exploit, but again changing his policy he collected an army of Neapolitans and Italians and published a proclamation at Rimini in which he appealed for unity and independence and declared war against Austria (March 30th, 1815). But the Italians, either suspicious or disillusioned, hesitated and failed to answer the call, while the army, forced to retire, was completely defeated (March 1st, 1815). At the same time Napoleon's career was stopped for ever at Waterloo, and the last desperate attempt

made by the Prince of Calabria was quenched in blood (October 13th, 1815).

Italy, exhausted by Napoleonic agitations and unable to obtain a free government, found peace—but it was the peace of the grave. The old princes returned to their thrones, joyfully welcomed by their friends of the old regime and by the populace, which was glad to protest against the long French oppression. But a new yoke, that of Austria, far worse than the preceding one, was laid on the peninsula, weighing no less heavily on the necks of its enemies than on those of its friends, of the masses, and of the middle classes.

Having overthrown the empire of Napoleon, the rulers of the Great Powers met at Vienna to carry out, as Prince Metternich, the Austrian minister, expressed it, a work of pacification in the interests of “civilisation and law.” As a matter of fact the Great Powers, fearing revolution and wishing to restore things to the conditions existing before 1789, could only conceive a policy of foolish reaction. In their apparent wish for balance and peace they considered only the interests of the princes, forgetting the aspirations and the needs of the peoples. Vanquished France was reduced to her ancient boundaries and strictly controlled as an element dangerous to European peace. Austria, Russia and Prussia, all of whom were under an absolutist form of government, divided among themselves the spoils of the Napoleonic Empire by a system of mutual concessions and compensations, regardless of the character or of the desires of the peoples concerned. At the same time the sovereigns pledged themselves to support each other peacefully to preserve the newly-established order, and to watch and fight liberal ideas—in other words, they promised armed intervention should any revolution take place within their respective states.

This was the complete triumph of the despotic principle of government, and it was desired in the name of peace that these arbitrary measures should be given a guarantee of stability.

The Restoration in Italy

The programme of the Congress of Vienna implicitly contained the determination to establish the *status quo* before 1789, with a view to reinstating the principle of right "downtrodden by the violence of the revolution and by the tyranny of Napoleon." The princes therefore, who had been chased from their thrones by the Revolution, were to come back by virtue of the principle of legitimacy and to be recognised by the governments. This decision however found itself in direct opposition to the desire to give Europe a new balance of power, to ensure social peace by means of absolutism and to build a strong barrier against France. The ancient republics of Venice, of Genoa, and of Lucca, which had names and constitutions terrifying to reactionary principles, were accordingly not re-established and Austria, having become the guardian of European equilibrium and peace, got Lombardy and Venice, and the right to keep garrisons in some towns of the duchy of Parma and in the "legations" of Ferrara and Ravenna, while the King of Sardinia, who occupied the Alpine frontiers of France and deserved to be rewarded for his fidelity to the cause of legitimacy, received Genoa in addition to his old possessions (Sardinia, Piedmont, Nice and Savoy). The other princes, for the most part, returned to their old dominions. At Modena the succession fell to Francis IV. of Austria-Este. Ferdinand III. of Lorraine, who was reputed to be tolerant and mild,

returned to Florence. Pius VII., the old Pontiff who had suffered considerably at the hands of Napoleon, returned to Rome, while Ferdinand IV. of Bourbon remained in Naples. The Archduchess Marie Louise, wife of Napoleon, was given the duchy of Parma and Piacenza, but in 1816 it was agreed that at her death it should revert to its ancient sovereigns—the Bourbons of Parma—who in the meanwhile gained the newly constituted duchy of Lucca.

The greater part of these princes on their return to power hurriedly abolished all French laws and ordinances and set everything back in its original place, as if to carry on the traditions destroyed by the French Revolution. Victor Emmanuel I., King of Sardinia, by edict (May 14th, 1814) abolished all French laws and reinstated the Royal constitutions of 1770 and the provisions previous to 1800, which to a great extent were feudal in character. Likewise Francis IV. of Modena reverted to the constitutions of 1711 and to the old forms of government, while in Tuscany and in the Papal States Ferdinand and Pius VII. respectively gave the old laws back to their subjects. If in Parma and in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies new laws were given, the policy and the form of government belonged to the *ancien régime*. It seemed as if the twenty years of revolution and Napoleonic conquest, which had been among the most moving and solemn of modern history and had rendered incalculable services to the people, were to leave no trace in Italy. Actually, as we shall see later, that return to the past was only a vain effort, and the spirit of the restoration in Italy, no less than in the greater part of the European nations, was to be almost wholly overshadowed by the logic of the Revolution.

The main result of the Congress of Vienna, as far as

Italy was concerned, had been to establish the absolute predominance of Austria. It had given this nation direct control of Lombardy and Venetia, two of the richest and most populated regions of the peninsula, while the remaining provinces, skilfully divided up in the name of an unfortunate past and open without protest to Austrian intervention, were more or less directly tied to Austria. Austrian archdukes or princes occupied the thrones of Parma, Modena and Tuscany; the Bourbons in Naples took their cue from Vienna or Laibach; and the Papal States had Austrian garrisons at strategic points of the frontier. Only the House of Savoy, although almost an ally of Austria, could still look back upon a tradition of independence, but all her dominions, including desolate Sardinia, did not form a tenth part of the great ancient Austrian Empire.

The Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia

At this moment Austrian hegemony had reached its zenith. Austria had an unbroken territory extending from the Valtellina to Galicia, from Dalmatia to Bohemia, with a population of over 30,000,000, equal to that of France and far superior to that of England or Spain at that time. Her mighty economic resources—she derived annually 80,000,000 lire from taxation alone—and wise administration, built up by a long tradition of careful government, had allowed her, even after having lost over 300,000 men in the campaigns against France, to call up 500,000 soldiers during the last Napoleonic wars. Later, about 1848, with the increase of wealth and population, she could maintain an army of 300,000 men on a peace footing and could

raise it without delay into an army of more than double that number in case of war.

Into the hands of this power Lombardy and Venetia, the two best provinces, had fallen. These, which represented together over a sixth of the whole of Italy, were hemmed in on one side by Austrian dominions and controlled by the roads leading to Trent and to the coast of Trieste. Some Italian patriots, tired of French oppression and attracted by the promises made by Austrian generals who perfidiously invoked the rights of the "Italian Nation," had hoped to preserve an independent kingdom with a constitutional government, but were soon disillusioned. The Austrian Government gave these provinces the title of the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, with a viceroy at Milan and two central assemblies, one at Milan and the other at Venice; actually, policy and administration were directed from Vienna, or, to be more precise, by Metternich. The assemblies were directly nominated by the Emperor, had merely the semblance of a constitution and hardly ever took action. The Austrian code of laws was established; a severe police regime was at once started; the men called to the colours were sent across the Alps, and Italy was garrisoned by German, Hungarian and Croatian troops. Wise government and honest administration were responsible for a certain degree of material prosperity, and there was also some increase in the population, which from 4,250,000 in 1825 rose to 5,500,000 in 1855. Attention should however be drawn to the fact that the money acquired through taxation only partially remained in the country, whereas over 60,000,000 of it was sent yearly from Lombardy-Venetia to fill the state coffers at Vienna, or was used to defray the general expenses of the Empire, not counting the

money derived from expropriations and from the works of art which were sent to Vienna. It is safe therefore to affirm that the prosperity of these provinces would have been far greater had not the removal of wealth and men intervened to impoverish them. Such was the reverse of the medal.

The Duchies of Central Italy and the Papal States

A few words will be sufficient to characterise the lesser Italian states more or less directly under Austrian domination. These were so small and so closed in that they could have little importance either economically or militarily. The duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, and of Modena, Reggio and Massa-Carrara, were each about as large as one of the present provinces of Piedmont, with a population, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, of about 30,000, "mere nutshells" as Giusti called one of them. Still smaller and less important was the duchy of Lucca which disappeared in 1847, when it was incorporated once more into Tuscany. As to the grand duchy of Tuscany, though not so large as Lombardy and correspondingly flourishing as a result of the ancient civilisation of this region, its population was small, less than 1,500,000, so that not needing an army it had no security or desire for anything better. The Austrian archdukes who governed it knew they could always count upon Austria, and therefore allowed a certain tolerance which tended to enervate its inhabitants.

The Papal States on the other hand were more alive; they embraced a vast territory stretching from Ferrara to Ascoli-Piceno and Rome, twice as large again as Tuscany, with a population of 2,500,000. Here the Revolution had, for a few years, swept away the

obscurantist government of priests and feudal lords. The reaction tried to reinstate the *status quo* but met with opposition and conspiracies. The population and wealth had grown with the increase of commercial development, especially in the Adriatic zone, so that the strict restoration policy had to be slightly modified. The state however lacked any military forces (there were only 20,000 troops for the keeping of order within the state), while Austria had the right to keep garrisons at Ferrara and at Ravenna.

The Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Two Sicilies

There were only two states in Italy which had any real solidity : these were the Kingdom of Sardinia on one side and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies on the other. The Kingdom of Sardinia was formed by Piedmont with Nice and Genoa and the island of Sardinia ; it had a territory almost three times that of Lombardy and Tuscany, and a population of almost 4,000,000, with a regular army of 50,000 men which in war time could be doubled. Having grown up slowly during the struggles between France, Spain and Austria, amidst continual warfare, it had learnt to appreciate the value of independence as a condition necessary to the development of its energies, and had firmly disciplined its army and its administration. In the gravest moments of national danger, when the slightest sign of weariness or anger would have been sufficient to ruin it, it had not hesitated to sacrifice men, money and policy. Thus by bloodshed it had settled the problem of its boundaries with France and had reached the crest of the Alps, continually extending its territory and increasing its economic and military strength. When the provinces of the mainland had been overrun by

the Revolution it had withdrawn itself into its great island, behind a mighty bulwark, suffering in silence the yoke of foreign oppression. The Restoration had made it the keystone of the new readjustment of Europe, using it almost as an outpost against France, and adding to it on this account the territory of Genoa, thus noticeably increasing its strength on land as well as by sea. Notwithstanding this, however, it was still ten times smaller and less powerful than Austria. Having recovered its independence and embraced the rôle of anti-French state, it is not to be wondered at that at first it indulged in reactionary tendencies. Legitimacy seemed the basis of the rights of the state, and the best-educated classes of society, jealous of their independence as well as for other reasons, strongly supported legitimacy. But although the Restoration was desired, the policy of its rulers was not just blindly reactionary. Soon, owing in part to rapid economic development, liberal tendencies reappeared, and found there later a favourable base from which to organise the revolt of the peninsula.

This was the largest of the Italian states, since it covered more than one-third of the whole of Italy and had a population of over 7,500,000 inhabitants. But although for centuries it had formed a compact body, more or less formally divided between the continent¹ and Sicily, it had had in the past a very depressing history and a corrupt administration. The brief French domination on the mainland, which removed the feudal system, improved the army and favoured industry in the cities, had carried with it very considerable benefits and ideas of freedom had made rapid progress there. Nor had Sicily, which on account of its favourable

¹ *Continent* here, as elsewhere, refers to the mainland of the peninsula as opposed to the islands.

position preserved a certain degree of commercial prosperity and political autonomy, lagged behind. But the Restoration placed on the throne the worst of dynasties, that of the Bourbons, and a cowardly and abject prince, Ferdinand II., who, not understanding the new times, could think of no better policy than that of binding himself closely to Austria, even at the cost of being disloyal to the constitution. He neglected the army however: and instead of keeping up, as he might, one of almost 100,000 men, he reduced it to less than half that amount. He also neglected industrial and commercial development. Thus a vast and noble-spirited country, rich in energy and intelligence, found its progress hindered by its bad government.

Secret Societies : The " Carboneria "

The Restoration had attempted to counteract Revolutionary institutions by reviving the old regime: it had substituted divine for natural right, legitimacy for popular sovereignty, the rights of a state for the rights of the individual, authority and order for freedom. But such a return to the past was impossible. Society had profoundly changed during the eighteenth century, and could not, after the shock of the Revolution, renounce its new conquests even for the sake of peace. The rulers on the other hand, allied with the clergy and the nobles, had reinstated the Inquisition and the public executioner, rigorous disciplinary measures and police espionage. The middle classes, which had increased in number and in power, had asked for peace and instead had been given despotism and obscurantism. Prevented from free and open discussion, they carried on the tradition inherited from the past, and

met together secretly to plot against their oppressors and prepare the way for freedom.

Freemasonry, which had been imported from France and England, was already widespread in Italy during the eighteenth century; but this association, which during the Napoleonic age had been protected, soon degenerated and became almost a weapon in the hands of the police. It was therefore replaced by other secret societies, with no longer a vague philanthropic aim but a definite political one—the struggle for liberty.

Of all these secret societies the most important was the *Carboneria*, which, as it was said, was at that time merely a kind of reformed Masonry, with its headquarters in Paris and *vendite* or centres throughout most of the European states. In Italy it had spread since Napoleonic days, but it had found the greatest favour in Southern Italy, under the reign of Joachim Murat, when it assumed a more marked political character as an organ for the defence of individual rights against the despotism of the Government. After the Restoration—especially in the cities—all who wanted independence, no less than all the malcontents, consisting mainly of soldiers belonging to the Napoleonic army, who in Piedmont, in Lombardy and in the Neapolitan provinces had been degraded or demobilised, joined it.

Since 1816 the Italian *Carboneria* had included in its constitution the following motto, which summed up the national programme of unification—"Unity, Liberty, Independence." It differed however in the various countries, and where the central organisation was weak it had taken other forms, upholding various programmes. Thus other groups more or less political or religious had arisen, such as the *Federati* in Piedmont, the *Guelfi* and *Adelfi* in Romagna and elsewhere. In

opposition to these, and in defence of the reactionary governments yet other secret societies had been formed, with a more marked Catholic tendency, such as the *Sanfedisti*, the *Conciliatoristi*, the *Congregazionisti*. But all of them more or less sincerely, at least at their inception, professed to desire the freedom of the Italian states from the foreign yoke.

Revolutionary Movements in Naples and Sicily, 1820-1821

The regime of the Restoration had lasted barely six years and discontent was already preparing a revolution throughout Western Europe. Where police measures were inadequate or not sufficiently prompt, disorders had already broken out as far back as 1820. In Spain the absolute monarch was forced to grant the Constitution of 1812, and immediately afterwards the revolt broke out in the Neapolitan provinces, where the *Carboneria* was widely spread. On the 2nd of July 1820 a group of soldiers, commanded by two lieutenants, Morelli and Silvati, belonging to the *Carboneria*, left Nola and marched towards Avellino crying: "Long live God, the King and the Constitution!" Here the insurgents soon received reinforcements and support from various provinces, and on the night of the 5th of July, when General Guglielmo Pepe, with a whole brigade from Naples, placed himself at their head, formed a corps of 12,000 soldiers. King Ferdinand, frightened and surprised by the insurrection, solemnly declared to the people that he would, of his own free will, grant a constitution, without however stating its character. At the same time, adducing reasons of health, he withdrew from the government and entrusted the regency to his son, Francis. But the people, distrusting the dynasty, would not have

any delay, and loudly clamoured for the immediate promulgation of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which was granted by the Regent, while the King subsequently solemnly swore on the Gospels to uphold it. Meanwhile the news of the Neapolitan insurrection had provoked great ferment in Sicily. The island possessed a remote tradition of autonomy and had not fallen under French domination, and in 1812 had been given its own parliamentary constitution. Hence it ill tolerated the *coup d'état* by which the Bourbon dynasty, in order to unify the kingdom and to reduce the island to the state of a province subject to the absolute monarch residing in Naples, had abolished the constitution, and in 1816 proclaimed the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Sicily therefore took the opportunity offered by the Neapolitan revolution and rose demanding the re-establishment of the constitution. It was a real separatist movement, very inopportune, which added to the difficulties of the new Neapolitan government and forced it to send a military expedition against the rebel forces. When, later, a convention was agreed upon, it was not ratified by the Parliament, members of which were for the majority suspicious doctrinaires, while the country was hardly ready for a constitutional regime.

Meanwhile a storm was brewing elsewhere which was soon to defeat the liberal tendencies of the southern kingdom. The Neapolitan movement was disturbing the quiet despotism guaranteed by Austria. Prince Metternich called together the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance at Vienna and invited King Ferdinand to attend. The King asked Parliament for permission to do so, assuring them that he would plead the cause of the constitution (December 5th). Once arrived at Laibach he revealed himself in his true colours and asked for

help against the revolutionaries. Austria readily granted him an army to put him back on the throne and to restore absolute government.

This serious menace, however, was not sufficient to convince the Government and the *Carboneria* that it was necessary to take resolute action. The Regent succeeded in making them believe that the King had been overruled and that the constitution desired by the citizens had nothing to fear from the King or from his viceroy. The *Carbonari*, protesting the purity of their intentions, continued to hope that Papal neutrality would be preserved, and wasted time in academic discussions and in partial measures. When the menace became imminent an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men was mobilised and divided into two army corps under the command of rival generals, neither of whom had any fixed plan of action. The Austrians crossed the Po at the end of January 1821 and slowly advanced southwards, unscrupulously violating Papal neutrality, practically without protest. General Pepe, who held the line of the Abruzzi, crossed the frontier and attacked the Austrian troops at Rieti but was defeated on the 7th of March. The rest of the army disbanded, while the troops garrisoned in Naples declared themselves for absolutism, and the Austrians entered Naples on the 25th of March 1821. The rulers cast away all hypocritical pretence at constitutional sympathies, and nothing further remained to be done except for the police to punish severely the ringleaders of the movement and to persecute all who were suspected of liberal ideas.

Revolutionary Movements in Piedmont in 1821

Three days after Pepe's defeat at Rieti a revolution broke out in Piedmont. Here also it was due to the

Carboneria, and though it came as a result of the Neapolitan affair it was not directly connected with it. The Piedmontese *Carbonari*, who called themselves *Federati*, mainly belonged to the rich and cultured classes or to the army, all of whom were contrary to the reactionary policy of the government and its acquiescence to Austria. They had close relations with the conspirators of Lombardy and Romagna who were anxious for liberty and hated the Austrian yoke. But the Piedmontese movement derived its greatest importance from the part played in it by Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano and heir to the throne. Although not himself a member of the *Carboneria* he had intimate friends among some of the best and most active *Federati*, such as Santa Rosa, Provana di Collegno, Moffa di Lisio. As an admirer of the new liberal and romantic literary tendencies he ardently desired the freedom of Italy and hated Austrian domination.

The conspirators, trusting in the Prince's adhesion to the cause, organised the movement, especially among the army, but when all was ready the Prince hesitated and dissuaded them from the insurrection. But it was too late. During the night of the 9th-10th of March 1821 the Constitutionals rose, first at Alessandria, then at Fossano, at Casale, at Pinerolo, and finally in the citadel of Turin, upon which they hoisted the Italian tricolour. No one threatened the King or the dynasty, but the constitution was demanded, together with war against Austria while that country was busy in the Neapolitan provinces. King Victor Emmanuel I., surprised by the insurrection and incapable of governing, preferred to abdicate in favour of his brother, Charles Felix, and since that prince was then at Modena he entrusted the regency

to his nephew, Charles Albert. This took place on the 13th of March.

On the following day, at Turin, the crowd before the royal palace loudly asked for the Spanish Constitution, which Charles Albert granted, reserving the assent of the absent King. Charles Felix however, from Modena, signified his disapproval, ordered Charles Albert to leave the regency and the state and, at the same time, asked the troops who had remained faithful to gather together at Novara. Charles Albert in the face of these violent orders withdrew, and was on this account accused by the liberals of treachery. Charles Felix, calling for the support of an Austrian army, moved against the revolutionaries who, though few in number and abandoned by many, bravely decided to fight to the last, but on the 8th of April they were routed at Novara. A few days later the new King entered Turin, and the Government proceeded to take severe police measures; many of the patriots went into exile, amongst whom was Santorre di Santa Rosa, who shortly afterwards died fighting for the independence of Greece.

Meanwhile in Milan the Austrian reaction had made the foreign yoke insufferable. Writers and scientists kept Italian feeling alive and covertly proclaimed the need for free institutions. In 1818 the first number of the *Conciliatore* appeared, and in 1819 Silvio Pellico's tragedy, *Francesca da Rimini*, containing his famous invocation to Italy, was performed in Milan. At the same time Confalonieri and Porro opened the first free schools for the people. In a soil so eminently favourable to conspiracies the *Carboneria* soon took root. In 1819, at Fratte, in the Polesine, the Austrian police discovered a plot, organised by the *Carbonari* and connected with the Neapolitan secret societies. Shortly afterwards an imprudent letter from Maroncelli—

who had come from Forlì to Milan and had at once made close friends with numerous Lombard and Piedmontese *Federati*—set the police on the track of a vast conspiracy of *Carbonari*, and gave rise to a whole chain of arrests and trials. Maroncelli was arrested on the 7th of October, Pellico on the 13th, followed by numerous others. Shortly afterwards the discovery of an agreement between the Lombard patriots and the Piedmontese revolutionaries led to the arrest of Confalonieri, Francesco Arese and others. The Austrian inquisition—further perfected by a system of secret procedure, by which Baron Antonio Salvotti made himself famous—and the singular taste of the Emperor Francis I. for the systematic persecution of political offenders, accomplished the rest. The gloomy walls of the Spielberg, the prisons of Laibach, Mantua and Venice were filled with patriots guilty only of having loved their country and of having sworn to free her. It was under the walls of the Spielberg that the silent tragedy of the unhappy wife of Confalonieri, Teresa Casati, took place. After having gone to Vienna in the heart of the winter to beg the Emperor for the life of her husband, condemned to death, and having obtained the commutation of his sentence to that of solitary confinement, she returned to Milan in an agony of anxiety lest she should not arrive in time to prevent his execution, and subsequently lived the rest of her life near the castle, content at being able at least to gaze upon those walls within which her husband was entombed in a living death.

Revolutionary Movements in Central Italy, 1821–1831

The Austrian prosecutions against the *Carbonari* opened an era of persecution and reaction throughout

the Italian states. Austria had set the example which was followed by Charles Felix in Piedmont, Francis IV. at Modena, Cardinal Rivarola in Romagna, the Prince of Carroza in the Kingdom of Naples, who became the tools of a fierce political vendetta. Numerous martyrs lost their lives on the scaffold; many languished in prison or had to flee into exile. It is calculated that during this period Austria alone tried 1500 persons, of whom 55 were executed and the greater part were sentenced to solitary confinement for life or to the galleys. Over 4000 were the victims of the perjury and cruelty of the Bourbons. These events on the other hand revealed Austria to be the arbiter of Europe and the ever-watchful instrument of repression of every expression of freedom in or outside Italy. The congresses of European sovereigns at Carlsbad in 1819, at Troppau in 1820, at Laibach in 1821 and at Verona in 1822 had proved that Austria was ready and determined to intervene in the name of public peace against every revolutionary agitation, and this fact forced silence and bondage upon all lovers of freedom.

Nothing could have disturbed the quiet stagnation of reaction, protected by the police and enforced by the fear of the scaffold, had not a popular revolution broken out in France in July 1830, which suddenly overturned the absolute monarchy and set up a liberal monarchy under Louis Philippe who, at first, appeared as the upholder of liberal ideals in Europe. Moreover the promises made by the French liberals, who were bound by many ties of friendship to the secret sects in Italy, and the declaration made by the new Government to the effect that France would use if needs be the principle of non-intervention against Austria—*i.e.* the duty of all states, including Austria herself, of

abstaining from intervention in domestic affairs of other states—raised the hopes of the Italian conspirators.

To the peoples concerned this appeared as a kind of promise of freedom of action. The conspirators in the Duchies and in the Papal States, where the need of reform was greatest, decided to take advantage of it. At Modena a strange alliance had taken place between the *Carbonari* and the *Conciliatoristi*. The Duke, Francis IV., an ambitious prince devoid of moral scruples—although bound to the latter—had succeeded in gaining the confidence of some of the former, and principally that of Enrico Misley and of Ciro Menotti, and secretly declared himself ready to lead a movement aiming at the constitution of a strong and independent state in Central and Northern Italy. Such a declaration had given Menotti considerable freedom of action, and allowed him to work with the *Carbonari* in Romagna and to prepare a revolution, which was to have broken out on the 5th of February. Francis IV., however, either doubtful of the support of France or because he had found out that Austria had discovered his intrigues, betrayed his friends, and while Menotti, suspecting the Duke, had decided to start the revolution on the 4th, the latter, on the night of the 3rd, attacked the house of Menotti in Modena, where the conspirators were assembled, with strong forces, and sent them to prison. The following day, however, having heard of the insurrection at Bologna, and frightened by the course of events, he fled to Mantua, taking with him Menotti, and placed himself under the protection of Austria. Meanwhile the revolution had broken out at Bologna, where the reactionary policy had been so drastic that it had caused the Government to be hated not only by the members of the revolutionary sects but also by peace-

loving citizens. Thus when, after the death of Pope Pius VIII., owing to a long Conclave, the Papal throne remained unoccupied for a considerable period of time, the inhabitants of Bologna, in concert with the conspirators at Modena and Reggio, rose on the night of the 3rd of February and without any bloodshed established a provisional government and hoisted the tricolour flag. The revolt spread at once through all the Papal States, from Bologna to Ferrara and into the Romagna, the Marches and Umbria. Amid great festivities a government was formed, under the name of Government of the United Provinces, which declared the temporal dominion of the Pope at an end, called an assembly of all the provinces at Bologna (February 26th), nominated committees to elect representatives, organised an army and introduced several new reforms into the state.

All this, however, was but a fragile and improvised edifice, founded merely on the ingenuous hope that France would have prevented, if necessary by force of arms, the intervention of Austria. Austria, on the contrary, playing on the fears of Louis Philippe by setting up the scarecrow of a Bonapartist restoration, ably succeeded in overcoming the liberal tendencies of the new French monarchy. After some uncertainty, on the 17th of March 1831, Casimir Périer declared in Parliament that the French Government, respecting the principle of non-intervention, would not "carry French arms where this principle was not respected."

This marked the destruction of all the hopes—to say the least illusory—of the Italian liberals, and amounted to granting Austria permission to act. She had not indeed awaited this official declaration. The Austrian army had crossed the Po between the 6th and 13th of March and, after occupying the province of Modena,

and giving Parma once more into the possession of the Archduchess Marie Louise, advanced towards the Romagna. Bologna was occupied on the 21st of March, but the Government of the United Provinces, strangely persisting in the hope of French help, withdrew to Ancona, but, unsuccessfully supported by the volunteer legions under the command of General Zucchi, was forced to capitulate on the 26th of March.

The revolution in Central Italy had lasted only fifty days, and had for its epilogue the treacherous capture, in the Adriatic, of Zucchi and many volunteers who were fleeing into exile, and the execution of *Ciro Menotti* and of *Vincenzo Borelli*, one of his followers, at Modena, on the 26th of May. This brief revolution had revealed however a deep-rooted social movement. If in 1821 only a small class of soldiers and civil servants, intolerant of reaction and in relatively restricted centres, had taken part in the revolts at Naples and in Piedmont, all social classes, and principally the citizen classes, had taken part in those of Modena and Romagna, thus showing that the germs of national independence were already ripe.

CHAPTER II

FROM MAZZINI TO GIOBERTI: REVOLUTION
versus REFORM (1831-1847)

Mazzini and "La Giovine Italia"

UP to this time, Italian movements had lacked leadership and driving power. *Carbonari* plots burst out here and there, without any real organisation, or any particular programme; they relied chiefly on native or foreign sovereigns, without taking into account the imperative and growing strength of a people made conscious of its rights. To find a remedy for these deficiencies was the task Giuseppe Mazzini set himself.

He was born at Genoa, on June the 22nd, 1805. Sensitive by nature, his mother instilled in him religious feeling, while his father, who was a doctor, imbued him with liberal ideas. At the age of sixteen he experienced his first deep, unforgettable feeling of love for his country. One Sunday in April 1821, he was walking with his mother and an old family friend through one of the streets of Genoa when, among the Piedmontese fugitives who were crowding to the port in order to find safety in exile, he saw, coming towards him, a man of stern countenance, who, holding out his hand, said these words: "For the Italian refugees." That day, as he wrote later on, a thought rose confusedly in his mind, "I will not say of patriotism and liberty, but a thought that one could, nay should, fight for the freedom of one's native land." The idea became an article of faith, and to this faith he consecrated his whole life.

He was initiated into the *Carboneria* in 1827; then

he became a university student, and soon fell under suspicion on account of his correspondence and his essays in literary criticism which had a political undercurrent. He was arrested in 1830 and imprisoned at Savona, but proofs of his guilt were lacking, and he was set free on the 2nd of February 1831, but obliged to go into exile.

Soon after, in 1832, Mazzini founded at Marseilles a new society, "Young Italy," with the idea of avoiding the theoretical and practical mistakes of the *Carboneria* and of rousing the dormant powers of the nation. The programme of the new society contained the whole essence of the ideas which Mazzini had been working out in meditation and study and which for many years were to inspire his vigorous writings and actions. These ideas were at once mystical and democratic; they were founded on the motto, "God and the People," through which the religious sentiment of the time was raised to the level of a sublime moral inspiration, governed by laws not of this world; according to which the civil rights of all men ought to be recognised and everyone should be brought up ready to make any sacrifice in the supreme interests of the nation and of humanity. For Italy, which he thought of as a chosen nation, because of its civilisation and of the spirit of justice of its people, he demanded "Unity and a Republic." Unity, because the union of all the scattered parts of the nation was intended by nature, by tradition, by popular feeling, and was the only means of overcoming ancient and present rivalries between the different parts of the peninsula, and of building up a strong organism, capable of a life of its own; a republic, because this form of government was the simplest and expressed more closely the will of the people. To achieve these ideals he required the fusion

of "Thought and Action." He demanded, in order to attain this ideal, absolute, immediate and genuine harmony between the inspiring idea, derived from a profound knowledge of the needs of the people, and action—that is, practical activity—watchful, untiring, capable of any sacrifice. Realising however that the question of the form of government was not an essential one at the moment, he declared himself willing to subordinate his idea of a republic to the ideal of unity.

"Young Italy" spread rapidly among the younger men, inspiring a new spirit of revolution, and provoking insurrections on the one side and repression on the other. In 1831 Charles Albert ascended the throne of Piedmont. He was convinced, after the unfortunate revolution of 1821, that above all his state needed discipline and peaceful development, not disturbances and contentions. Nevertheless, the new society gained numerous followers in Piedmont among the army and navy, but they were soon discovered and severely dealt with at the trials held at Chambéry, Genoa and Alessandria (June 1833). When Mazzini, deeply moved by the fate of his friends, made a bold attempt from Savoy to get into Piedmont and stir up a revolution (1834), he found the Government ready to repress it and the desperate enterprise failed miserably, causing new and severe penalties. Mazzini had also many adherents in Lombardy-Venetia and in Romagna; but the severity of the police thwarted every effort. The same took place in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where between 1831 and 1843, in almost every town, men were tried and condemned.

The most important among these movements was the Calabrian insurrection which broke out at Cosenza on the 15th of May 1844. Two Venetians, Attilio

and Emilio Bandiera, brought up in the Mazzinian creed, collected some companions from different parts of Italy and landed at Cosenza to help the insurrection, but owing to a traitor among them they were surrounded by the police and, after a brief resistance, were arrested. The two brothers, with fifteen of their companions, were sentenced to death—nine were executed, and the rest condemned to solitary confinement for life.

Attilio and Emilio Bandiera were sons of the Austrian admiral who, thirteen years earlier, in 1831, had captured the revolutionaries of Romagna off Ancona. They themselves had belonged to the Austrian navy, where they could easily have won quick promotion and honours. But they were far from being in sympathy with the paternal tradition of discipline, and were ready to give up all for their country. Their companions came from various parts of Italy: their small circle thus almost offered an example of the ideal union of Italy. They all fell with the cry of "Long live Italy!" on their lips.

This daring enterprise and its severe punishment aroused strong feeling in the peninsula. The Mazzinian doctrines were said to be responsible for these fruitless efforts and cruel reprisals. But in spite of the apparent foolhardiness of the Bandiera attempt, it showed nevertheless what heroic sacrifices the teachings of Mazzini were able to inspire in the minds of the Italians.

While Mazzini's teaching gave a frankly national and concrete programme to the Democratic party, at that time necessarily revolutionary, the new National Liberal party, with a practical programme of progressive reform, was working outside the narrow limits of sectarian factions. This party was formed by the educated and industrial classes of the Italian towns,

at the time of the eighteenth-century reforms, and owed its growth to the general feeling that feudal privileges, ecclesiastical predominance, and the disastrous particularism of the governments should be destroyed. Though it had been partially swept away by the Jacobinism of the French Revolution it had partly laid the foundation of the Italian kingdom. Later, at the fall of the Napoleonic Empire, weary of subjection to the French, as we have already seen, it had been submerged by internal strife, and had been obliged to accept Austrian domination or to join the revolutionary conspirators. Melchiorre Gioia and G. D. Romagnosi were the chief leaders of this party, even after the Restoration, and their ideas attracted many writers and public men, such as G. P. Vieusseux and Gino Capponi in Tuscany, Federico Confalonieri and Silvio Pellico in Lombardy, Cesare Balbo and Massimo d'Azeglio in Piedmont. In 1833 Pellico, released from the Spielberg, published his book, *Le mie Prigioni* ("My Prisons"), in which, simply and sincerely, he revealed the horrors of the Austrian prisons. This book, which Balbo later declared had done greater harm to Austria than a lost battle, won many supporters for the Italian cause.

Vincenzo Gioberti and the "Riformisti"

The *Riformisti* were a small minority in the grip of this tragic dilemma: whether silently to wait for the slow ripening of time or to perish as conspirators. The task of giving this party a consciousness and a programme, of regularising it and causing its power to spread rapidly, was to fall to a great Piedmontese thinker, Vincenzo Gioberti.

Vincenzo Gioberti was born at Turin on the 5th of

April 1801, and thus was almost contemporary with Mazzini. Brought up to a clerical career, he became Court chaplain, but his high talents, honest heart and ardent faith soon caused him to be suspected of liberal ideas, and during the reaction of 1833 he was imprisoned and exiled. Although actually he did not belong to "Young Italy," his deep love for his country made him a supporter of the generous ideals of that society. But after the unfortunate enterprise of Savoy he broke away from Mazzini and became his bitter enemy. During his long exile, passed in study and meditation at Paris and Brussels, he had trained his mind to the most difficult problems of theology, philosophy and history, upon which he brought to bear a keen political vision. He was a sincere and fervent Catholic, capable at the same time of realising all the needs of his day, both as a thinker and as a politician. He conceived the idea of a system of reconciling science and religion, Church and State, the individual and the community, discipline and liberty. Thus tradition and modern needs were co-ordinated, allowing for the strictest respect for the most important elements in the past and for a free and vigorous development of the youthful forces of modern society.

This programme was developed by Vincenzo Gioberti in a great and eloquent book, called *Il Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani*,¹ published at Brussels in 1843. In this book Gioberti enumerates the Italian nation's claim to nobility and examines the depressing political conditions of the country in his time. He proclaims the necessity for the liberation of Italy, not only in the name of her historical and natural rights, but also in the supreme interest of world-civilisation, to which she had con-

¹ *The Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians.*

tributed—and could contribute—so much. He then showed how this enfranchisement might be carried out by means of a series of bold reforms, which would reconcile the past with the present. He counter-balanced the revolutionary and republican programme of Mazzini by the moderating influence of reforms, and the agreement between the princes and people. He substituted the simple idea of immediate federation for the ideal of unity, to which, however, he adhered fundamentally, although he thought it could only be attained gradually. The Papacy, an institution of immense moral force, which had Rome for its centre, should in the high interests of civilisation take the lead in these reforms, and preside over this great confederation.

Gioberti's work was to some extent exaggerated and Utopian, but it was noble in its conception and possessed great persuasive eloquence. Above all it had the merit of proposing a conciliatory policy which immediately won to the Italian cause all those of the upper and middle classes who, through dislike of secret societies and revolutionary methods, had till then kept aloof from politics, and had passively endured the harshness of reaction. Gioberti later gave up the idea of the presidency of the Pontiff and more openly advocated the ideal of unity, which was his ultimate aim, showing that this could only be realised by means of the Piedmontese monarchy. In the meantime this book, keeping up the illusion of a pacific league of the Italian States blessed by the Pope, exercised great influence over the educated and moderate classes of Italy.

Reforms and Reformers

The need of a great political change was now universally acknowledged. With the development of the

population which, in thirty years, showed an increase of about 5,000,000, with the outburst of trade and industry, to which the Italians were turning their talents and activities, the old economic protectionism of the paternal governments had become unbearable, as had also the customs duties between the small states. These, for example, made it necessary to pay duty seven times when carrying goods by the waterways linking Milan with Venice. With the advance of culture and science the persecutions of the ever-suspicious police were now regarded as hateful. So long as the desire for changes of government had found its expression in plots and crimes leading to vain sacrifices, the Italian cause had been supported only by few. But now that it was openly professed on the legal ground of reform; that it appeared bound up with the faith of their ancestors and the glorious tradition of the past; and that it was supported by the superior moral authority of the Pontiff, the Italian cause became a popular cause. Public discussion became lively and heated. In 1844 Cesare Balbo's book, *Delle Speranze d'Italia* ("Italian Hopes"), appeared. In it the idea of reform was expounded with much moderation, but practically made to depend upon the military forces of Piedmont. Soon after Massimo d'Azeglio, in his little work, *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna* ("Recent Events in Romagna"), denounced and stigmatised the abject attitude of the Pontifical Government; while Giacomo Durando published his book on *Nazionalità Italiana* ("Italian Nationality"), in which, still on a federalist basis, he maintained the necessity for driving Austria out of Italy.

At the same time, the congresses of Italian scientists, who since 1839 had begun to hold meetings at centres of learning in different parts of Italy, under

the pretext of scientific discussions, were continually fostering the consciousness of a common nationality, and proclaiming the urgency for reform.

Charles Albert's Attitude towards Reform

It was in this atmosphere of hope and reform that the King of Piedmont decided upon a course of action which was to play a very important part in the destinies of the Italian *risorgimento*. Charles Albert, who ascended the throne at the bitterest moment of the reaction (1831), at first showed himself to be in no way different from the other Italian princes, and vigorously opposed liberal ideas. Though on the one hand, it seemed as if he wished to forget that period, not very remote, in which he had found himself involved in the Revolution of 1821, and to make Austria forgive his youthful idealism; on the other, knowing the sad condition of his country, he proposed to improve it, concentrating his attention upon the army, finance and juridical institutions. But, as is the way with weak and unstable natures, in order not to allow himself to swerve from this purpose, he refused to consider any further liberal measures, and almost condemned and repulsed, as it were, all other ideals. A series of vigorous legislative, military and financial reforms had indeed, quietly but surely, considerably improved the welfare of the kingdom. Deep down in his heart, however, Charles Albert nursed a profound dislike for Austria, coupled with the secret ambition of putting himself at the head of an enterprise having as its aim the achievement of Italian independence.

Some hint of this had been noticed by one or two of his most faithful and observant subjects. The reaction against Mazzini's rising in Savoy in 1834 had been

less severe; moreover the many enlightened reforms had the effect of gaining him the sympathy of the best people. Gioberti's book, which exalted the native strength of Piedmont and pointed out to Charles Albert the importance of Piedmont's military mission for Italian independence, had been freely circulated in the kingdom. Cesare Balbo, in the *Speranze d'Italia*, had not hesitated to declare that Piedmont, by virtue of its discipline, its army and its legislation, was superior to all the Italian states, and that it would be the only sure basis when the hour of the struggle for freedom should strike.

But the revelation of Charles Albert's real sentiments was granted to Mazzimo d'Azeglio when the latter, at the end of 1845, having returned from a long journey through the peninsula, undertaken to learn the real conditions of the country and the attitude of the Italians, asked the King for an audience, in order to place his report before him. In this conversation, which, as was his wont, d'Azeglio describes with such vivacity and truth in his book, *I miei ricordi* ("My Memories"), after speaking of the hopes and impatience of the patriots, he heard the King almost unexpectedly reply: "Tell these gentlemen to remain quiet and not to move, as at present there is nothing to be done; but let them rest assured that, when the occasion arises, my life and that of my children, my treasures, my army, all will be spent for the cause of Italy."

This frank statement, which history was destined tragically and solemnly to confirm, was in itself a sign that the time was getting ripe for action. No later than April 1846, after a long diplomatic struggle with Austria over the Customs, the King replied in strong language to an act of reprisal on the part of Austria, while a silent but affectionate demonstration by his

people, before the palace at Turin, further encouraged him to stand firm.

The Election of Pius IX. and the Decree of Amnesty

A new and truly remarkable event took place, which hastened to bring things to a head. On the 10th of June 1846 the Papal Throne was ascended by a man of no great learning, but kindly in spirit and possessed of strong common sense, who felt a deep affection for his country, and whose heart had perhaps been moved by reading the eloquent pages on the civil mission of the Pope in Vincenzo Gioberti's *Primato*. Clearly the Conclave was but partially acquainted with these liberal tendencies. After the death of Gregory XVI., who was almost hated by his subjects, the Cardinals, urged by the petitions of the cities of the Romagna to choose someone who would understand the needs of the state, had purposely omitted the name of Cardinal Lambruschini, who had been too much concerned with the reactionary government of the late Pontiff, and had, without prejudice, given their votes to a man who seemed to guarantee good sense and peace. Thus it came about that the Bishop of Imola, Cardinal Giovanni Mastai-Ferretti, was elected. He was born at Sinigaglia in 1792, and was well known for his works of piety and learning, natural goodness and praiseworthy tolerance. Owing to some curious circumstances Cardinal Gaysruk, Archbishop of Milan, who should have represented the Austrian vote in the Papal elections, only reached the Conclave at its conclusion, and was unable to exercise against the Bishop of Imola the right of veto, demanded by Austria, which might, perhaps, have prevented the nomination of this candidate.

Having been elected Pope, Pius IX. soon found himself in an atmosphere favourable to mildness and reform. Barely a month after his election, on the 17th of July 1846, he issued, unprompted, a *motuproprio* (a decree) of amnesty to political prisoners and exiles, which was greeted with great enthusiasm not only in Rome but all over Italy. By this act the Pope, the greatest moral authority of the time, gave the reigning sovereigns an example of lenient government, and openly condemned the "political" methods of Gregory XVI. It seemed as if a new era were beginning. Public opinion saw in Pius IX. the long-awaited reformer, the inspirer of the new Italy announced by Gioberti, and hailed him with demonstrations of joy. All this was certainly carried too far: the decree, in the mind of its giver, did not exceed the limits of sovereign clemency which usually inspires such natures; but a new meaning had already been read into it, and thenceforth the old city of Rome was swept by one of those waves of enthusiasm which distinguish it even in our own day. Cheering multitudes followed the Pope about the streets; each date and each event of his life was duly celebrated by festivities, and during the warm summer evenings, or in the soft autumnal afternoons, the people swarmed up the Quirinal, and from the balcony the Pope blessed the kneeling, cheering crowds.

The Italian Princes and the Reforms of Pius IX.

Thus Pope Pius IX., notwithstanding the opposition of Austria, was induced, almost without wishing it, to grant at least a part of the reforms demanded by his faithful subjects. In April 1847 he created a "Council of State," the mere ghost of a representative

organisation, to which elective members approved by the Pontiff were summoned, but which, none the less, did offer the people a direct share in public life. In July the Civic Guard was formed, composed of citizens, and intended only to preserve order in the city, but such was the enthusiasm of the people that it became almost a symbol of liberty upheld by the arms of the citizens, who, after a long lapse of time, were once more in arms. These acts led to a demand for new reforms in all the Italian states. At Rome, Turin and Florence, urged on by popular demonstrations, freedom of the Press was granted, Councils of State promised, and the formation of a Civic Guard authorised. Everywhere the need for independence from Austria became more acute, since both that country and the Neapolitan dynasty were showing themselves adversely disposed towards the new demands, and obdurate over the granting of reforms. When, on the 13th of August 1847, Austrian soldiers occupied the town of Ferrara to check an agitation there, a burst of indignation swept all over Italy. Charles Albert offered his troops to defend the Papal territory; in many towns arms and money were collected for war against Austria. Mazzini wrote from London the famous letter to Pius IX. in which he urged him to unify the mother-country, while from Montevideo, Garibaldi—who had become famous on account of the gallantry of his Legion—offered himself to the Pope for the defence of Italian territory against the foreigner. Italy was no longer merely a “geographical expression,” as Metternich had defined it thirty years before; nor yet a “land of the dead,” as it had been called by a great French poet (Lamartine), who admired only the monuments of its past. About the end of 1846 the anniversary of the expulsion of the Austrians was

celebrated at Genoa, while the chain of bonfires which on the night of the 11th of December lit up the Apennines between Tuscany and the Romagna was a new challenge to Austria. The hour of the Italian Revolution was about to strike.

CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1848-1849)

The First Revolutionary Movements of 1848

At the beginning of 1848 there was much excitement all over Italy. A few months earlier there had been a conflict with the police at Milan, when, on the occasion of some illuminations at a religious festival, the cry, "Long live Pius IX.!" had been raised. On the New Year of 1848 the citizens agreed to refrain from smoking in order to cause financial embarrassment to their oppressors, whereupon the police used this as a pretext for severe measures against them. On the evening of the 3rd of January the streets were running with blood, and fifty-seven persons were killed. Similar scenes of bloodshed occurred at Pavia and Padua, where the student element was strongest. The same thing happened at Venice, where the repression had been very harsh, when the people had boldly demanded reforms and the patriots Daniele Manin and Niccolò Tommaseo were thrown into prison.

Meanwhile, on the 12th of January, a revolution broke out in Sicily. At that time Sicily was certainly not the country where the Italian patriots' doctrines of revolution and reform had penetrated most deeply, but she chafed at being harnessed to the worst government in Italy, that of the Bourbons, which would allow no reforms. Palermo rose up demanding autonomy and the Constitution of 1812. Once again it was a separatist movement, and did not differ from that of 1812, but it had great value, for it served as a pretext to the Italian Revolution. After a desperate struggle which lasted ten days, and had

amazing episodes of heroism, the city freed itself from the Bourbon troops, and soon the island, urged on by the same war-cry, was up in arms and free, after having victoriously withstood a military expedition. When the agitation reached Naples, where the demands for reforms and a constitution became more threatening, Ferdinand II. made a decision so unforeseen as to raise doubts as to his sincerity: on the 29th of January he solemnly promised a constitution and formed a liberal ministry.

The announcement of this event provoked demonstrations and demands for a liberal regime in the other Italian states. In Piedmont the constitution was demanded by the most enlightened of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Charles Albert was reluctant to grant it, as he did not think it would contribute to the establishment of a well-ordered government, but he was nevertheless forced to it by popular enthusiasm, and on the morning of February the 8th he promised a constitution, and published its fundamental principles. Soon after, on the 17th of February, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II., was induced to do likewise. The constitution of Naples was sworn to by the King on the 10th of February; that of Piedmont was published on the 5th of March. Meanwhile at Rome the enthusiastic populace clamoured for a similar concession from Pius IX. The Pontiff hesitated, fearful of prejudicing the special nature of the Pope's religious position, but finally, driven to it by the force of events, he too granted a constitution.

The Revolution at Venice and "The Five Days" "
Insurrection at Milan

While these events were taking place, amid general excitement, news reached Italy of the revolution in

Paris on the 24th of February, which overthrew Louis Philippe's monarchy. Then came tidings of the popular movements in the German cities and of the rising which broke out at Vienna on the 13th of March. All this hastened Italian plans, already in a fair state of preparation. On the morning of the 18th of March a popular demonstration at Venice, with the cry of "Long live Pius IX.!" demanded and obtained the liberation of Manin and Tommaseo, the promise of reforms and a constitution. Then on the 22nd of March, when the news came of the victorious days at Milan, a civil and military revolt broke out, led by Daniele Manin, and in a few days, almost without bloodshed, Venice had freed herself from Austria. A Provisional Government was formed, which proclaimed the Republic, and soon collected a large number of soldiers and arms and ammunition. At the same time, but quite independently, a popular manifestation broke out in Milan, on the morning of the 18th of March, when over 20,000 citizens led by the *podestà* (mayor) made their way to the palace to demand freedom and reform. Confronted by the police and by Croatian troops a tumult ensued. Some of the citizens rushed to arms, but the Austrian soldiers, commanded by Radetzky, at first succeeded in keeping control. The next morning however, at the sound of the tocsin, the whole city rose up; barricades were built, and a fierce and heroic fight began in the streets. In four days the townspeople, unprepared and unarmed, but noble-spirited and determined, overcame a trained army of 13,000 soldiers who, tired of fighting and uncertain of the issue, after much savagery, sought safety in retreat during the night of the 22nd of March. The Milanese had 150 killed and 600 wounded, but the Austrians lost about 1000 dead or wounded. By this heroic effort,

which lasted from the 18th to the 22nd of March and was called "The Five Days," Milan was freed from her long oppression, and the Tricolour waved triumphantly from the spire of the cathedral.

The example of Venice and Milan fired other cities. Provisional governments were formed at Vicenza, Belluno and Udine, to the cry of "Long live Italy!" "Long live Pius IX!" and arms and volunteers were collected. The Austrians were expelled from all the Lombard cities, hounded out by the furious populace or taking to flight of their own accord. Soon the only towns which remained to the old rulers were the strongholds, the four strongly fortified cities of Verona, Mantua, Legnago and Peschiera, called the *Quadrilatero* (Quadrilateral), under Radetzky's army, besides Trent—where a strong revolutionary outburst was firmly suppressed—and the Italian coast towns, which were also under a harsh rule.

The news of the decisive victory of the Milanese insurgents was brought to Turin on the 23rd of March by envoys who came to ask for help from the Sardinian army. But in the liberal paper, *Il Risorgimento*, that morning there had already appeared an article by Camillo Cavour, which opened with these words: "The supreme hour for the Sardinian monarchy has struck . . . only one road is open to the nation, the government, and the king—war, immediately, without delay." The Council of Ministers met under the presidency of the King. The people crowded expectantly in front of the Royal palace. It was already night when a balcony window opened, and the tall figure of the King appeared. He waved a scarf towards the breathlessly silent crowd—the tricolour scarf. This was the declaration of war against Austria. Charles Albert issued a stirring proclamation to the people of

Lombardy and Venetia on the 25th of March, declaring war against Austria, while at the same time a nucleus of 5000 Piedmontese soldiers crossed the frontier, and took the road towards Milan. Four days later the bulk of the Piedmontese army led by Charles Albert, and consisting of about 25,000 men, later increased by new detachments, crossed the Ticino and, going by way of Lodi and Cremona, moved towards the fortified strongholds of Austria. They did not touch Milan, which was now free (but where party strife was once more beginning): a Royal decree granted the kingdom, fighting for Italy's freedom, the use of the tricolour flag, bearing the cross of Savoy. The Italian Revolution had found its weapons and its symbol.

The Holy War

This was the War of Liberation prophesied by poets and martyrs, prepared by writers and statesmen, blessed by the Pope. There was no desire to disregard the rights of anyone, or to overthrow law and order: Italy was not discussing the legitimacy of the governments, but only asking for liberty, reform and a constitution. The war against Austria, against the hateful bondage of reaction, against that disgraceful tool of the Holy Alliance which trampled on the rights of the people, was necessary to attain these legitimate objects. Thus it was a war of the Italian People and Governments, a war which raised a storm of enthusiasm among all classes in every part of the land.

Swept away by this wave of irresistible enthusiasm, even the princes were obliged to bend before it. On the 21st of March Leopold II. issued a proclamation which he renewed on the 5th of April, when 3000 regular troops and 3000 volunteers set out for the war. These

crossed the Po at Brescello on the 7th of April, and joined the Piedmontese forces. Thus at the end of March, notwithstanding the Pope's reluctance, the first regular Papal troops set forth, under the command of General Durando. Others followed later, so that by the 21st of April nearly 19,000 men had crossed the Po and linked up with the Piedmontese troops. At Naples, where Ferdinand II. had declared his support of the war on the 7th of April, a large corps (really only 14,000 men) was being prepared, and by the middle of May was also at the front. The Papal troops were distinguished by a cross. The war seemed to be one of liberation, a holy war, and thus it came to be called.

Meanwhile the Piedmontese army, under Charles Albert, was making its way towards the *Quadrilatero*. Having reached the Mincio, it met the Austrians on the 8th of April, at Goito, at Monzambano on the 9th, and on the 10th and 11th at Valeggio, and achieved the first series of victories. There was tremendous enthusiasm everywhere, and the highest hopes were entertained.

"*Italia farà da sè*" ("Italy will carry on by herself"), said Charles Albert, and indeed, while all Europe was in revolt against the reactionary governments, Italy, in the name of her ancient national rights, urged on by her poets, with banners flying, had risen too. It seemed as if nothing could stop the onrush of the reborn Italian People.

Military Events and the Salasco Armistice

But all this splendid array of forces, which, had it been truly united and used rapidly, might have got the better of Austria, possessed instead but small

staying powers. This weakness was due to various causes, the two principal ones being lack of military preparation, which led to serious mistakes, and internal dissension. When the Austrian army, driven out of the towns of Lombardy and Venetia, reached its strongholds in considerable disorder, Radetzky, who faced by military and political difficulties might well have momentarily despaired, at once put new heart into his soldiers with the promise of a not far distant victory. As he later and quite frankly wrote, he was relying on Italian mistakes and disagreements.

In spite of being superior in discipline and well organised, the Piedmontese army was not ready for a war against Austria. One should not forget the great disproportion between the small sub-Alpine state and the powerful Empire. Charles Albert realised the necessity for war with Austria, but he had not reckoned on carrying it on single-handed, and had hoped for the support of the Italian revolutionary forces. But the unpreparedness of the Piedmontese army was perhaps greater than one is led to suppose. The army in the field during the whole of the war never exceeded 60,000 men; money was scarce and there was great difficulty in obtaining supplies in a country where the rural population was indifferent or hostile. On the other hand, the reinforcements of volunteers and of the allies were necessarily slow and inadequate. Finally, forced to give battle among the Austrian strongholds, and urged on by the impatience of factions, the army did not know how to gain time by digging a defensive system of entrenchments, or how to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements by boldly taking advantage of its first successes; thus its best energies were wasted in sudden attacks or in exasperating idleness.

After the first victories on the Mincio, and after

having checked the bold movement by Radetzky at Pastrengo (April 30th), the Piedmontese army, which was moving towards Vienna because of false reports of an insurrection there, met its first reverse at St Lucia (May 6th). It then surrounded Peschiera and kept watch on Mantua, in order to threaten the first of the terrible Austrian bulwarks, and to protect the advance upon Verona. Meanwhile numerous Austrian reinforcements, having occupied Udine, reached the Piave by the 1st of May. In vain Papal troops, following Charles Albert's order, attempted to stop their progress: notwithstanding a brilliant defence of Vicenza, on the 22nd of May this new army succeeded in joining that of Radetzky near Verona.

Radetzky then attempted by a surprise attack to turn the Piedmontese right flank, but the heroic, though unlucky, resistance of the Tuscan volunteers at Curtatone and Montanara on the 29th of May disclosed the trap and caused the plan to fail. Charles Albert was enabled to recross the Mincio, and when he was attacked the following day at Goito he was ready with a counter-attack, and was able to carry off a signal victory. At the same time Peschiera surrendered and hope was reborn.

But just at this time, owing to various circumstances of which we shall speak, the Piedmontese army found itself abandoned by its allies. It was therefore reduced to inactivity, while the Austrians took advantage of this to turn once more against Vicenza, defended by the last of the Papal troops still in the field and by volunteers. Vicenza, attacked by an overwhelming force, was obliged to surrender after a fierce battle (June 10th). By the middle of July the Piedmontese army was quite alone except for scanty help from the volunteers, and found it increasingly difficult to procure provisions in a territory which had been

fought over for four months. Austria, on the other hand, having partly overcome her internal troubles, after setting free all the Venetian mainland and reforming the army of Italy—bringing it up almost to 80,000 men—resolutely took the offensive. The Piedmontese troops reinforced by regulars and volunteers from Tuscany obtained another brilliant victory at Governolo (July 18th); but then, attacked by overwhelming forces and worn out by the prolonged struggle, met with a serious disaster at Custoza (July 25th) and were forced to retire. The Austrian army, partly by reason of its military training and partly owing to the absence of any scruples in its treatment of the population, immediately started in pursuit, so that after some fighting the retreat was turned into a rout. Charles Albert might have been able to cross to the right bank of the Po, and so put the great river between himself and the enemy army, but to do this he would have been obliged to leave Milan to Austrian vengeance. He preferred to retire on to this city and to try his luck again in battle. After a desperate engagement with the Austrians under the walls of the great city seething with tumult (August 3rd) he was obliged to treat with the enemy. Dejectedly the Piedmontese army recrossed the Ticino, and the armistice which was signed for the King by General Salasco (August 9th), on the basis of the old boundaries, caused the cessation of hostilities. The Austrians re-entered Milan, and any hope of liberation was almost entirely given up.

The Italian States and the War

Neither the action of the governments nor that of the parties and classes in any way adequately responded

to the enthusiasm which revealed such a strong feeling of Italian nationality. The movement started by Pius IX. began with the idea of a league between the Italian states and war against Austria, which Gioberti and the reformers had long been preaching. But under the stress of events the idea of the league proved to be impracticable, and war with Austria found everyone unprepared, except indeed the army of Piedmont. As a matter of fact the difficulties began in the Papal States. What part could the Pontiff take in a league of the Italian states? How would his leadership of all the Catholics of the world harmonise with his temporal sovereignty over a specific country where his subjects had now a share in the government? How could the Pope decide—or allow to be decided—a war against the Catholic Powers in the interests of Italy alone? These and other difficulties were not long in presenting themselves to Pope Pius IX., reminding him of the demands made upon him by his religious office. The Papal troops, carried on by popular enthusiasm, had hardly crossed the border before a pontifical allocution (April 29th) declared that the Pope, as head of all the Catholics, did not wish to make war against any Catholic Power. This action rendered the position of the Papal troops outside the states very difficult; they were speedily beaten by Austria and put out of action in the heroic but unfortunate defence of Vicenza (June 10th). Moreover, this gave rise to much discontent among the already irritated political parties in Rome. In order to calm things down, the Pope was obliged to summon Terenzio Mamiani, who was a Moderate Liberal, to the ministry (May 4th); but he pleased nobody and was dismissed (July 30th). He was succeeded by Pellegrino Rossi (September 15th), a man of determina-

tion and energy, who had rendered the State good service in difficult times by bold reforms and much sound sense, but who was unpopular, both with the reactionaries and with the popular agitators, by whose order he was murdered on the steps of the Parliament House (November 15th). Under these ministries the plans for a league or confederation of the Italian states, which was also supported by another great philosopher, Rosmini, fell to the ground through the utter impossibility of bringing divergent interests and fixed traditions into line.

Meanwhile, in the Kingdom of Naples the life of the new constitution was being evolved amid speeches, feasts and merrymaking, which distracted the people's minds and actions from the serious needs of the moment. The malcontents took advantage of this, supported by the reactionary and turbulent elements of the population. On the 15th of May a revolt broke out in Naples, accompanied by bloodshed. The King, who had granted the constitution and dispatched his troops to the war with a heavy heart, since he knew that by so doing he had nothing to gain, took advantage of this tragic occurrence to resume his reactionary policy, and recalled his troops from the field. From that moment the Neapolitan constitution was nothing but a phantom and only a few patriots who defied the King's orders, such as Pepe, Poerio, Rossaroll and others—besides La Masa with his hundred Sicilian volunteers—were the sole representatives of the generous-hearted southern Italians in the war of independence. The Neapolitan Government was wholly concerned with opposing the autonomy of Sicily, which, under the Provisional Government of Ruggero Settimo,¹ continued to maintain her independence.

¹ A Sicilian patriot who organised and led the revolutionary movement for the establishment of the Constitution of 1848.

Tuscany also did not show herself too favourably disposed towards the League of the Italian States, and her contribution to the war did not extend beyond the small contingent which she had dispatched at the outset. The Grand Duke did not see that Tuscany had anything to gain by the war and the internal political parties were in a state of turmoil. On the 26th of June Parliament was opened under the Ridolfi Ministry, but the revolutionary republican party, with headquarters at Leghorn, immediately started a violent agitation, which prevented the Government's work being peacefully carried on.

Party Strife in Milan

Nor was there firm agreement—essential in order to resist against so formidable a power as Austria—in those parts of Italy which had freed themselves from the Austrian domination. The impetuous heroism and remarkable good fortune of Milan's "Five Days" had made the people over-confident, and this was one of the principal causes of their speedy ruin. Two main parties had been formed at Milan: on one side the "Moderates," inspired by the ideas of Gioberti and Balbo, who advocated the union of Lombardy with Piedmont, maintaining that only that state could adequately oppose Austria, and so lead the way to Italian independence; and on the other side the "Democrats," the majority of whom clung to Mazzini's doctrines of unification and a republic, trusting only in the native strength of the people, and wishing them to decide their own fate. The opinions of the first party, led by Casati, prevailed in the Provisional Government formed after the Austrians had been driven out; but the second party,

under the leadership of a highly intelligent and upright man, Carlo Cattaneo, fired by the convincing and glorious example of "The Five Days," openly showed its superior strength and demanded to control the Government's policy.

An agreement was reached by which the Democrats were to support wholeheartedly the Austrian war and Charles Albert, yet at the same time without prejudicing the question of the form of government and the fate of Lombardy, which could be decided all in good time, by the will of the nation. No more equivocal situation could have arisen, and Charles Albert did wrong tacitly to consent to it. The truce between the parties was only on the surface. The Moderates grew more determined on union with Piedmont, as the only means of guaranteeing Lombardy from Austrian domination, and of rewarding the generosity of a prince and of a people. On the other hand the Democrats and Republicans inevitably saw in every triumph of Charles Albert a menace to their policy and to their ill-concealed expectations. The first party, in proclamations and official documents, declared that when the war was over the nation should decide its own fate, but they secretly did all they could to urge on a speedy union with Piedmont: the second party appeared to help on the war, encouraging volunteers to enroll themselves, but were privately preparing for a republican movement, which was to take place when the King and the Provisional Government, as they fully expected would happen, showed themselves unequal to the undertaking. Consequently the Provisional Government, which now had a larger number of democratic elements, proceeded irresolutely and without energy. The levy *en masse*, which would have more than doubled Charles Albert's

army, was not ordered, and there were barely 12,000 badly trained volunteers. Endless discussions as to the form of government and the conduct of the war took place; people spoke of a "royal war," as opposed to a "people's war," whereas they should only have spoken of an Italian war. A general insurrection of all the Italian peoples was favoured as likely to bring freedom and union to the country, but in reality Italian disagreements alienated promised supporters from the League, delayed the armies, and left the Piedmontese army, except for volunteers, almost alone in the stern struggle, with inadequate resources, among a suspicious and almost unfriendly population.

When events showed that only speedy annexation to Piedmont could, by restoring unity to the government, save the situation and force the Provisional Government to summon the people to a vote, it seemed that the truce agreed upon had been broken, and there was much talk of treachery. This madness reached such a point that when, on the 3rd of August, the Piedmontese troops defeated at Custoza retired on Milan (an ill-timed military movement, but morally justified by the King's wish to cover the Lombard capital), party fury was rekindled, not soothed, by the threatening enemy. While at the gates of Milan the discouraged troops were putting up a last resistance, inside the city, on the evening of the 5th of August, Charles Albert was discussing with the heads of the Government the best measures for the imminent and inevitable surrender. Around Palazzo Greppi, where the meeting was being held, a deluded and turbulent mob cursed the treachery of a king who had exposed his own life and that of his children, and shots even were fired at Charles Albert whilst he was standing on the balcony, almost apologising for the misfortunes of his

army. The following day the remains of the Piedmontese army, followed by a pitiful crowd of refugees, left the city, and the Austrians victoriously re-entered Milan, almost, it seemed, as if swiftly to punish the people of Milan for the irreparable mistakes and ruinous errors caused by party strife.

Meanwhile a glimpse had been caught of the right way to obtain the unification of Italy, and it began to be followed. While the opposing parties at Milan had been considering an unnatural and dangerous neutrality, which diminished the efficient conduct of the war, the necessity for an immediate solution of the question of the government of the freed provinces, by their annexation to Piedmont, was becoming daily more imperative. This was initiated, almost of their own accord, by the small duchies of Central Italy which were, more than the other states, conscious of the necessity for the support of a stronger state. At the beginning of April union with Piedmont was cheered at Piacenza, Reggio and Modena. This example was followed soon after by various Lombard towns—Brescia, Bergamo, Crema, Cremona—where there was not much party strife, and by the Venetian cities—Vicenza, Padua, Treviso, Rovigo—where the threat of a new Austrian occupation was most felt. Even Milan felt the universal pressure and, at the instigation of Gioberti, a meeting of the *Circolo Patriottico* was held on 8th May, when it was proposed to address the Government on the subject of immediate union with the Sardinian States. A plebiscite was taken, and on the 8th of June the result was declared. It showed almost unanimous voting for an immediate union, though under the conditions of a revised statute. Lastly, at Venice, where the republic had been proclaimed, an assembly expressly summoned on the 4th of July, at which the fierce

republican Manin nobly and deliberately did not take part, decided also for union with Piedmont.

Military events, however, were precipitating. The "Kingdom of Upper Italy," which had thus been created by the free expression of popular will, and which would have proved the soundest guarantee against the Austrian yoke, had been received and sanctioned by the sub-Alpine Parliament, when first the Venetian mainland, and then Lombardy and the duchies, fell again under the iron rule of Austria.

The Republics of Rome, Venice and Tuscany

The retreat of Charles Albert not only marked the ruin of the newly born Kingdom of Upper Italy, but also that of the ideals of federalists and reformers fostered by the moderates and by the Piedmontese liberals under the leadership of Gioberti and Balbo. In the revolution however, which still continued in some parts of Italy, contrary ideas prevailed—such as those of unification and democracy upheld by Mazzini, who dreamt of the union of Italy through the immediate insurrection of the people, coupled with a republican form of government.

While in Venice the announcement of the armistice provoked a new popular movement which reinstated the republic—suspended for a few days—and brought the stern and loyal Daniele Manin back to power, in Tuscany and in Rome agitations and revolts once more broke out. At Florence, after a long spell of crises and a brief experiment of reform by Gino Capponi, a Democratic Ministry was formed, with Guerrazzi and Montanelli, while at Leghorn a Constituent Assembly was proclaimed. Soon after, however, the Grand Duke, who was really averse to all democratic reforms, retired

to Siena (January 30th, 1849), and thence made preparations for his flight to Gaeta, where the reactionary Italian princes were collecting. A Provisional Government was appointed in the meantime (February 1849); under the triumvirate of Guerrazzi, Montanelli and Mazzini.

But more serious things were happening in Rome. Here, as we have seen, party strife and disorder in the government were very great, and Pellegrino Rossi, who, with much courage, had vainly tried to curb them, fell by the hand of an assassin (November 15th). Even greater disorders had then arisen because the Papal government and constitutional guarantees were now shown to be really unreconcilable. A popular rising, in favour of Democracy, due to Rossi's death, practically forced the Pontiff to accept a Democratic Ministry presided over by Galletti (November 17th). Pius IX. yielded, but seven days later he fled from Rome and sought refuge at Gaeta, under the protection of the King of the Two Sicilies.

After fruitless attempts at recalling the Pontiff, the Constitutional Assembly met in Rome (February 5th, 1849) and proclaimed a Republic which abolished the Temporal Power of the Pope, and after a few days nominated a triumvirate composed of Mazzini, Armellini and Saffi. When the Piedmontese laid down their arms, the Roman Republic, mindful of the wishes of the people expressed by the Assembly, aspired to appear almost as the nucleus of a new motive power in the unification of Italy.

Piedmont after the Armistice

In Piedmont the unfortunate result of the campaign had given rise to an unrestrained flow of accusations

and recriminations, and had increased the discord between the parties. The Retrogrades, or *Codini*, who were openly opposed to the war, were now joined by the Moderates, or *Municipali*, who formerly had sung the praises of constitutional reforms and of the war, but who, after the unhappy military events, now wished Piedmont to follow a Piedmontese, not an Italian, policy, and not to jeopardise itself by an undertaking which had proved the ingratitude of the revolutionaries and roused open aversion among the rural classes of Lombardy. At the opposite extreme were the Democrats or Revolutionaries, the "hot-heads," as they were then called in Piedmont, under the leadership of Brofferio. These were increased by many impatient Lombard immigrants who loudly demanded the immediate renewal of hostilities, threatening to overthrow the constitution, and to proclaim social democracy and a republic. They were partially supported by the bulk of the liberal party, who, while opposed to excessive measures, saw nevertheless that it was necessary that Piedmont should not dash the hopes of Italy, but make a further attempt.

Party struggles between August 1848 and March of the following year became so bitter that the Government and the army were prevented from making thorough and adequate preparations. Moreover the governments, which rapidly followed each other in power, were persecuted by intrigues and abuse, and the soldiers were poisoned by a shameful defeatist propaganda, partly inspired by the Retrogrades, who discouraged them from helping in a war harmful to their interests, and partly by the Revolutionaries, who encouraged them to despise an incapable dynasty and a king accused of treachery.

All this was certainly not a good preparation for war, but on the other hand, in the confusion of ideas and

parties, the need for it was becoming greater. An attempt at Anglo-French mediation was rendered fruitless by the hostile and short-sighted intervention of Austria, while the Gioberti Ministry's policy of putting off the war until diplomatic and military preparations should be more complete, and afford a greater assurance of success, and its attempt to divert the action of Piedmont by intervention in Central Italy, came up against the impatience and intrigues of the extremist parties. Charles Albert was very sensitive to the accusations of treachery which he felt were being made against him on all sides, and greatly distressed his brave and loyal conscience, and ultimately forced him to yield. On the 12th of March, when it seemed necessary that the Piedmontese monarchy, confronted by a recrudescence of the republican idea, should not lose its position as a leader in the task of freeing the nation, and when it seemed urgent and wise to provoke a Lombard insurrection and to render aid to the Venetians and the other Italian insurgents, Charles Albert on the 20th of March suddenly denounced the armistice, and decreed the opening of hostilities.

Austria was prepared and was only awaiting a pretext to invade Piedmont. The action of Piedmont now gave it to her. General Radetzky, with an army of over 100,000 trained and disciplined men, immediately took the initiative, and crossed the Ticino below Pavia, whilst the General in charge of the defence (Ramorino), if not treacherously at least through lack of discipline, disobeyed orders and shifted his position. The Piedmontese army, about 80,000 strong (another 40,000 held various positions), commanded by the Polish General Czarnowsky, to whom the King had yielded the supreme command, found itself forced on to the defensive, instead of working out its original

plan of attack (see Map, p. 81). The main body of the army was stretched along the line Vigevano-Mortara, with its centre at the Sforzesca; but while the left wing and centre brilliantly resisted the enemy's onslaught, the right wing gave way. Fearing to be surrounded, orders were given to retreat on Novara. Here, on the following day (March 23rd), part of the army sustained vigorous attacks at the Bicocca, repeatedly losing and recapturing their positions; but other sections, demoralised by propaganda and weakened by the retreat, were overcome by the enemy and took to flight. Thus the whole army retreated in disorder to, and later beyond, Novara.

Charles Albert, who had fought gallantly with his soldiers, now saw it was impossible to resist any further, and vainly sought for death in the front ranks. Then, anxious to reduce as far as possible the humiliating conditions of the enemy, and to remove his own person from eventual recriminations, during that night, in the presence of a few generals, he abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel, and, accompanied only by two servants, he succeeded with difficulty in crossing the enemy lines under an assumed name, and went into exile. He reached Oporto (Portugal), where, oppressed by a heavy burden of memories, he soon succumbed to a broken heart (July 28th). To the deputation sent him by the Senate he had replied: "Providence has not decreed that the regeneration of Italy should be fulfilled now; I am confident that it is only postponed, and that such brave examples, such proofs of generosity and valour as have been given by the nation will not prove fruitless. This temporary adversity will admonish Italians to be more united another time if they wish to prove invincible." Victor Emmanuel II. obtained an armistice from Radetzky, with hard conditions, but he

saved the Constitution. Soon after, peace was signed at Milan (August 6th, 1849).

The Failure of the Italian Revolution

Novara marks the increasingly rapid crumbling of the Italian revolution. Brescia, which had risen at once on the renewal of war, had been obliged by overpowering forces to yield to Haynau, after a brave defence of ten days (1st of April), and was subjected to cruel and savage reprisals.

In Tuscany, after some reactionary tumults on the part of the peasants, the democratic government of Guerrazzi, which had been converted into a dictatorship, and later into a Provisional Government of Moderates, made vain efforts to save constitutional liberty, for Austria, having restored the old sovereigns to the duchies, now intervened at Lucca, Leghorn and Florence (May 25th), and restored autocratic government under the Grand Duke.

At Naples, where the disagreements among the revolutionaries had lasted for a long time, the King had succeeded in formally suspending all constitutional guarantees (March 13th), and turned all his energies to quelling the Sicilian revolution, and reduced the whole island again under his tyranny (May 15th).

There still remained Rome and Venice. Here republican ideas had raised in people's minds a strong desire for a last defence of Italian ideals of freedom. At Rome, Giuseppe Garibaldi was further establishing his reputation for bravery. Having come over from America to fight against Austria in 1848, he had distinguished himself as the leader of a battalion of Lombard volunteers, and even after the Salasco armistice had seriously hampered the Austrians on Lake Maggiore.

When the Republic was proclaimed he hastened to Rome, and there organised the defence against the threat of foreign intervention.

The Fall of Rome and of Venice

Rome's main threat came from France, where, the socialist revolution of March having soon burned itself out, Louis Napoleon had been elected President of the Republic, and French politics had taken a conservative turn. Interference at Rome on behalf of the Pope had the double object of winning the French Catholics to the Napoleonic cause and of counterbalancing Austrian power in Italy. The first expedition under Oudinot, which set out from Civitavecchia, met however with defeat outside Porta S. Pancrazio (April 30th), and a like fate met the King of Naples, who had reached Palestrina (May 6th), but was pursued and beaten by Garibaldi at Velletri (May 19th). In the meantime considerable French forces were disembarked at Civitavecchia and on the night of the 3rd of June once more attacked Rome. The gallant defence, which lasted for a month, was marked by the heroic defence of Villa Pamphyli, of the Quattroventi, the Vascello and Villa Spada. A handful of volunteers who had rallied round Garibaldi from all parts of Italy—among them Mameli, Bixio, Dandolo, Medici and Manara—covered themselves with glory, and accomplished miracles of valour. On July the 2nd the French entered the city; shortly afterwards the Republican Assembly was dispersed, the Triumvirate was forced to yield and the reactionary forces in spite of French illusions inevitably reasserted their sway.

As the French troops entered Rome, Garibaldi left it by Porta S. Giovanni, with 3000 volunteers and one

gun, in order to hasten to the defence of Venice. The route of the retreat was closely watched by the Austrian army which occupied the Marches. Garibaldi, however, successfully managed to elude the enemy and, on the 30th of July, after a daring and fatiguing march, entered the territory of the Republic of S. Marino. Here, being now surrounded by enemies, he was compelled to disband his troops, but he himself, with his faithful wife Annita, who was ill with fever, and 200 followers, went down to Cesenatico, whence they set sail for Venice. Surprised during the voyage by enemy vessels, and separated from his companions, he landed at Magnavacca and hid himself in a cottage in the pine forest of Ravenna. Here Annita, who had bravely accompanied him in his campaigns in America and in Italy, died in his arms (August 4th). From Ravenna he made his way in disguise into Tuscany, and with the help of some brave patriots was able to take ship at Portovenere for Chiavari, where he was detained by the Piedmontese police, but finally allowed to depart for the Maddalena and Tangiers.

Some of Garibaldi's companions, amongst whom was the Bolognese, Ugo Bassi, a priest and a brave patriot—who was shot on the 8th of August at Bologna, with his colleague, Captain Livraghi—met their death at the hands of the Austrians, while two days later nine more of Garibaldi's followers were shot without trial at Rovigo, including Ciceruacchio and his two young sons.

Venice heroically held out until August. On hearing of the disaster of Novara she had determined to resist to the last, and the Assembly of the Representatives of the Provisional Government (the name of "Republic of S. Marco" had now wisely been given up) had appointed Daniele Manin as dictator (2nd of April). Meanwhile Austria, mistress of the whole

of Lombardy-Venetia, sent large forces and big guns, under the command of Haynau, to besiege the city. Mestre was soon retaken by the Austrians, and Venice was closely hemmed in and subjected to a continuous bombardment. After a long resistance the fortress of Marghera was abandoned (May 27th), and the defenders of the city were driven back to the bridge, where they put up a desperate fight until, ravaged by famine and cholera, the city was obliged to surrender on the 22nd of August.

In Venice, as in Rome, the defenders came from all parts of Italy. Poerio and Rossaroll, who fell fighting, were southerners, so were the brave commanders and soldiers Pepe, Ulloa, Cosenz, Mezzacapo; Sirtori, Zambeccari, Morandi, Orsini and others came from different parts of Italy, while from the Trentino and Istria numerous volunteers had also come. More than 2000 Italians had fallen in the gallant defence, without counting the victims of famine and disease inside the city. Thus, in the fellowship of common suffering and sacrifice, the union of Italian hearts was cemented, the last remains of separatism fell away, and the aspiration towards the complete reunion of all the provinces of the mother-country imperiously affirmed itself.

Characteristics of the Italian Revolution

Amid the general European commotion, which had now almost entirely been quelled, the Italian revolution, revealing as it did the deep national consciousness of an entire people who had hitherto been divided by many barriers, stood out as a noble affirmation of the beginning of a new system of European law : of the right that is, to unity and independence for all peoples bound together

by community of race, territory, language, customs, history and ideals. Although the application of this principle was for a time hindered by blind brute force, none the less that force was morally condemned, and the vanquished were encouraged by the realisation of the righteousness of their cause.

Perhaps one may attribute the purity and lofty idealism which so often manifested itself in a practical form, and accompanied all the phases of the Italian revolution, to this deep-set feeling of right, which for centuries had been ripening in the people's mind. Similar in this to the American, and partly in contradiction to the French, the Italian national revolution was led by noble and high-minded men, ready for any sacrifice, and carried out by a people brought up by tradition and by suffering to a sense of justice which avoided all excesses; it revealed a voluntary and sincere belief in those principles of public right and civil equity out of which it had arisen. Italy, notwithstanding internal strife, showed her vocation for government by an enlightened democracy as opposed to arbitrary systems of violence, from which she had suffered for years, and an indomitable enthusiasm for a just cause. In the full consciousness of its rights, the Italian revolution, although quelled in bloodshed, proclaimed for itself, and for all oppressed peoples, a principle of civil justice which was shortly to receive its solemn consecration. At this moment however the whole of Italy, overwhelmed by a masterful enemy, exhausted but not broken by prolonged effort, found herself once more held down by the shackles of a fierce and terrible reaction.

CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF LIBERAL IDEAS IN PIEDMONT, AND THE WAR OF 1859 (1848-1859)

HISTORY is a succession of events determined by circumstances and by men, and unfolds itself in a continuous chain of cause and effect. An exact knowledge, whenever possible, of the most relevant circumstances and facts accurately explains this development; but it would be a mistake to think that such facts and circumstances obey absolute and irrevocable laws. This belief, put forward by the historic materialism of the last century, is only the product of a facile and simple-minded logic, which does not greatly differ from the old Christian conception of a Divine Providence. The truth is that human actions, determined by changing desires and unforeseen ideas, can modify circumstances and give a new turn to history.

When, after the defeat of Novara, the new King, Victor Emmanuel II., who had come to the throne through such tragic and unforeseen events, left the camp on horseback, accompanied by a few followers, on the misty morning of Saturday, March the 24th, he was, without doubt, fully, if unconsciously, aware of the part he was called upon to play. The interview with Marshal Radetzky in which the terms were to be discussed was to take place at Vignale, near Novara. Circumstances however were not such as to tend to strengthen him in the course he was going to pursue. The crowds of wounded and worn-out soldiers which he passed in silence, save for the frequent cry of "Peace! Peace!"; the vision of that disastrous defeat, still present to his troubled spirit, which had extinguished all hope and enthusiasm; the bitter record

of party strife, partly responsible for that defeat; the expectation of new and perhaps more violent quarrels; the approaching interview with a proud and cunning enemy, who would make every endeavour to persuade him to renounce constitutional freedom—all these things did not encourage him to persist in the purpose which a feeling of loyalty had suddenly borne in upon his mind. But his will, instead, was firm and determined. Vainly did the clever old Field-Marshal, with insinuating promises and threats, try to persuade the young King to throw off the troublesome burden of the constitution, which could so easily give rise to new dangers for the peace of Italy, which Austria was now prepared to guarantee, promising the House of Savoy, at the same time, an increase of territory and political advantages. The King's reply was one sentence and a scornful gesture, which tradition and history have put into these words: "Our race knows the road to exile, not that to dishonour." By this reply the young ruler not only confirmed the new principle of international right, that no Power must interfere in the national affairs of another, but above all, by this brave and straightforward action, he saved such hopes and claims for Italian Nationality as might still be rescued from the cruel catastrophe.

The Revolution of 1848 and its Lessons

The severe trials of these two stormy years had dissipated many illusions. Many mistakes had been recognised, but many vital elements remained, which had to be garnered and treasured. The idea of a federation of Italian states under the guidance of the Pope had shown itself to be a delusion and a mistake, since the religious mission of the Papacy could not be reconciled with that of civil government;

no less feasible was the federative idea without the Pope, for the interests of the states proved to be too divergent. On the other hand, not less illusory and fallacious was the revolutionary and republican idea of an insurrection by an unarmed population—partially uneducated and brutalised by three centuries of foreign servitude—which was, by itself, to get the better of an Empire like that of Austria, organised for centuries and militarily powerful. Attempts at regional autonomy, like those which had occurred in Sicily and in the Republic of S. Marco, had proved themselves harmful and dangerous, since they disturbed the unity of power necessary for action and were founded on a worn-out tradition. Lastly, no hope could be placed in any of the cowardly or dishonest dynasties, such as the Bourbons of Naples or the Lorraines of Tuscany.

The thought, on the other hand, that Austria must be fought if Italy was to be freed, and that for this great undertaking powerful well-trained forces were essential, remained firmly fixed in the mind of everyone. It was realised, that, for the necessary leadership of these forces, reliance must be placed on the only Italian state—Piedmont—which could be trusted and had a proper military organisation, and which although the result of its previous efforts had been unhappy had, none the less, given sure proofs of its power and of its fine spirit of sacrifice; and on one dynasty—that of Savoy—which had shown itself to be loyal, generous and brave. It was true that the existing moral unity of Italy was due to the doctrine of unification preached by Mazzini, and through it the somewhat confused, but none the less definite, realisation that Italian independence could only be obtained by means of unity—through the union of all the hearts, all the energies and all the states of Italy—had gained ground. People

were now convinced that to reach these ends it was necessary to oppose anything that might give rise to divisions, and to welcome every means, every pretext, that might lead to real, immediate union of the various Italian provinces, without party prejudices or secret understandings of neutrality pernicious to action. Such were the teachings which emerged out of the shadow of the catastrophes of Novara and Brescia, Rome and Venice, and were before long to bear fruit.

Reaction and Persecution in other Italian States

After the victory of Novara the Austrian yoke lay still more heavily on the necks of the subject peoples. Trials, persecutions, even the beating of women, all accurately witnessed and documented, were the daily instruments of repression used by the Government. The people, chafing and restive, looked hopefully towards Piedmont. The impulse to revolt, however, made headway in the minds of the more daring, urged on by Mazzini, who had gone to London in 1850, where he had formed a central committee to hasten on the independence and freeing of Italy. Secret organisations connected with this committee existed in the various Lombard cities, and Mazzini started a loan, with bonds at twenty-five lire each, in order to raise the funds necessary to wage a people's war. One of the most active sub-committees was that at Mantua, presided over by a cultured and brave priest, Don Enrico Tazzoli, a noble type of apostle and martyr. The police discovered the conspiracy, made over 200 arrests, and instituted a trial. On the 7th of December 1852 Don Tazzoli and four companions were hanged at Belfiore, near Mantua, and three months later four other victims were led to the gallows,

amongst whom were Tito Speri, a soldier and a conspirator Carlo Montanari and Bartolomeo Grazioli, priest and patriot. In the meantime a very ill-advised Mazzinian movement had broken out at Milan, where a sudden attack on the barracks, on the 6th of February 1853, cost the lives of sixteen persons, who were hanged. Shortly before this, at Milan, Antonio Sciesca, a man of the people, was hanged, on the charge of having attempted to put up some revolutionary manifestos, and soon after, in 1855, a like fate befell P. F. Calvi, the heroic defender of the Cadore.

Reaction was raging in the duchies of Central Italy which had returned once more under Austrian protection. At Parma Charles III., a tyrannical libertine who imitated the dress and habits of Pier Luigi Farnese, of evil memory, was stabbed, in 1854, for a private vendetta, leaving the throne to a boy and the regency to a woman. At Modena, Francis V. was following in his father's footsteps. In Tuscany, Leopold II., reinstated by Austria after he had repealed the Constitution and punished the patriots, tried to abase the people by a mild, inactive government, whilst at Naples, Ferdinand II., with unheard-of ferocity, by the help of dungeons and tortures stifled every constitutional aspiration and produced an ever-increasing wave of hatred, so great that Gladstone described his government as "a permanent outrage against religion, civilisation, humanity," and as "a denial of God." Nor were conditions in the Papal States radically different.

*The Situation in Piedmont and the Proclamation
of Moncalieri*

Victor Emmanuel was from the very outset of his reign faced with serious difficulties. The unfortunate

result of the war had aroused, as always happens, violent party strife. On March the 29th a republican revolt broke out in Genoa, and the rebels were masters of the city for some days. In Parliament the extremists delayed and prevented the ratification of peace with Austria, a sad necessity, since this peace, even though it meant the payment of a large indemnity (75,000,000 lire), nevertheless saved the independence of the country, the Tricolour and the right of welcoming exiles from all parts of Italy. It was in vain that the D'Azeglio Ministry dissolved the Chamber, the new deputies, elected by badly attended and indifferent assemblies, dismissed the discussion with fresh excuses. Victor Emmanuel did not welcome the reactionary suggestion that he should suspend constitutional guarantees but, advised by D'Azeglio, took decisive action and again dissolved the Chamber and issued an appeal called the "Proclamation of Moncalieri" (November 20th, 1849), which to the extreme parties appeared a violation of constitutional methods, but was an act of true bravery, strictly within the Royal Prerogative, which gave a severe, yet noble, warning to the deluded and sluggish electors. The country responded to it, and the new Chamber, opened on December the 20th, after a few days sanctioned the treaty by a heavy majority. Shortly after, laws were passed destroying ancient ecclesiastical privileges and initiating a firm liberal policy.

Camillo di Cavour and the Liberal Programme

These liberal reforms received from Cavour a more powerful stimulus in this direction. Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, was born at Turin, on the 10th of August 1810. He entered upon a military career,

and as a successful officer, physically strong, with a temperament eager yet resolute in action, revealed from his youth quickness of intuition, activity and an independent spirit, which made him love the study of mathematics and history, of economics and agriculture, and rendered him impatient of the discipline of the old Piedmontese army. At twenty he already held and expressed bold and independent political views, so much so that the Austrian ambassador, in a report to the police at Milan, described him in these terms: "This young man belongs to one of the best families of Piedmont, and his father, the Marquis of Cavour, is generally respected, and is the first person to regret his son's conduct. . . . I consider him as a most dangerous man; all efforts at correcting him are fruitless; he ought therefore carefully to be watched."

Having thrown up the army, he travelled in France, Switzerland and England, taking every opportunity for thought and study. Later he undertook the management of his estate at Leri, in the province of Vercelli, displaying in this admirable energy and initiative. Thus, between study, travel and a life of practical activity, those political opinions were being formed which made of him a bold and honest liberal, equally removed from the narrow limitations of the conservatives and reactionaries as from the methods and excesses of the revolutionaries. He settled at Turin in 1847 and gave himself up to journalism and politics. He was a regular contributor to the *Risorgimento*, a paper started by the Piedmontese liberals, and showed himself to be one of the keenest supporters of constitutional rule and of war against Austria. He was elected deputy, and had some considerable difficulty in establishing his political position owing to the antipathy which he aroused among the reactionaries, who considered him a hot-

head, and among the Revolutionaries, who thought him a Moderate, or *Codino*.

In October 1850 Massimo d'Azeglio, however, appointed him Minister of Agriculture, and his fine solid qualities of statesmanship soon revealed themselves. In January 1851, while explaining to the Chamber the policy of D'Azeglio's Cabinet, he sketched out a programme of liberal government which for ten years was to be his own programme: "The Ministry," he said, "believes that it has a double mission—that of broadly carrying out liberal ideas and of developing the principles involved in the constitution; but, while it considers it necessary to move along the lines of reform, it also believes that it ought openly and actively to combat any attempt of the extreme parties, which have their roots outside the constitution, under whatever form they may present themselves, whether they conceal themselves under the hypocritical cloak of religion or whether they rise up in the threatening garb of a revolution." Thenceforward he was a convinced follower of the doctrine of freedom, in order to give little Piedmont the agricultural and commercial prosperity which was a necessary condition for a fruitful and progressive policy. He summed up his political and social opinions as follows:—"History shows that society is irrevocably impelled forward along the path of progress. In matters politic it tends to modify its institutions in order that a greater number of citizens may have a share in political power; in economics it is clearly attempting to better the conditions of the lower classes, and to obtain a more equable distribution of capital and of the fruits of the land."

These ideas, so frankly liberal, led Cavour to ally himself with the more moderate members of the Left parliamentary wing, and to leave the D'Azeglio

Cabinet (May 1852). For six months Cavour travelled in France and England, with a view to opening up political relations with these countries, and then Victor Emmanuel summoned him to form a new ministry (November 1852).

Cavour's Policy, the Crimean War and the Congress of Paris

In the *Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia* (1851), Gioberti, notwithstanding the disaster which had befallen the revolutionary movement of 1848-1849, had written: "The Sardinian monarchy will surely perish in the coming vicissitudes of Europe unless it seeks its safety in the redemption of Italy." Cavour's whole work, from November 1852 to July 1859—that is, during the seven years in which he was uninterruptedly head of the constitutional government of the little kingdom—was entirely directed towards this end: to give Piedmont this splendid mission. The finances of the State were consolidated, the country's energies developed, education encouraged, the army reorganised and the remains of ecclesiastical and feudal privileges suppressed. When Austria, after the Milanese affair of February 1853, seized the property of all the Lombard and Venetian *émigrés*, most of whom had fled to Piedmont in 1848 and had not taken any part in the affair, Cavour dared to raise an indignant protest to all the civilised nations of Europe. He recalled his own ambassador from Vienna, and caused a law to be passed establishing an indemnity for the *émigrés* who had been injured by Austria.

Thus Cavour took the first step in a bold policy directed towards isolating Austria from the other nations and drawing attention to the small and liberal

Italian monarchy. In 1853 the Russo-Turkish War broke out in the East, and England and France, fearing Russian predominance in the Ottoman territories and in the Mediterranean, undertook to defend the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and made war against Russia in the Crimea (April 1854). In spite of considerable allied successes the undertaking was difficult, and new forces and fresh sacrifices were required. The allies had opened negotiations with Austria with a view to obtaining her assistance; but Austria, bound to Russia by ties of gratitude for the support given her in suppressing the Hungarian revolution of 1848, held back, declaring that she wished to maintain an armed neutrality. Cavour, always on the alert, immediately seized this propitious occasion for turning the isolation of Austria to the advantage of Italy, offered the help of Piedmont, and made an alliance with France and England which obliged the Kingdom of Sardinia to help the enterprise in the Crimea with an expeditionary corps of 15,000 soldiers (January 10th, 1854).

Cavour's proposal met with considerable opposition in Parliament, in the Press and throughout the country, for the retrogrades said it was madness to entangle Piedmont in a foreign war, while the most fiery patriots maintained that the military forces of the little realm ought not to be wasted on a non-Italian cause. They did not see, however, that the small Eastern enterprise was but a prelude to a great campaign in Italy. Piedmont's alliance with France and England meant henceforth the isolation of Austria and the interest of the great European Powers in the Italian cause. To participate in the war was the quickest and surest way to show the renewed strength of the Piedmontese army and to wipe out the disgrace of Novara. News

of the engagement at Taktir, at the crossing of the Tchernaya (August 16th, 1855), where the Piedmontese troops distinguished themselves, spread throughout Italy, rousing a thrill of confidence and enthusiasm. Peace negotiations having begun, the Congress of Paris was convened (February 1856), in which Cavour took part as the delegate of the King of Sardinia. This was a triumph for the little kingdom and a set-back for Austria. These results were further stressed when Cavour, in the session on April the 8th, was able to raise the Italian question, openly defending it and pointing to Austria as the cause of all the evils and turmoil in the peninsula. It was the first time in history, as Cavour said, that the Italian question had been brought before a European congress with a view to finding some remedy for that country's ills. The material was now lying ready on the loom and European events, wisely handled by the little Piedmontese weaver, were soon to start working it.

*Napoleon III. ; the Italian Question and the Convention
of Plombières*

The Italian question was indeed rapidly maturing. In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies a double attempt at insurrection—one at Termini, provoked by Francesco Bentivegna (1856), and another at Sapri, led by Carlo Pisacane (1857)—was quenched in blood and roused protests among public opinion throughout Europe. In Lombardy-Venetia an attempt at reconciliation between the mild government of the viceroy Maximilian and the better-educated classes of the population broke down before the will of the latter, who under the rigorous policy of the hated Emperor Franz-Josef were for independence.

From his place of exile, the old republican Daniele Manin urged the Italians to be united, and to trust the King of Sardinia. In Piedmont, where the exiles from every part of Italy were welcomed and almost formed a model of Italian unity, a " *Società Nazionale Italiana* " was started in 1857, with Giorgio Pallavicino, who had been freed from the Spielberg, as its president, and for its vice-president Giuseppe Garibaldi, the heroic republican leader. La Farina, a Sicilian exile, a close friend of Cavour, was secretary. The society, rising above all party antagonism, had as its splendid object the independence of the mother-country.

It was amid these circumstances that a prince appeared on the stage who was to play a very important part in the drama of Italian independence. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had passed his youth in Switzerland and Italy, had taken part in the revolutionary agitations in Romagna in 1831, and become close friends with several ardent Italian patriots. He hastened to Paris at the time of the Revolution of 1848, and was not long in becoming President of the Republic. In 1851 he obtained dictatorial powers for ten years and in 1852, discarding the last semblance of republicanism, he assumed the title of Emperor Napoleon III. This was a period of great civil development for France, who had been longing to break the shackles which bound her to the Holy Alliance and to proclaim her power in Europe. The French army had won splendid laurels in the Crimean War, and the European Congress had met at Paris, as if in recognition of the world-wide prestige acquired by France.

In order, however, to keep and increase this prestige, as well as to restrain her internal party strifes, it was necessary that France should maintain a firm attitude and a strong position in European politics, and that

Austrian predominance, for forty years all-powerful in Europe, should be overthrown. Therefore in opposition to Austria, upholder of reaction and absolutism, Napoleon III. set France up as the champion of the principle of nationality and of the liberty of peoples.

The Italian question of necessity came therefore within the scope of French policy, and the skilful intrigues of Cavour had contributed to its firm establishment. This edifice, so cunningly built, threatened for a moment to crash, owing to the anarchical republican plot of Felice Orsini, who, with some companions, made an attempt on the life of the Emperor in Paris on the evening of the 14th of January 1858, by placing bombs on the route taken by the Imperial carriage on its way to the theatre, and caused injuries to, and the death of, many innocent victims. But Orsini's noble request from the scaffold that the Emperor should free his country from the foreigner lessened the horror of the deed and made a deep impression on Napoleon's mind.

Four months after Orsini's execution the Emperor invited Cavour to a secret meeting at Plombières, and at this meeting, which took place on July the 20th, the basis of an agreement between France and Piedmont was laid down. The agreement included these three principal points: war with Austria; the marriage of Victor Emmanuel's eldest daughter, Clothilde, with Prince Jerome Napoleon, the Emperor's cousin, and the cession of Savoy to France. The object of the war was to be "the complete clearance of the Austrians from Italy, and no territory to be left to Austria from the Alps to the Isonzo." All the valley of the Po, as far as the Adriatic, with the Duchies and the Romagna, were to form a Kingdom of Upper Italy, with about 11,000,000 inhabitants, under the sceptre of the

Savoy dynasty. The Emperor appeared to favour a confederation of the other Italian states, which was vaguely mentioned at the meeting. But in order to justify the war in the eyes of French and European public opinion it was decided that the pretext for it should come from Austria.

What were the reasons which urged Napoleon to this alliance with Piedmont and to war? Dynastic reasons have been suggested, or the desire for revenge on Austria, the old vanquisher of the first Napoleonic Empire, or Napoleon III.'s personal affection for Italy. In reality the reasons were complex, and involved the whole of French policy at this period. Above all Napoleon III. intended to strike a hard blow at Austrian predominance in Europe, which had lasted since 1815, and to replace it by French predominance, thereby adding prestige to his own Empire. In the second place, he wished to establish a strong kingdom on the French frontier, which, bound to him by ties of gratitude, should act as a makeweight in the balance of Europe. Furthermore, he thought to solve the national Italian problem on the lines of this policy, favourable to the principle of nationality, by a federation of the Italian states, reduced to four (Upper Italy, Tuscany, Papal States and the Two Sicilies), with the Pope at its head, which would please the French Catholics. As regards Tuscany, the Emperor nursed a secret hope of being able to extend its borders and to bestow the crown on a prince of his own house, Prince Jerome Bonaparte. Finally, he aspired to obtain for France an increase of territory with the addition, now agreed upon, of Savoy, and perhaps of Nice, thus fulfilling France's old desire of regaining her natural boundaries.

The Outbreak of War

The Franco-Sardinian agreement was not long in giving some sign of its existence. At the New Year reception of 1859 Napoleon III., turning to the Austrian ambassador, hinted that some clouds had arisen to obscure the diplomatic relations of their two countries. A few days later, on January the 10th, when opening the parliamentary session at Turin, King Victor Emmanuel made his famous speech in which, after drawing attention to the progress of the state, and to the noble ideals it upheld, he declared that he was *not insensible to the cry of grief which was raised towards him from so many parts of Italy*. Prince Jerome's journey to Turin, the signing of the secret Treaty of Alliance (January 19th), the consequent military convention and the marriage of the Princess Clothilde followed shortly afterwards.

Cavour was the soul of this rapid succession of events. From the first moment of the agreement with Napoleon, Cavour had been mainly occupied in turning events in the direction of a war, for he knew by old experience that Austria would never give up her power in Italy unless beaten in the field. On the other hand, it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution, for the agreement with Napoleon provided for help from French armies only in the event of Austria attacking Piedmont. So he began to weave a bold and subtle web of diplomacy, which was to keep Austria isolated, to do away with all possible hindrances to the war on the part of the Powers, and to induce Austria herself to declare war. And at the same time he was busy preparing the military forces of Piedmont, and linking up the ranks of patriots all over Italy, in order to be able to influence public opinion, and yet prevent it from going to excesses.

All this was indeed Cavour's masterpiece during those agitated months of his life, from January to April 1859. Thus he obtained from the Chamber the vote of a loan of 50,000,000 lire for the eventual expenses of a war (February 9th) and kept in constant contact with the National Society, which was stirring up public feeling in various Italian states. But he avoided actual arrangements about armaments which might have seemed like a provocation, and curbed the impatience of the most eager patriots. When however he learned that Austria had put the army of Italy on a war footing (February 25th), when he saw English and Russian diplomacy intent on closing round Piedmont and France in order to prevent war, he had the courage to face a grave decision: he called the contingents to arms and opened Piedmont to volunteers, who rushed in from all parts of Italy, and made them into the body of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi* (Alpine Hunters). This corps he entrusted to Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had now become the symbol of the Italian revolution, and was ready to fight under the Royal flag for the freedom of Italy.

But an obstacle then arose which threatened to shatter these carefully laid plans. Russia, averse to the war, proposed that a congress should be summoned to decide the Italian question, and was soon supported by England and, formally, by Napoleon. Cavour well knew that, confronted by Austrian obstinacy, the congress would only be able to reconfirm the *status quo*, which meant the indefinite postponement of the Italian question. He went to Paris (26th of March) and sought to overcome Napoleon's hesitation; for a short while he almost despaired, and even thought of suicide. Fortunately, however, Austria's overweening pride saved the situation. Austria, who had beaten

Piedmont at Custoza and Novara, whose formidable armies had weighed upon the destinies of Europe even as recently as the Crimean War, who dominated Italy and defended European peace; Austria, too confident of her power, was annoyed that, through Piedmont's fault, the Italian question, which she considered affected herself only, should be brought up for discussion, and she broke off negotiations for the congress (18th of April). European public opinion, and especially that of France which, until that moment, had been uncertain, although cleverly inspired by Cavour and the exiles, soon showed itself favourable towards Italy's aspirations, and Napoleon promised Cavour his help. The situation was saved. Austria's ultimatum reached Turin on the 23rd of April; it bade Piedmont disarm, and gave a period of three days in which to reply. But the battle was already won, the cause of Italy triumphed, and Cavour persuaded the Chamber to pass a Bill granting the King dictatorial powers during the war.

The First Phases of the War : Palestro and Magenta

The Austrian army, which had about 200,000 men in Lombardy-Venetia, was ready; and by April the 29th over 130,000 men were crossing the Ticino at Pavia and Buffalora under General Giulay, and in two days the lines of the Sesia and Po were reached. The plan of campaign was obvious: to fight the Piedmontese army before the arrival of the French, and then to meet the latter gradually as they emerged from the Alpine passes. But Piedmont was also prepared. The little army (only about 60,000 men), under the command of the King, occupied a kind of naturally entrenched camp between Alessandria and Piacenza, which protected part of the territory and the



THEATRE OF WAR 1849 AND 1859

valleys of approach for the French army and threatened the Austrian left wing. The road to Turin on the north was left almost free, but the Piedmontese had here flooded the plains between the Dora and the Sesia, and had posted an enthusiastic group of Garibaldi's volunteers towards Ivrea. The Austrian general hesitated; first he massed his troops towards his left wing to meet the threatened danger there; then he pushed his right wing forward toward Turin, which with a few troops and the national guard was preparing for a strenuous resistance; then he shifted again, falling back on Vercelli. In this way, by marches and counter-marches, he wasted three weeks, and in the meanwhile the French troops were pouring in from all sides, from Genoa, Nice and the Mont Cenis, at the rate of 20,000 men a day. He therefore had to prepare for a possible offensive, so he again concentrated his troops between Mortara and the Po, and foreseeing that the attack would follow the course of this river, threatening by the shortest line the vital centres of Lombardy, he thrust forward against Voghera in order to cut off the enemy's advance while it was on the march. He met with his first grave reverse at Montebello (May 20th) where the Piedmontese forces, supported by a French division, obtained a brilliant victory. In the meantime Napoleon III., having reached Alessandria, put himself at the head of his troops (14th of May) and planned a bold manœuvre northward, which ended in the complete reversal of the enemy's plans. While the Piedmontese troops deployed along the Sesia, covering their movements, they had a fierce and glorious fight at Palestro (30th-31st May), and the bulk of the French army, taking advantage of the Alessandria-Casale-Novara railway, made its way to the latter town and crossed the Ticino below

Turbigo. Giulay, threatened by an encircling movement, was obliged to recross the river, and concentrate a large portion of his troops (about 80,000 men) at Magenta, where, on the 4th of June, a sharp engagement took place. The issue remained undecided for the whole day, but in the evening, through the energy of General MacMahon, and the arrival of a corps commanded by General Fanti, it ended with the complete victory of the allies.

On the 18th of June Victor Emmanuel and Napoleon entered Milan, welcomed by tremendous enthusiasm, while the rear-guard of the Austrian army, retiring towards Lodi and Crema, were beaten at Melegnano. Meanwhile Garibaldi, with his volunteers, who had at first undertaken the Piedmontese defence towards Ivrea, had thrown themselves against Lombardy along the line at the foot of the mountains, and had driven the Austrians from Varese (May 24th) and from S. Fermo (May 27th), whence, after a short retreat, they continued the march upon Lecco, Bergamo and Brescia, amid the enthusiasm of the liberated population.

Solferino and S. Martino ; the Armistice of Villafranca

The beaten Austrian army had now retired towards the *Quadrilatero*, and here was heavily reinforced, and a new commander arrived—the Emperor Franz-Josef himself. The Austrians, designing to hurl back the Franco-Piedmontese armies before they were able to concentrate on the Mincio, immediately recrossed this river and occupied the strong heights of S. Martino and Solferino. On the morning of the 24th, Napoleon, who was aiming at these same positions, encountered the Austrian forces, believed at first to be only small, but later found to be very considerable. A big battle

raged all day, in which more than 130,000 men took part on each side. The Piedmontese directed their forces against S. Martino, whilst the French attacked Solferino. Towards five in the afternoon, after a hard struggle, the French obtained their objectives, and a few hours later, when the light was beginning to fail and a hurricane had suddenly arisen, the Piedmontese, by a prolonged and desperate attack, succeeded in capturing the enemy positions.

The struggle had been fierce. The Austrians had lost over 20,000 men, of whom not less than 13,000 were dead or wounded, while the allied casualties were about the same (4000 Sardinians and 20,000 French). The two emperors looked upon the battlefield with considerable emotion. Since the time of Napoleon I. never had so strenuous and so deadly a day been fought in Italy.

The news of the victory aroused great enthusiasm; it seemed to the Italians to be a sign of the end of their long slavery. But while everyone was looking forward to further progress, which would have soon caused the downfall of Austrian power in Italy, rumours were suddenly circulated of the peace preliminaries at Villafranca, agreed upon by the two emperors on July the 11th. As far back as the 6th an envoy from Napoleon had brought the Austrian Emperor, not a little to his surprise, the proposal for an armistice and a treaty, and the offer had been accepted. The Agreement of Villafranca included the cession of Lombardy to Napoleon, who was to hand it over to King Victor Emmanuel, except for the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, while Parma and Piacenza were tacitly left to Piedmont; Modena, Romagna and Tuscany, who had freed themselves from their sovereigns, were to be forced to revert to their old rulers. Venetia remained

to Austria, but as a province separate from the Empire. Moreover, the Treaty admitted the possibility of an Italian confederation, with the Pope at the head of it.

All of this was only partially in accordance with the clauses of the Alliance, and King Victor Emmanuel tried to oppose it; but Napoleon in reply declared that he could not do otherwise. Cavour, on first hearing of the Treaty, rushed to the scene of action, and when he learned of the proposals he raised angry protests with the King and Prince Jerome; but all in vain. On the evening of July the 11th, not wishing to put his signature to a treaty which destroyed Italian hopes, violated agreements and cast the shadow of suspicion on his policy, Cavour sent in his resignation. Victor Emmanuel signed the preliminaries, with this reserve, which the Emperor himself advised: "*I accept pour ce qui me concerne*"—which was an indication of only partial acceptance, and thus a way was left open for the future.



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UNION OF ITALY, 1859-1870

CHAPTER V

THE ANNEXATIONS, THE EXPEDITION OF THE THOUSAND AND THE PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY (1859-1861)

Causes of the Armistice of Villafranca

NAPOLÉON III.'s decision was due to serious political and military reasons. The war was entailing an enormous effort and grievous losses to France. Its continuation would have demanded new sacrifices, since it was necessary to attack a powerful chain of forts—the so-called *Quadrilatero*. The Emperor knew also that the Italian war, although warmly welcomed by the majority of the French people, aroused grave opposition in the clerical party, which considered a strong Italy as dangerous to the safety of the Papal States. Moreover, events were proceeding in Italy very differently from what Napoleon had calculated. He had proposed to create nothing more than a Kingdom of Northern Italy, counterbalanced by other strong states in Central and Southern Italy, while the Papacy was to exert its moral authority over all. He saw, instead, that Central Italy had one aim, union with Piedmont as a step towards the complete union of Italy, and this destroyed the balance he had conceived and gave another and wholly different character to the new Italian State. But more than all, he had received news that Prussia, concerned by the French victories, was arming, and had gathered together her troops, threatening France on the Rhine. Unable to count on the help of Russia, he was not in a position to face a double war on two distant fronts. It was therefore necessary to make peace as soon as possible, since the main objective, that of fighting Austria in

the twofold interests of French prestige and Italian ideals, had been accomplished.

The First Annexations

The Armistice of Villafranca had thrown everyone in Italy into deep consternation. It seemed indeed to arrest a magnificent movement, determined by a widespread popular will and by a wonderful co-operation between parties and men. Moreover the war against Austria had been transformed into an enthusiastic and disciplined unitarian rising, all of which was the almost unconscious result of the gloomy events of 1848 and 1849 and the ten long years of reactionary oppression. Party differences had altogether ceased; the Constitutional Party had learned to stifle the old municipal instincts for local, autonomous government, while the Revolutionary Party, on the other hand, had not hesitated to welcome the slogan of Manin and of Garibaldi: "Italy and Victor Emmanuel!"

The volunteers had flocked from every part of the country, and at the very outset of the war they had reached the remarkable figure of 20,000 or 25,000 men, drawn from every class of society. Even the humblest classes, not only in the city but also in the country, were profoundly changed; witness the carters, the boatmen, the peasants who, in the country-side of Lombardy and Emilia, on the shores of Tuscany or of Romagna, had with numberless wiles helped the fugitives in their flight towards Piedmont. The whole Italian people was genuinely convinced that the moment had come, and that only at this moment could Italian independence be achieved, and that only under the guidance of Piedmont. Thus it was ready to stifle, with an act of wonderful discipline, every party

disturbance, to condemn all wavering and to renounce every futile wish for traditional self-government.

Scarcely had news arrived of the victory of Magenta when the municipal body of Milan, supported by an imposing popular demonstration, renewed the vote in favour of annexation to Piedmont made in 1848 and sent it to King Victor Emmanuel (May 9th), thus condemning all those acts of weakness and hesitancy which had done so much harm to the first national revolution. A similar procedure was followed by the other Lombard towns, as they freed themselves from the Austrian troops. Thus the new government proceeded to establish itself with amazing rapidity and with a firm and voluntary discipline.

The same thing was taking place in Central Italy. In Tuscany, since the morning of the 27th of April, an imposing popular demonstration at Florence, under the leadership of the patrician Ricasoli and the plebeian Dolfi, had spoken eloquently for Italy and for Victor Emmanuel, so that the Grand Duke, after refusing to unite with Piedmont and grant a constitution, took swift refuge under the wings of Austria. A Provisional Government was, therefore, formed, only to proclaim the sole dictatorship of Victor Emmanuel. Such an act could not be recognised by Piedmont, bound by its agreements with France; so the King merely accepted the Protectorship of Tuscany, sending Boncompagni there as his commissioner, while the Provisional Government was entrusted to Bettino Ricasoli. But the affair served to show Tuscany's uncompromising desire for unity.

In the same way Parma and Piacenza, on the 9th of June, renewing the plebiscite of 1848, joined themselves to Piedmont. Modena, on the flight of the Duke, constituted a Provisional Government Council

to consider union with Piedmont. No sooner had the Austrian troops left, than Bologna offered the Dictatorship to Victor Emmanuel (June 12th). Soon after Cavour sent royal commissioners to these states, to give unity of purpose to the government: Pallieri to Parma, Luigi Carlo Farini to Modena, and D'Azeglio, a little later, into Romagna. The unitarian movement was spreading rapidly through the Marches and into Umbria: Perugia rose against the Papal troops (14th June); Pesaro and Ancona asserted their right to freedom. A violent and disgraceful military repression stifled these risings in the Marches, especially at Perugia; but they indicated none the less the general will of the nation.

*The Provisional Governments of Central Italy after
Villafranca*

The news of the armistice came to disturb a movement which had received wide approbation from the people, but which had gone too far to be stopped completely. The royal commissioners, posted in the various states by the side of the rapidly constituted provisional governments, were actually nothing but delegates of the Royal Government, spontaneously entrusted by the people of the different provinces with sovereign powers, thus forming a direct link with the Government of Turin. How could it have been possible to break up an organisation already formed and in full working order?

The Armistice of Villafranca however was explicit: the old sovereigns had the right to return to their states. It was not specified, however, how they were to return; and thus came about a verbal understanding between the two emperors, by which France and

Austria undertook not to intervene in these states. Cavour, before leaving power, had sent orders to the commissioners to abandon their posts, recommending them at the same time to see that the state was further strengthened by good laws and protected by military forces.

The spontaneous intuition of the people did the rest. The very first were the tiny duchies, which already, in 1848, had anticipated the other provinces by seeking help from the only Italian state willing to uphold liberty. The news of the Armistice of Villafranca had hardly been received when the municipality and the citizens gathered together at Modena, at Reggio and at Parma sent addresses to Victor Emmanuel asking that the representatives should be retained, and that there should be no breaking of the bond which had so favourably united them to the firmer and more generous nucleus of Italy (July 17th). And when, in a moving proclamation announcing the resignations, Farini bade farewell to his fellow-administrators (July 27th), the next day an imposing crowd of people, before the Governor's palace at Modena and at Reggio, proclaimed Farini dictator. In this way the extraordinary powers were restored twofold at the very moment in which they had been renounced. A short time afterwards, at Parma, whence the royal commissioner had departed, dictatorial powers were loudly asked for Farini, with the result that out of various fragments a strong state was formed which, as it were, opened out the way for the Piedmontese monarchy to acquire the rest of Italy. Meanwhile in Tuscany, after Boncompagni's resignation, the dictatorial powers were transferred to Ricasoli, an energetic man, devoted to Cavour, and openly unitarian; and, later, Romagna, already entrusted to D'Azeglio, elected Leonetto

Cipriani as Governor-General, who soon resigned the dictatorship in favour of Farini. The latter, who inspired unlimited confidence, found himself as if by miracle the ruler of a vast state, extending from Piacenza to Rimini.

The people had already expressed their wish for immediate annexation to Piedmont; but Napoleon remained firm in his idea of an Italian confederation, and Victor Emmanuel was obliged to decline these offers, declaring at the same time that he would not fail to bear in mind Italian aspirations. Farini had written to Ricasoli: "We shall win by unity, by energy and, if needs be, by daring," and he at once set about organising a military league between Modena, Romagna and Tuscany, joined also by Parma, which gathered together an army of 25,000 men—which soon increased to 45,000—under the command of Manfredo Fanti of Modena, one of the most gifted generals of the Piedmontese army. This served to declare still more convincingly the will of the Italians to be united and to oppose the return of the old governments. Meanwhile the constituent assemblies met, and the dictators declared once again for union with Piedmont and the House of Savoy.

Amidst these uncertainties the plenipotentiaries of France, Piedmont and Austria met at Zurich in the autumn of 1859 and signed the Peace Treaty (November 10th), which substantially repeated the conditions of Villafranca, adding nothing concerning the fate of the smaller states of Central Italy.

The Return of Cavour and the Cession of Nice and Savoy

At this point Cavour, having seen the course to pursue, returned to the political arena. In the solitude

of Leri he had considered events carefully, and had radically changed his views about the Peace of Villafranca. This peace, in point of fact, by its eloquent silence, opened out the way for the most daring schemes. He realised that it was necessary to force Napoleon's hand by helping him to silence French public opinion, preoccupied by the territorial acquisitions of the new kingdom; he realised further that Austria, exhausted financially and militarily, and watched by Napoleon, was unable to move a finger; finally he realised that the new English ministry (Palmerston and Russell), favourable towards Italy, was only too anxious to wrest from France the prestige gained by her support of liberal ideas, and wished for nothing better than to lend diplomatic assistance.

On the fall of the ministry of La Marmora and Rattazzi (16th of January 1860) Cavour returned to power. Having sent a note to the Powers to the effect that Victor Emmanuel would henceforth be unable to withstand the wishes of the Italian people, he began once more to weave his network of agreements between Napoleon, England and the Provisional Governments of Central Italy. In less than two months he had succeeded in solving this very intricate problem. Napoleon III., opposed at first to the annexations, could not persist any longer in this attitude, since it denied his own professed principle of the rights of nationality; nothing further remained for him to do, therefore, save to demand compensation for France, in order to counterbalance the unexpected advantage gained by the new kingdom and to appease public opinion. He asked for the cession of Savoy and Nice, to which Cavour consented, not only as a recompense to France for the help she had given to the cause of independence, but also to break down the opposition

of the allied nation to the annexations of Tuscany and Romagna.

Great Britain, now a staunch upholder of Italian independence, lent her diplomatic aid, and on the 11th and 12th of March the plebiscites in Emilia, Romagna and Tuscany definitely proclaimed, by an overwhelming majority, the union with King Victor Emmanuel's constitutional monarchy. When on the 24th of March the agreement for the cession of the two provinces to France became known, the extremists were extremely irate, while Garibaldi deeply felt the loss of his birth-place; to which Victor Emmanuel could answer that he had made no less a sacrifice in ceding the land of his fathers to France. By these sacrifices the problem of Italian unity was solved.

The Sicilian Revolution and the Expedition of the Thousand

This agreement guaranteed the principle of non-intervention, and authorised the free expression of the popular will, and made even the most daring schemes possible. The question of Central Italy had still to be settled, when on the 4th of April a revolutionary movement broke out at Palermo.

After the fierce repressions of 1849, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had devoted all its energies to strengthening its military forces and to making itself, by police methods, proof against insurrections. The sporadic efforts of Baron Bentivegna and of Carlo Pisacane had been sternly put down.¹ The army numbered over 100,000 men and the fleet consisted of 120 ships. Moreover in the southern towns, that section of the middle classes which elsewhere—in

¹ See Chapter IV., p. 74.

the towns of Lombardy and Romagna—had kept alive the revolutionary spirit was far from numerous. Ferdinand II., the faithless and cruel prince, had been succeeded in May 1859 by his son, Francis II., a youth who, though neither wicked nor dishonest, was weak and foolish. Upon the news of the victory of Magenta a great demonstration had taken place in the streets of Naples (June 7th); but it had been but a momentary flare-up; the police were on the watch. Meanwhile, in pursuance of Napoleon's plan, Cavour had suggested an alliance to the King of Naples; but the idea had not been welcomed owing to lack of energy on the part of the King, who followed the counsels of Rome and of the reactionaries.


In Sicily however conditions were different. Here a larger proportion of the wealthy middle class and of the industrious working class, especially in the towns, had always shown itself anxious for liberty, and had fought several times for autonomy. The gospel of Mazzini, having easily penetrated into this ferment, spread abroad unitarian and republican ideals and destroyed the old separatist tendencies. Later, in 1858, the unitarian-monarchical idea had taken the place of this republican idea. La Farina, secretary of the National Italian Society, was a Sicilian; Francesco Crispi—a republican, yet ready to sacrifice his personal bias to the supreme aims of liberty and to the unity of the mother-country—was also a Sicilian.

From September 1859 onwards, revolutionary committees had become numerous in Sicilian towns. From Liguria and Malta arms had been smuggled in great numbers by the exiles, and Giuseppe Garibaldi had been sent for to lead the revolution.

Garibaldi, who combined daring with the prudence

of a great leader, had declared that he would intervene only in case of a serious and well-organised revolution, having some hope of success. Meanwhile Mazzini was urging his friends on to action (March 1860); in Palermo two committees, one of nobles and the other of workmen, the latter presided over by the tinsmith, Francesco Riso, agreed to rise, and fixed the date for the 4th of April. The insurrection was to break out at Palermo, Catania and Messina; the conspirators were to stir up the towns, while bands of armed men were to come in from the country-side. But the police were on the watch, over 20,000 soldiers were in Palermo, and the action of the committees was forestalled. At the fixed moment only Riso and a few followers started the insurrection. They barricaded themselves in the convent of Garcia, where they made a desperate stand against overwhelming numbers. Riso died of wounds and fourteen of his comrades were sent to the scaffold. Almost simultaneously Messina had risen, but the revolution had been stifled. On the 10th of April, however, several Sicilian exiles landed at Messina—Rosolino Pilo, Prince of Capece and the plebeian Giovanni Corrao, with a few followers who, with the cognizance of Mazzini and Crispi, had set out from Genoa to aid the Sicilian revolution—carrying news of Garibaldi's support. This gave new life to the movement on the eve of collapse, at least as far as the guerrilla bands of patriots were concerned, which were overrunning the island pursued by Bourbon troops.

When, on the 6th of April, news reached Genoa of the Sicilian revolution, Bixio, Crispi and Bertani hastened to Garibaldi at Turin and induced him to set himself at the head of an expedition. Garibaldi accepted on condition that the insurrection held out until his arrival



EXPEDITION OF THE THOUSAND

and that the enterprise was carried out in the name and with the consent of Victor Emmanuel. This last condition placed the Royal Government in an awkward position. Victor Emmanuel himself was favourable to the enterprise and had the highest faith in Garibaldi ; but Cavour hesitated, fearing new diplomatic difficulties, whilst the other extremely grave problems of those days remained as yet unsolved. Perhaps he feared that the hotheads who were pushing the expedition, and who were for the most part Republicans, should gain ascendancy over the loyal soul of Garibaldi, and give a republican direction to the enterprise (April 30th). In the meantime, from every part of Italy, the followers of Garibaldi and many other young enthusiasts were flocking to Genoa, where the expedition was being prepared. La Farina had handed over the rifles of the National Society and money was not wanting. On the 1st of May, Cavour, forced by his diplomatic position, showed signs of wishing to prevent the expedition, but the King being of the opinion that consent should be given, Cavour ordered the authorities at Genoa to give no help, but neither were they to prevent the departure. On the dawn of the 5th of May two ships, forcibly requisitioned from the Compagnia di Navigazione Rubattino, the *Piemonte* and the *Lombardo*, left Quarto, with about 1100 volunteers from every region of Italy, on their way to make a bid for the oldest and vastest state of the old divided Italy.

The Landing at Marsala and the Capture of Palermo

After a short pause at Talamone (May 7th), where a few men landed feigning an expedition against the Papal States, the two ships, skilfully avoiding the

Bourbon fleet, arrived on the 11th of May at Marsala, and the landing began. To ensure that, as it were, no part of Italy should be left outside the ring of Italian unity, Garibaldi had chosen for it the extreme western coast of Sicily, as that farthest from the centres of revolt. Here, too, the landing was easier and the place more favourable to a successful beginning of the enterprise.

The landing had hardly begun when three Bourbon vessels appeared and began to bombard the port and the shore. It was a serious moment, but the situation was saved by the providential intervention of two English vessels, anchored outside the port, which demanded that the Bourbon admiral should respect the property of British subjects—*i.e.* the wine distilleries of Marsala over which the English flag was flying. The bombardment ceased and the landing was completed almost undisturbed.

At dawn on the 12th of May the expedition proceeded towards Salemi (see Map, p. 97). There it was joined by a squadron of Sicilian insurgents and the smouldering enthusiasm of the people was fanned into flame. At Salemi Garibaldi issued a decree by which he declared that he assumed the dictatorship in the name of Victor Emmanuel and ordered, at least in theory, a levy *en masse* (May 13th), and set out for Palermo. At Calatafimi his way was barred by a body of 4000 Bourbon soldiers. Although Garibaldi had only 800 of his own volunteers, and a little over 1000 armed Sicilians who had just joined his corps and lacked discipline and equipment, nevertheless he realised it was necessary to break through, as this would lend glory to the expedition and stir up the islanders.

On the 15th of May he attacked an enemy twice as strong in numbers and occupying a superior strategic

position. With wonderful resolution he fought on even when the issue seemed hopeless, and after eight hours' battle put the enemy to flight. The Bourbon troops retreated on Palermo, continuously harassed by squadrons of insurgents. Garibaldi's victory awakened new enthusiasm, new hopes and new courage. It was necessary however to lose no time in taking advantage of the favourable moment.

On the evening of the 18th the Garibaldians were at Renda, within sight of Palermo, but news came that the road was defended by a strong Bourbon army. Since it was impossible to reach Palermo from this side, protected as it was by an army of more than 20,000 men occupying formidable positions, Garibaldi suddenly turned south and encamped at Piana dei Greci, thus misleading the Bourbon general, who, thinking his aim was to penetrate further into the island in order to continue the guerrilla warfare there, followed him to Corleone. Instead of which Garibaldi, with a turning movement eastwards and then northwards, appeared unexpectedly at Gibilrossa, near Palermo, on the 26th of May. Here he joined forces with 3000 Sicilians, under La Masa, and thence, by night, he launched an attack against Porta Termini, which, taken by surprise, yielded to the heroic bravery of the Garibaldians. Garibaldi daringly entered the city, while the people of Palermo rose unanimously and engaged in a series of fierce street battles, threw up barricades and withstood a bombardment by land and sea. After three days' fighting, Lanza, the Bourbon general, was induced by the English admiral, Mundy, to ask for an armistice (May 30th), and opened negotiations just as new reinforcements reached the Bourbon troops. Once begun, however, the negotiations were pursued, and on the 31st of May an agreement was

drawn up, according to which the Bourbon troops were to evacuate the city within a few days.

Master of Palermo, the Dictator saw to public security and to the maintenance of law and order, and started reorganising his troops. Help was now forthcoming from the Piedmontese Government, which, profiting by the principle of non-intervention, and with the certainty that what had happened would duly be sanctioned, began openly to aid the Sicilian rising. On June the 6th the Sardinian fleet arrived at Palermo, and a short time afterwards three bodies of Italian volunteers, under the command of Medici, Cosenz and Malenchini, joined the Garibaldian troops.

Military action was energetically pressed forward. Garibaldi formed flying columns of troops which later, under the command of Türr, Bixio and Medici, moved towards the east coast. The Bourbon army barred the way at Milazzo, where the battle, begun by Medici on the 20th of July, was continued under the command of Garibaldi and ended with another victory. Sicily was now entirely free.

On the night of the 19th-20th of August the Garibaldian troops, eluding the vigilance of the Bourbon ships, crossed the Straits of Messina and landed in Calabria. The march now proceeded at a lightning speed, and everywhere the people welcomed Garibaldi as a liberator. The Bourbon army, surprised by the daring movements of Garibaldi and Cosenz, was crumbling up and surrendering. Francis II. fled from Naples on the night of the 6th of September, and on the following day Garibaldi entered the city, enthusiastically acclaimed by the inhabitants.

*The Intervention of the Royal Army in the Marches and
in the Neapolitan Provinces*

Garibaldi's enterprise had triumphed with amazing swiftness, but the main body of the Bourbon army had retreated to the line of the Volturno and was preparing for a new offensive. Elsewhere, around Rome and the Roman State, after the successful repressions at Perugia and Ancona, all the reactionary forces had been collecting, under shelter of papal authority. An army of Papal troops had been formed which, with Lamorcière at its head, might seriously threaten the Italian revolution. Cavour realised that it was now necessary to fight these forces with a well-organised regular army that should prevent any surprise move on their part. Moreover, he wished to forestall the possibility that the swiftness of his successes should induce Garibaldi to carry out the undertaking, so often attempted, of capturing Rome and thus creating new and unsurmountable difficulties with France. Again, he may have had a vague suspicion that the uncompromising supporters of Mazzini would flock around Garibaldi, gain the ascendancy over the hero and draw him from a wholehearted support of the unification of Italy under the monarchy.

Urged by Manfredo Fanti to counteract the danger of an armed Papal reaction and to forestall the possible intervention of Garibaldi in the Papal States, with no less lightning promptness he planned immediate intervention in the Marches and Umbria. He therefore ordered the regular army to lend its support, as soon as possible, to the Garibaldian enterprise in the Kingdom of Naples, so as to ensure the fall of the last Bourbon defences and to guarantee the possession of

the whole kingdom to the monarchy. Napoleon III., by this intervention, was saved any complications connected with the Roman question, and though he did not give his explicit consent he was unable to oppose it.

On the 7th of September 1860 Cavour intimated to Cardinal Antonelli to disband the Papal adventurers, and on the 10th the Italian army crossed the frontier under the command of General Fanti. While one of the two corps into which it had been divided occupied Orvieto and Perugia, the other, under General Cialdini, after occupying Pesaro, met the army of Lamorcière at Castelfidardo and wiped it out (18th of September). After a short siege Ancona also was forced to capitulate (September 29th). The Marches and Umbria were thus freed, and a plebiscite shortly afterwards joined them to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel.

The army was now free to proceed southwards under King Victor Emmanuel, who had placed himself at its head at Ancona, on the 9th of October. On the 15th he crossed the frontier on the road towards the Abruzzi, and was everywhere hailed as a liberator. The Bourbon troops, however, numbering about 40,000 men, who occupied strong positions along the line of the Volturno, with Capua for their base, had already violently attacked the Garibaldians (about 24,000) who had advanced to meet them (October the 1st). The battle was fierce, but was fought with great bravery by the volunteers and was won by the able strategy of the Garibaldians. The volunteers lost over 3000 men killed or wounded, but the Bourbon losses were heavier still, so that the Neapolitan army, defeated and driven back, was obliged to retreat behind the second line of the Garigliano.

The Annexation of the Two Sicilies

The plebiscites at Naples and in Sicily had expressed almost unanimously the desire for union with the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel. Garibaldi, who had gone to meet the King, joined him at Teano (October 27th), and in that simple clasp of the hand was symbolised, as it were, the generous handing over of a whole Italian kingdom to the banner of Italian unity. On the 8th of November, in the throne-room at Naples, Garibaldi solemnly presented the King with the plebiscites of Naples and Sicily, and a few days later, refusing any decoration, he left for the solitude of his island home at Caprera.

The last diplomatic and military difficulties remained still to be overcome to ensure the kingdom's conquest of so large a part of its territory. The intervention of the army in the Marches and in Umbria had provoked the protests of Russia and Prussia, besides the formal protests of Napoleon. Austria threatened to intervene, but the skill of Cavour, the firmness of Napoleon, added to the loyal support of England, overcame these difficulties. Meanwhile the regular army was pressing the Bourbon troops on the line of the Garigliano and at Gaeta. When, through the energetic remonstrances of England, it was possible to obtain the departure of a French fleet from the waters of Gaeta (January 19th, 1861) the stronghold, surrounded on all sides, was obliged to surrender to the Italian troops.

The Proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy

Meanwhile the general elections had taken place in every province, old and new. On the 18th of February 1861, when opening the new Parliament at Turin,

Victor Emmanuel hailed it as "the first Italian Parliament." Immediately afterwards a law, approved unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies and by the Senate, proclaimed the constitution of the Kingdom of Italy in the person of Victor Emmanuel and of his successors (March 17th, 1861). The generation which had witnessed the formation, in less than two years, of a single, strong and united state—which embraced nearly all Italy and comprised nearly 22,000,000 inhabitants—out of so many states for centuries divided, could look at the achievement of Italian unity, now nearing its completion, with a mingled sense of wonder and satisfaction. Venice still remained outside, but everyone knew that the struggle, interrupted by Villafranca, would soon be resumed. As to Rome, the logical necessity of things, as well as tradition and the wishes of all, made it be recognised as the ideal and essential centre, the apex of the now united edifice, and the only capital capable of removing every divergence of interests and local rivalries. A vote passed in the Chamber (March 27th), inspired by Cavour, did not hesitate daringly to proclaim Rome the "Capital of Italy": while awaiting to join her once and for all to the other parts of the nation, now at last almost all again reunited—over which, for so many centuries, she had presided with such glory.

CHAPTER VI

THE WAR FOR THE LIBERATION OF VENETIA AND THE OCCUPATION OF ROME (1861-1871)

Political and Financial Difficulties of the New Kingdom

THEIR newly acquired liberty aroused in the Italians an impatient desire for radical changes in their public and private institutions and for equitable social well-being. But very grave difficulties presented themselves immediately, as the new kingdom was heir to an unhappy past of over three centuries of foreign domination, during which Italy had remained almost entirely shut out from the rapid progress of modern nations. Commerce was scanty, industry scarcer still, agriculture was behindhand; there were few roads and fewer railways (in Southern Italy there were only 128 kilometres of railroad, while in Piedmont there were 850); the ports were small and almost deserted, and the schools almost non-existent; the whole economic and social life of the country had been stifled in the interest of the nations who had preyed upon it—Spain, France and Austria—through a paltry and fearful Government policy. What the standard of moral life was, is shown by the very low standard of education (illiteracy had reached the alarming figure of 78 per cent.), owing to the prejudices of an ignorant and corrupt clergy and of an idle and powerful nobility. In Northern and Central Italy there were signs of activity on the part of an urban middle class, the remains for the most part of former prosperity never wholly destroyed, and now reawakening to life. In the south appalling sordidness reigned, characterised by primitive

agriculture, complete isolation of the various centres, malaria, and by superstition.

Moreover ancient traditions and unexhausted wealth, monuments and memories worthy of respect, prevented men from proceeding with the freedom of those who build on new soil. Acute differences between the various regions, discordant economic conditions, laws and customs, for the most part inspired by the spirit of a remote civilisation, hampered the levelling action of the unitarian ideal, so that the task of reform was extremely delicate and difficult.

Signs of this difficult condition of affairs soon appeared in the outbreak of brigandage in Southern Italy which followed the victories of Garibaldi and of the royal army. It was determined by social causes—*i.e.* by the poverty and wretched conditions of the field labourers—but it assumed also a political character by reason of the plots of the Bourbons, who had taken refuge in Rome, and who encouraged it in the hope of regaining possession of the throne, no less than on account of a natural reaction against the new system of government. It needed a bitter struggle, that lasted four years (1860-1864), to stamp it out; but even then the economic and social causes which had brought it about were not wholly removed.

Again every plan for economic improvement and reform came up against the extreme lack of public funds, for the National Debt reached the sum, at that time considered enormous, of 3,000,000,000 lire, while the annual deficit of the first budget came to over 250,000,000 lire. To cover the expenses of the State it was necessary to have recourse to loans and taxation; but the loans swelled the public debt and the taxes were a burden on public wealth which should instead have been lightened rather than increased.

To these various difficulties was added a further grave misfortune ; on the 6th June 1861, after a brief illness, Cavour died. The State lost in him a great supporter, a profound student of the problems of public economy and of politics, and one who had gained the trust of the whole of the New Italy.

The Political Parties ; Aspromonte

In his speech on the 18th of February 1861, before the representatives of the first National Parliament, Victor Emmanuel, exalting the awe-inspiring events of the unification, had said : " These events have filled the nation with a great confidence in its own destiny." In these words lay a hope and a wish ; but the "*Re Galantuomo*" had therein struck upon—perhaps without knowing it—the greatest danger which awaited the political life of the new Italy. The rapid and immense good fortune which in less than two years had given Italians a free and united mother-country was very propitious to excessive confidence in their own strength and in the course of events, which easily leads to mistakes. In the course of a few months the power of Austria had been crushed on the battlefields of Palestro and Magenta, of S. Martino and Solferino ; three thrones had been seen fall and, later, a vast kingdom and other large provinces had been joined to the rest of Italy. Heroic feats of daring had been rewarded with undreamt-of success, and seemed to call for new feats of daring to crown the work as yet unfinished, by quickly joining Venice and Rome to Italy, thereby giving her back her full national energies. Every delay, every hesitation seemed a crime and a lack of intelligence. It was not realised that this good fortune was due to the almost fortuitous conjunction of

wholly exceptional circumstances and, above all, to an unusually complete unity of purpose and of parties which was not likely to be repeated.

This exaggerated confidence in the fate of the nation, which the populace expressed in the famous saying about trusting to Italy's good star (to the "*Stellone d'Italia*"), was not exactly calculated to make them see in their true light the terrible difficulties facing a new nation just beginning to live again, and at times it was responsible for impatience and foolhardiness, and at others for discouragement and hesitation—things disturbing both to the minds of the citizens and to the life of the State.

Because of this the divergencies between parties had become more clearly defined. Nor did these follow theoretical party differences which are necessary to the normal development of a constitutional government, but were confused with personal interests, regional antagonisms and individual and class discontent. All this broke out in the parliamentary debates, in the newspapers, in the administrative bodies, in public places, and prevented a calm review of the real needs of public life. An example of this unrest was the attack, moved by Garibaldi, against Cavour during the parliamentary sitting of the 18th of April 1861, when, taking advantage of the Government's treatment of the Garibaldian militia, a sharp quarrel had arisen between the two great driving forces of the *Risorgimento*. But further signs of excess were seen later, over and over again, during this agitated period.

A party had been formed which called itself "*The Party of Action*," led by Garibaldi. It was composed of the firebrands, malcontents and extremists of all parties. It resolved to decide immediately the problem of the independence of Venice and Rome, and it accused of pusillanimity and stupidity all opposition

from the responsible members of the Government. Moreover the parliamentary Right, which was opposed to these outbursts, was incapable of following a firm and courageous policy, and showed itself weak and vacillating before the indignation and agitations of the extreme parties.

This vacillation in the matter of government at once became apparent in the successors of Cavour. The ministry formed by Bettino Ricasoli showed itself powerless to lead the State, and gave place to a ministry composed for the most part of men from the Left, presided over by Urbano Rattazzi, who nominally advocated a more daring political programme, but who actually showed himself to be the servant of the most restless elements of the country, whom he was forced later to disavow. Confident of the Government's acquiescence, the Party of Action at once began its revolutionary agitations—first of all by a rising at Sarnico, aimed at the Venetian frontier and immediately crushed, and then by a much wider movement for the liberation of Rome, which ended in the sad incident at Aspromonte. In July 1862 Garibaldi went down to Sicily and gathered about him a few thousand volunteers, mostly Sicilians, ready to follow his war-cry of "Rome or Death!" The Government did nothing to nip in the bud this wholly ill-advised movement; while it was the general opinion that there was a secret agreement between Garibaldi and the King. When Garibaldi with his men crossed to the mainland to stir up a march upon Rome the Government was at last forced to take prompt action, and on the 29th of August the Bersaglieri, commanded by Pallavicini, met the Garibaldians at Aspromonte. Italian blood was shed—seven soldiers and five Garibaldians fell—and Garibaldi, wounded in the foot,

was captured with his followers, and conducted to the fort of Varignano, near Spezia. An amnesty arrived without delay, by way of seeking to appease the parties, but the gloomy episode, which might have been so easily avoided, could not be wiped out, and Rattazzi was forced to resign (November 1862).

*The September Convention and the Removal of the
Capital to Florence*

A Government by the Right followed, first under Farini, then under Minghetti, who attacked the gravest problems and sought to give them a practical solution; but he found a formidable obstacle in the deficit, and was forced to add considerably to the public debt. Among other problems, the gravest and most urgent was that of converting an agglomeration of scattered principalities, each possessing marked regional differences, into a unified and well-organised modern nation. The new Italy was not to be an enlarged Piedmont: it was to become a separate and compact organism, and the Right had the great merit of achieving this end, through a brave and energetic policy and a wide system of legislation based on organic and rational principles. But with regard to the administrative problems it followed a system of uniform concentration which complicated the bureaucratic organisation and destroyed some local peculiarities, corresponding to real or historical conditions, which might well have been spared. We must recognise however that, in all the other political, financial and legislative problems, the Right did notably contribute to the rapid removal of Italian regional differences and to the solution of very serious financial and political problems.

The so-called September Convention (signed on

the 15th of September 1864) between Minghetti and Napoleon III. aimed not only, as was thought, at delaying the Roman question in order to keep peace with France, but it answered to the rational design of reviving the political life of the country, and was an immediate result of the policy of the Right. The minister Minghetti, from its very inception, resumed the discussions with Napoleon III., begun by Cavour and continued by Ricasoli, with a view to obtaining the removal from Rome of the French troops, who seriously impaired the dignity of Italy and were a pretext for revolutionary agitations. Napoleon consented on condition that a guarantee should be given to Catholic public opinion in France that the Italian Government loyally promised not to disturb the peace with France and the Catholic world by the occupation of Rome. The guarantee offered by Minghetti consisted in removing the capital from Turin to Florence and a pledge on the part of the Italian Government to defend the integrity of the Papal territory, which was duly accepted by Napoleon.

It aroused, however, the most violent protests. The Party of Action saw in it a betrayal of Italian ambitions in regard to Rome, and on the 20th of September serious trouble broke out in Turin. King Victor Emmanuel invited the ministry to resign, but the Convention, which was following out the plan of organising a revival of Italian political life, and was really another step towards the acquisition of Rome, was not affected.

At Milan, at Naples and at Bologna it was received with public acclamations; the La Marmora Ministry had it approved by the two parties in Parliament (November 19th); France withdrew her troops from Rome, and the capital of the kingdom was removed to Florence (June 1865).

The Venetian Question and the Prusso-Italian Alliance

The September Convention induced the Government and the country to give great prominence to the Venetian question. This could be attained in three ways: by a treaty with Austria for a peaceful surrender of the region, which was to be henceforth joined to Italy; by a general insurrection of all the peoples under Austrian tyranny, which would free the Venetians from the bondage of foreign slavery, supported if necessary by the armed intervention of Italy; finally, by an offensive and defensive alliance with a foreign Power with a view to a common war against Austria. The first plan was tried by La Marmora, who sounded with caution the opinions of the Government circles in Vienna, but he came up against the blind stubbornness of Austria. As to the second, it formed the great ideal of Giuseppe Mazzini, whose seer-like spirit would have liked every nation oppressed by Austria to rise in one united revolutionary movement. With this end in view he had, until 1863, maintained from London close touch with Hungarian and Slav patriots, and had come to an agreement with Garibaldi and King Victor Emmanuel. But this second alternative was soon shown to be too difficult and perhaps not suitable at the moment, since the people of Venetia would have had to rise against a Power which had turned their lands into field-works, while the Slavs of Austria had as yet no realisation of their nationality, and the Hungarians were already aiming at a close and selfish understanding with Austria, which was to be realised in a few years' time (1867).

One way still remained: an alliance with a strong nation adverse to Austria, with a view to a common war upon the Empire of the Hapsburgs; and this

nation could only be Prussia, which was already aspiring to affirm its power and to place itself at the head of the German Confederation. This same idea had been in the mind of Cavour when, towards the end of January 1861, he had sent La Marmora to Berlin, presumably as an act of courtesy but in reality secretly to prepare the ground for a Prusso-Italian alliance against Austria. Afterwards, for various reasons, the idea had been completely forgotten; but it was later destined to be taken up, and with more precise plans in view, by the great Prussian minister, Otto von Bismarck, who, upon coming into office, had immediately and stealthily placed in motion his complex machinery of intrigues, violence and clever ruses, in order to obtain new lands for Prussia and to exclude Austria from the Confederation. It should be noticed that with this end in view, in December 1862, he had sent an emissary to Turin secretly to ask the Italian Government what its attitude would be in case of a war against Austria, and having received the expected answer he had engineered the disagreement between Prussia and Austria for the joint rule of Schleswig-Holstein, and was now aiming at giving Prussia the exclusive right over those regions, snatched from Denmark, and so confirming the primacy of Prussia.

Thus between Bismarck and La Marmora, now President of the Council of Ministers, negotiations for an alliance were set on foot. Things proceeded with great difficulty, partly on account of the unwillingness in Prussian circles for a war against Austria, and partly because of Bismarck's distrust of Italy on account of her attachment to France. But Napoleon III., who, from a struggle between Prussia and Austria, hoped to gain the Rhenish Provinces for the French Empire, encouraged Italy to push on proceedings.

After long delays an offensive and defensive alliance between Prussia and Italy was signed at Berlin, by which it was agreed that, if war broke out between Prussia and Austria, Italy would declare war on Austria and carry it on with energy, that the allies would not conclude either peace or armistice without reciprocal consent and, in any case, not before Austria had given up the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia to Italy and equivalent territories to Prussia (8th of April 1866). When Austria received tardy information of this alliance, then, and then only, did she bestir herself and, through Napoleon III., suggested, at the beginning of May, the cession of Venice to Italy, on condition that the latter would remain neutral in the case of an Austro-Prussian War. The offer, as may be seen, was both attractive and embarrassing; but La Marmora in his great loyalty did not hesitate for a moment, but refused the proposal, thus remaining faithful to the treaty.

The War of 1866; Custoza and Sadowa

War was now imminent; it was declared by La Marmora on the 20th of June, with an interval of three days in which to begin hostilities. The war against Austria with the aim of freeing Venice removed at once all internal dissensions and awoke the most ardent enthusiasm throughout the country.

But the result of the campaign did not correspond to this magnificent unity of purpose, owing entirely, it must be confessed, to lack of preparation and to the bad conduct of the campaign.

First of all the army preparations had been completed slowly and without any well-defined guiding principle. The Italian army was then in its early

infancy, and from 1865 onwards, after the death of Manfredo Fanti, who had been its creator and organiser, financial needs had weakened instead of strengthened it. To which should be added the problem of leadership. There were several commanders who had justly become famous and could not easily be made to co-operate or be eliminated. Apart from Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi, Cialdini, the victor of Castelfidardo, and Gaeta, who carried on Fanti's clever military ideas, had to be taken into account; it was also impossible to ignore La Marmora, who, as head of the Government, had conducted diplomatic negotiations and who as former commander in the Crimean War, and as Chief of the General Staff in the victorious war of 1859, now aspired to be the leader of the new campaign.

The new Italian state lacked as yet the rigid sense of discipline which is ready to sacrifice personal ambition to ensure the efficiency and adequate military preparation of the army. Because of this, while the last preparations for the war were being hurriedly pushed through, and soldiers and volunteers were being called up, a compromise was reached with regard to the command which was one of the main causes of the unfortunate outcome of the campaign. Whilst Garibaldi was entrusted with the task of piercing the difficult lines of the Trentino, the supreme command was given to the King, though in reality to his Chief of Staff, General La Marmora, who was at the head of three army corps (about 110,000 men). Cialdini, on the other hand, as commander of an enlarged army corps of 80,000 men, was given power to follow out his own plan of attack, and complete freedom of action in respect of the supreme command. To the fatal error of this divided command was added

a divergence of opinion between La Marmora and Cialdini as to the plan of action. Whereas the latter wished the main body of the army merely to make a feint towards the Mincio, against the Quadrilateral, in order to attract and hold the enemy forces, and thus enable the invading army to cross the Po towards Ferrara and thence, proceeding swiftly beyond the radius of the armed fortresses, to threaten Rovigo and Vicenza—vital points in the enemy's defences—La Marmora, on the other hand, obsessed by the old Piedmontese plan of attacking the Quadrilateral, intended reserving the task of the main attack to his more numerous troops.

Austria, forced to fight on two different fronts against two enemies, had in Italy an army of only 100,000 men. She made up for her inferiority in numbers however by unity of command, in the person of an energetic and clever general, the Archduke Albert, and by having skilful military preparation and exact information as to the enemy's movements. When the Archduke Albert, who had all his troops well in hand, learned that La Marmora's army had passed the Mincio, to occupy a position near Verona, he forestalled him by a forced march on the heights of Custoza and Sona (see Map, p. 123), where, on the morning of June the 24th, he launched a surprise attack against the left wing, thus provoking a long and fierce battle, fought with great bravery by a few sections of troops isolated from the rest of the Italian army, without any orders from the supreme command, which, taken by surprise, did not know what to do, while several commanders, lacking initiative, watched the battle with idle troops. When, towards six in the evening, the two most active corps (the 1st and 3rd), exhausted and harassed by superior forces, were forced to surrender, the order

was given for a wholly unjustified general retreat beyond the Mincio, which in some places had the appearance of a rout. Thus the Austrian army, which had lost more men than the Italian (6700 men, as compared to 6000 Italians), found itself victorious almost without knowing it.

All this was bound to have a bad effect on the conduct of the other detached army corps preparing for the difficult task of crossing the Po. When Cialdini received news of the flight, further exaggerated by the commanders' confused impressions, he judged it dangerous to attempt to cross the river and to expose himself to the risk of being surprised by a rapid advance on the part of the victorious Austrians. Accordingly he too ordered a retreat on Bologna, so as to be ready to oppose the victorious army should it attempt to cross the river at one of the two likely points at Borgoforte or at Ferrara. But his movement, justified from a military point of view, contributed to keep the army inactive, when under a better leadership it might perhaps have taken swift revenge.

Meanwhile events were proceeding swiftly on the other front, where the Prussian army, most carefully prepared, with skilful strategical movements penetrated into Bohemia and after much fighting for the space of two weeks defeated the Austrians at Sadowa (July 3rd).

*The Renewal of the Campaign in Italy: the Battle
of Lissa*

These events induced Austria once more to offer Venice to Italy; and Napoleon III., who hoped for new territories from a defeat, and not from a victory, of Prussia, seeing his dream shattered and wishing

for peace, insisted on the offer being accepted. The Italian Government, bound by its alliance, refused, and provided for a vigorous continuation of the war (July 5th). While Garibaldi was having brilliant successes in the Trentino, Cialdini, appointed commander-in-chief, carrying out his plan of crossing the Po, occupied Rovigo and advanced rapidly along the Piave (July 20th). But Austria, invaded by the Prussian army, was recalling its troops from Venetia, and the march of the Italian army met with little opposition and was enthusiastically greeted by the populations freed from the Austrian yoke.

Urgently in need of military successes, Italian hopes turned towards the fleet, which was stronger than the Austrian and rich in brave sailors; but, formed as it was out of the antagonistic elements of the old Sardinian and Neapolitan navies, badly commanded by Persano—an admiral who did not enjoy the confidence of his men—and lacking naval bases in the Adriatic, its conduct had been uncertain, thereby losing the opportunity of beating the Austrian ships when they appeared before Ancona (June 27th).

To fulfil the country's needs Persano was forced, by a formal invitation from the minister Depretis (a lawyer who had unfortunately been entrusted with the Secretaryship of the Navy), to strike a decisive blow against the island of Lissa, under pain of being deprived of his command. On the 19th of July the forts of Lissa were bombarded; but the following day, when the Austrian fleet appeared under the command of Admiral Tegethoff, in battle formation, the Italian fleet, with no faith in its commander, poorly armed, weakened by personal antagonisms and by the lack of discipline among certain commanders, fought badly. Seven alone of the twenty-one ships took part, and amongst

them that of the despised admiral. Brilliant deeds of bravery were not wanting, but the Italians lost two large ships, the *Palestro* and the *Re d'Italia*, and were beaten almost without fighting; while the enemy's fleet, fearing the intervention of the second-line vessels, commanded by Albini, which until then had remained inactive, retreated with few losses to the canal of Lesina, proud of its easy success.

*The Armistices of Nikolsburg and Cormons and the
Consequences of the War of 1866*

Just at this time Bismarck succeeded in subduing the militarist tendencies of a triumphant Prussia, and with his own aims in view proposed an armistice to Austria (July 21st) which foretold favourable conditions for the conquered. This act, as far as Italy was concerned, was politically disastrous and disloyal. The wording of the Prusso-Italian Treaty obliged the parties not to make peace or grant an armistice without the reciprocal consent of the parties concerned; instead of which the armistice had been concluded entirely without the knowledge of Italy, and just at a time when the vigorous action of the Italian army had rewarded Garibaldi with the victory of Bezzecca, General Medici with the successes of Primolano and Borgo, and Cialdini with the rapid march into Venetia (22nd-23rd of July). Prussia, protesting that the conditions of peace were satisfactory as regards Italy, since she now gained Venetia, signed the peace preliminaries at Nikolsburg (July 26th). Italy, though reluctant and indignant at having lost the opportunity of recovering from the defeat of Custoza and Lissa, but driven by circumstances, which would have brought upon her the whole weight of the Austrian army, was forced,

after an eight days' truce, to sign preliminaries of peace at Cormons, by which she had to give up the Trentino and all lands occupied towards the Isonzo. Garibaldi, surprised by the news of the armistice almost at the gates of Trento, answered the Government's invitation to withdraw with the famous and tragic "I obey," which showed in the hero that virtue of discipline which had failed the majority of Italians in the difficult hour of trial.

The defeats at Custoza and at Lissa had regrettable consequences that pierced the hearts of the men of the time, and weighed for two generations on the political life of Italy. First of all, they prevented the accomplishment of the national will which had been expressed by the unanimous consent of all parties and all classes. Venice had been joined to the other free provinces, but indirectly, by means of a surrender which wounded the natural dignity of a nation which had fought loyally if not with success. It is true that the plebiscites at the annexation period, by which the Venetians had expressed almost unanimously the desire to be united to Italy, did much to heal this wound; but there yet remained the form sanctioned by the peace treaty concluded at Vienna, on October the 3rd, and which shouldered Italy with the public debt of the province—a sum of 87,000,000 lire.

In the second place, it was chiefly as an outcome of the war that Austria was given a free hand to trace a line of frontier wholly disadvantageous to Italy, who thus found herself continually menaced by a powerful army ready at any moment to invade her by open and well-protected roads. In the Friuli, Austria kept a whole bastion, from the Pontebba to Monfalcone, from which it could pounce upon the defenceless plain; while in the north, by the occupation of the

whole Trentino, it kept a road opening out into the valley of the Po, which offered numerous and formidable ways of invasion into Venetia and Lombardy. So, too, in the Adriatic, the sea of Venice, Austria was exerting a predominance in the highest degree prejudicial to the pacific development of Italian national life.

Finally, the failures of the war, instead of inciting Italians to a calm and thoughtful survey of its real causes and to a solid preparation for an eventual *revanche*, threw the nation once more into a sea of fruitless bickerings and recriminations and party quarrels, leaving it for several decades in the woeful position of a beaten nation, which, though beaten for reasons that were not insurmountable, has none the less lost all faith in itself. At Palermo there were many reactionary disturbances put down by force (16th-21st of September). La Marmora, of little use as an army commander, but who very loyally conducted negotiations for an alliance, and subsequently, with great political insight, no less difficult peace negotiations, was violently and unjustly attacked as a politician, without anyone being able to see and to remedy the real failings of the Italian army. The long and badly conducted trial of Persano, leaving the country under the unjust suspicion of treason and of having attempted to save his own life, prevented a clear understanding of the error of military unpreparedness, and of the lack of discipline among the leaders and the navy, which were the real causes of the defeat of Lissa.

The Roman Question

The Venetian question having been solved more or less successfully, the desire to solve the Roman question



THEATRE OF WAR 1848, 1859 AND 1866

became greater than ever. This question was one of extreme delicacy. The legitimate Italian aspirations met with the opposition due not only to the moral injury arising from the denunciations of the Pontiff, who after the occupation of a part of the Papal States had scattered excommunications broadcast and diplomatic protests, but also, and even more, to the hostility of the French Government, which, needing Catholic support, had in the name of misunderstood religious interests assumed the unfortunate rôle of guardian of the last remnant of the Pope's Temporal Power. Ricasoli, who had been building up Italian politics since 1866, wished to solve the question either peacefully, by an enlightened and prudent programme of religious liberty and just concessions to the clergy, or, if necessary, by an act of force, whenever the wishes of the people of Rome and the surrounding province should express themselves in a courageous manifestation of revolt. But he was met by the stolidity of conservative Rome, which seemed to have exhausted itself nearly entirely in the bonfires of 1849.

It was natural that the Party of Action, disheartened by the unhappy outcome of the recent war, should start agitating once more. The combined forces of the State, to which every class and every party had given full and sincere support, had shown themselves unequal to the task; therefore, it was thought, they were unworthy of confidence, since perhaps on their ineptitude alone depended the hesitation with regard to the Roman question. It was necessary to act, and to act daringly, by appealing to the healthy energies of the people and waving on high the torch of revolution. Garibaldi, disillusioned by the vicissitudes of the war, crossed Venetia, rousing the people; Mazzini took up his revolutionary tactics once more, and

Crispi from Florence directed the new Committees of Action.

Soon Ricasoli was succeeded by Rattazzi (April 1867), and a capable and courageous government was followed by one constituted by men of various parties, apparently in sympathy with the Left, but in reality ready more than anything else to toy with parliamentary finesse and intrigues. With distressing uniformity the 1861 situation was being repeated, rendered still more acute by the sad consequences of an unfortunate war. By reason of the new policy of complacency and weakness towards the Party of Action the latter plucked up courage enough to begin an insurrection in the Papal States. Garibaldi went into Tuscany, stirring up the frontier districts and threatening an invasion. The French Government, basing itself upon the September Convention, threatened immediate armed intervention. Rattazzi was forced to arrest Garibaldi at Sinalunga (September 24th, 1867) to prevent him entering the Papal States, and had him escorted back to Caprera. At the same time, however, he declared to France that the Italian Government could not oppose the revolution in the Papal States in view of the national will which it expressed. This unexpected declaration gave rise to legitimate protests from the French Government, which believed its interests to be protected by the pledges given by Italy; and Rattazzi, powerless to handle the situation, resigned (October 19th).

Garibaldi at Mentana

The new ministry under Menabrea ought to have repressed promptly and energetically these untimely agitations, but it was formed with difficulty and,

when at last it was complete, it was too late. The revolutionary committees, deluded by the Government's declarations, had roused the whole Roman country-side into a ferment. Garibaldi, eluding all surveillance, landed at Leghorn and, unmolested, at the head of numerous followers, most of whom were burning with noble impatience, arrived on the 24th of October at Scandriglia and marched on Monterotondo.

Meanwhile revolt had broken out in the tiny state; but Rome, which had been asked to rise, did not stir, except for a half-hearted movement in the Trastevere quarter, which was promptly stifled. Near Villa Glori the little group of Garibaldians (about seventy), under the leadership of the brothers Enrico and Giovanni Cairoli, were on their way to enter the city, which they believed to be in a state of insurrection, when they were attacked by overwhelming Papal forces, and after a heroic defence were wiped out (October 23rd).

Meanwhile, when the menace to the Papal States became known, the protests of the French Catholics became more imperious; everyone denounced the Italian Government, which persisted in ignoring the Convention. Napoleon III., having exhausted every diplomatic measure, threatened to intervene, and prepared an expedition at Toulon. When he received news of the fall of Rattazzi, and heard that no new ministry had been formed, he ceased to delay. The expedition landed at Civitavecchia on the 31st of October and joined the Papal troops.

Garibaldi at the head of 8000 volunteers, after putting the Papal troops to flight at Monterotondo (October 25th), and after waiting in vain for the revolution to break out in the city, began on the morning of the 3rd of November his retreat on Tivoli, when at Mentana he encountered the Papal and later the

French troops. The latter were provided with much artillery and new rifles, called *chassepôts*. The battle was fierce, the volunteers, with 150 dead and more than 200 wounded, were routed, and even the enemy troops suffered heavy losses. Garibaldi, following the Via Salaria, found refuge at Passo Corese, and thence, while moving towards Figline, was arrested, conducted to the Varignano and then sent once more to Caprera.

This bloody episode gave rise to new interminable and painful recriminations in the Italian Chamber. The speech in which Rattazzi tried, by much quibbling, to defend himself lasted three whole days. As a matter of fact, the responsible parties were neither discovered nor punished. Above these depressing discussions the heroic, if useless, feat of Garibaldi shone out in a clear light. Not only had he helped to keep alive the great aspirations of Italy towards Rome, but he had also shown clearly to the world the hopeless incompatibility of a temporal Papal rule with the changes in the times, and had thrown discredit on Napoleon's army, which had taken upon itself the thankless and shameful task of bolstering up the crumbling edifice by the help of bloodshed.

Financial Reforms and Parliamentary Inquiries

After the unfortunate war the financial position of the State had become disastrous ; the deficit had soared above 480,000,000 lire between 1867 and 1868, while the public revenue had fallen to 50,000,000 lire. Reforms were urged, and the Finance Minister, Cambray-Digny, by a brave and energetic policy, carried on later by Sella and Minghetti, began to attempt them. To him is due the application of the *grist* tax on cereals

(*tassa sul macinato*), which aroused angry protest but was for the time being a necessary and beneficent provision, besides the new laws on the collection of taxes and on the financial administration of the State. To improve the value of Government securities he also bethought himself of an ingenious financial operation by which tobacco production was given as a guarantee to a private company in exchange for a loan of 150,000,000 lire.

But at this time Italian political life was moving in a heavy atmosphere of discontent and suspicion. The opponents of the latter provision, declared by some to spell ruin to the Treasury, persisted in their hostility, even when the Chamber had approved the project by a large majority (August 1868). A deputy, Major Cristiano Lobbia, accused several colleagues of the Majority of corruption, and offered the President of the Chamber in a sealed envelope proofs of his assertion; but later it turned out that this offer was a mere pretence to avoid the necessity for actually bringing forward these proofs, and also further to discredit the ministry. A parliamentary inquiry was instituted, which arrived at conclusions which appeared as reticent as they were confused; the accusation of corruption and breach of trust was declared groundless, but it was hinted that a certain private document had produced "a profound impression" on the Commissioners. Thus began an interminable series of parliamentary inquiries, easily provoked by the atmosphere of disappointed hopes and spiteful gossip. These inquiries were nearly always conducted with a curious spirit of indulgence or of reticence, and never reached that fearless and outspoken statement of facts which should have been their aim, but merely left behind them a painful trail of spite and petty animosity.

Here, as elsewhere, was revealed that lack of balance, very natural in a people passing unexpectedly from a regime of political servitude to one of full liberty, which it was desired to preserve in its entirety, even at the cost of being, or appearing to be, indulgent. These disturbances and gusts of impatience found some justification in the rapid beginnings of a new life amidst a thousand unforeseen economic and social difficulties. Natural energies, if disciplined in the interests of the State and made conscious of their own efficiency, could alone counteract all uncertainties and defects. But the leaders of the State and of the separate parties lacked the determination to make the necessary effort.

The Occupation of Rome

A new and unexpected event was now about to render the solution of the Roman question possible without demur or protest from the Catholic States. In July 1870 France, who for twenty years had made herself champion of the papal claims upon Rome, had been unexpectedly dragged into a war with Prussia. Napoleon III. had turned to the Italian Government for military help, and Victor Emmanuel II., who had not forgotten France's generous help in the war of Italian independence, was very strongly inclined to give it. But the Government, knowing the economic and military conditions of Italy, hesitated, although in the preliminary discussions it had been stipulated that Rome should be allowed to be occupied. The condition was rejected, and Italy declared her intention of remaining neutral (July 24th). This was very lucky, since Italian intervention, necessarily sudden and tardy, could not have prevented the

catastrophe. With lightning rapidity the Prussian army, by a series of sanguinary and victorious battles, after scarcely forty-five days of skilful strategic movements, won the decisive victory of Sedan (September 1st). Napoleon III. was taken prisoner and the Napoleonic Empire was shattered.

At that time the Lanza Ministry had been in power for eight months, with Visconti-Venosta as Foreign Secretary and Sella as Financial Secretary. This ministry, composed of clear-sighted, loyal and noble-hearted men, was able to steer Italian policy with unequalled sagacity. The French garrison had been withdrawn from Rome and, a short while after, the Republic having been proclaimed in Paris (September 4th), the September Convention had no further reason to exist. The Italian Government accordingly hastened to fulfil the national programme, but showed itself anxious to repress any revolutionary agitation. Mazzini was arrested at Palermo and conducted with precautions to the fort of Gaeta; Garibaldi, wisely and generously, did not stir from Caprera. The national programme was to be fulfilled peacefully by the disciplined armies of the Italian State, which were to show themselves truly worthy of attaining the Eternal City.

The Visconti-Venosta Ministry sent notes to its foreign representatives announcing that, the French garrison in Rome having been withdrawn, it would be necessary for Italy to watch over the welfare of the people, threatened as they were by revolution, and to give them an opportunity to make their wishes heard (September 7th). A few days later Victor Emmanuel took a similar step, sending a special envoy to Pope Pius IX. (September 10th). When the Papal refusal shattered every illusion as to the possibility of a peaceful occupation of Rome, an

Italian army, commanded by a general of great tact and intelligence, Raffaele Cadorna, crossed the frontier (September 12th). The Papal garrison at Civita-vecchia capitulated and, on the 19th, Rome was surrounded on every side except on that of the Città Leonina. A last attempt at a pacific agreement having proved fruitless, on the morning of the 20th of September the artillery opened a breach in the walls between Porta Pia and Porta Salaria, and the Italian soldiers entered Rome. The Papal garrison, after a brief resistance, surrendered with military honours, and the city was occupied by the Italian troops, amidst the enthusiasm of the citizens. A Committee was at once formed, and shortly afterwards an almost unanimous plebiscite (40,785 *versus* 46) consecrated the annexation of Rome to the Kingdom of Italy.

The Law of Guarantees

The occupation of Rome had been accomplished almost as a sacred rite. Amidst the wishes of a whole redeemed nation, and the solemn expectation of all civilised nations, the Eternal City, which had twice given civilisation to the world, was restored to its natural position as capital of Italy, without anyone to dispute its ancient dignity as the founder of law, and as the metropolis of the Catholic world. Freed from the weight of foreign interference, which had hampered it so often; having shaken loose from the shackles, often far from honest, of a temporal government which had so often dishonoured it, the Roman Papacy, under the natural guardianship of the Italian State—a Power at last—rose higher in the estimation of the world and acquired a new dignity. All the best-disciplined and the finest forces of the young State

had been gathered together in this portentous moment which was destined to have a world-wide historical importance: honest and far-seeing rulers, an army-leader worthy to be ranked among the best, a disciplined and loyal people and a stainless army. Even the short resistance of the Papal troops, which had drawn blood (38 soldiers had fallen, of whom 21 were killed), was destined in history to remove any suspicion of connivance between the Head of a universal religion, who must be above and free from all governmental influences, and a civil Government which, of its own free will, undertook the mission of protecting a religious dignity happily unwilling to be protected.

When, on the 5th of December 1870, the Italian Parliament was opened, in the palace of Montecitorio, the King of Italy was able, amid frantic applause, to salute the happy completion of the national task. A few months later a law, called the Law of Guarantees¹ (13th of May 1871), following the lines traced by Cavour and Ricasoli, ensured the Holy See, with precise legal guarantees, a liberty that could not have been more complete, and which was to resist triumphantly against the most terrible ordeals—though not without sacrifice on the part of the Italian State. This law solved the age-old problem of the relations between the Church and the State by a system of just and clearly defined separation, which was to preserve the nation from any bitter religious struggles. To this law, which revealed deep juridical knowledge, and had

¹ This Law assured to the Pontiff the status of a reigning sovereign, declared his person inviolate, confirmed him in the possession and use of the Vatican and Lateran palaces, and forbade officials of the State to enter them without permission from the Vatican; moreover an annual subsidy of £129,000 was granted to him, but of this no Pope has as yet availed himself.

been prepared by the doctrines of Gioberti and of Cavour, were affixed the signatures of Emilio Visconti-Venosta, Ruggiero Bonghi and Terenzio Mamiani.

Political Tendencies in the "Third Italy"

With such a spirit of balance and justice Italy renewed at Rome, for the third time, her national life. If ancient Rome had succeeded, by dominion and by law, in spreading her imperishable civilisation amongst peoples largely uncivilised or hostile; if mediæval Italy, divided into a hundred republics and numberless principalities, had been able to preserve this civilisation and save it from barbarism, renewing it with the blood of her own vigorous offspring; no less important was the task that Italy, after three centuries of foreign slavery, was undertaking from the heights of the Capitol among the civilised nations of the modern world after winning her independence and unity. This mission, partly foreseen by Dante and stated in precise terms by Gioberti and Mazzini, was a mission of justice. Italy, clearly enclosed in her natural boundaries, was to be an element of balance in the contentions between other European nations; she was to uphold the rights of nationality by virtue of which every people, made conscious of its unity and independence, must be free to shape its own destinies; she was to be a driving force in the progress of the new civilisation.

But this task could not be understood all at once nor by everyone. Towards its northern and eastern boundaries Italy had not yet acquired security for her political existence, and was still threatened on the Trentino and the Isonzo by the reactionary forces of the Austrian Empire. The consciousness of the people

had not as yet been led to understand the exalted character of this mission. The country had still to overcome the conditions of economic and social inferiority which were preventing it from co-operating to the full in the fruitful yet complex work of modern civilisation. But the foundations had been laid, and notwithstanding the difficulties arising out of these deficiencies and hardships, and the vacillations and errors inevitable in the history of peoples, Italy could still apply her best energies to building up laboriously the new edifice.

CHAPTER VII

THE GROWTH OF THE NEW KINGDOM

Italy after 1870

IF the acquisition of Rome fulfilled the aspirations of all Italians, it did not guarantee the stability of the new kingdom; on the contrary, by raising the formidable Roman question, it carried with it yet further possibilities of danger. The Pontiff, encamped like an enemy within the State, was launching forth protests and excommunications which stirred up public opinion in Catholic nations and turned the still vigorous forces of the Italian clergy against the State. The Law of Guarantees, wide, enlightened and liberal though it was, but not as yet put to the test, was not in a position to calm these agitations. Catholic Austria was every day threatening to make herself the champion of the Papal claims; Germany saw with displeasure that a new state was assuming the protection of the Roman Church; France, after the defeat of 1870, in the throes of a deep clerical reaction and indignant, perhaps, at not having received help from a state which she had helped to set free, showed herself openly hostile. In the country itself the question of the relations between Church and State seemed the only important question in Italian national life. Not since 1861 perhaps had the new Italy run so grave a peril. She was united for the most part but, isolated and scarcely recognised abroad, and agitated and disturbed within by party strife, she had hardly as yet attained her complete *risorgimento*.

To these difficulties of a political nature were added no less serious economic ones. The deficit in the budget

had in five years reached the huge figure of 1,500,000 lire; the *rentes* had fallen to 62, while the scanty economic resources were further weighed down by the question of the Southern Provinces and, added to this, new expenditure was continually being required for the completion of the railroad system, for the upkeep of the army, and for naval construction. The death of Giuseppe Mazzini on the 10th of March 1872 deprived the country of the man who, above all others, worshipped the ideal of a great Italy, instrument of justice throughout the civilised world, and seemed to come as a warning to the country, threatened on all sides and reduced to dire extremity, and very far removed from the accomplishment of those high ideals.

The Fall of the Right and the Advent of the Left to Power

But dreaming could not change hard facts, and high praise is due to the leaders of the country during this difficult period of Italian history, who succeeded in steering the course of the State amidst so many hidden snags. The Right and the Left, though for different reasons, have both equally earned the gratitude of Italians. To the Right belongs the merit of having solved the ecclesiastical question and the financial problem; to the Left is due the beginning of an openly democratic policy and, after numberless mistakes, of having ensured to the State a firm position in the balance of Europe.

The ecclesiastical policy of the Right, after solving the problem of Papal guarantees, had preserved distinctly liberal tendencies, which, while breaking with the old theories of jurisdiction, preserved certain State prerogatives, and proved to internal political parties and to foreign Powers that the right of sovereignty of

a strong and respected state is fully compatible with the free religious life of a powerful world-organisation. In this way the Right fearlessly paved the way for an enlightened system of disestablishment, which has served—and still serves—to guarantee the State against dangerous ecclesiastical interference and to avoid religious strife. The financial policy, under the enlightened guidance of Minghetti, Sella and Antonio Scialoia, had been so judicious that in 1875 the Italian revenue fully balanced the deficit.

As if the functions of the Right were exhausted, in the parliamentary session of the 18th of March 1876 the Minghetti Ministry fell and the Left came into power. The Opposition had accused the Right of following a reactionary policy, of paying no attention to the wants of the people, of being too indulgent toward the Church, of burdening the people too heavily with the *grist* tax. As often happens in political quarrels many of these accusations had no foundation. It was forgotten above all that these political methods had served certain essential ends which now had been reached. But it is only right to recognise that a greater attention to the healthy elements of the people, with a view to uniting them more closely to the life of the State, would be highly beneficial.

The men of the Left, however, though steering in the right direction, had up till now limited themselves only to criticism, and lacked a definite programme, so that at the outset the Government's policy was uncertain and, while bringing about several excellent reforms, it committed the gravest faults. The first Ministry of the Left was formed by Agostino Depretis, a lawyer, very accomplished in debate and in avoiding parliamentary snags, but lacking political insight. In his various ministerial combinations he had as

collaborators Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, General Luigi Mezzacapo, Giovanni Nicotera, Giuseppe Zanardelli, Francesco Crispi and others, and thereby was enabled, despite his faults, to hold office for a considerable period, and to return several times to power. With him begins the period of *trasformismo*,¹ harmful to parliamentary institutions but necessary in order to attempt to blend political parties. While the Left was in power the 1877 law on compulsory education, which marked the beginning of the struggle of the State in the cause of culture; the 1882 law, which widened the right to vote, raising the restricted circle of electors from 500,000 to nearly 2,000,000, and the law of 1870, which began the abolition of the *grist* tax, that mainly hit the people, were passed.

Meanwhile, on the 9th of January 1878, King Victor Emmanuel, one of the greatest workers for the cause of Italian unity, died, and a month later Pope Pius IX. passed away, who after having been one of the initiators of the Italian revolution had become one of its bitterest enemies. The first event deprived the State of one of its most imposing figures and caused general sorrow. The funeral of the great King, which took place, for the first time, at the Pantheon, was a veritable apotheosis. The new King, Humbert I., was taking up a noble heritage, and declared his intention of maintaining it stainless. The death of Pius IX. put the Law of Guarantees to the test for the first time. The Cabinet, which had entrusted the Home Secretaryship to Francesco Crispi, made it known that it would guarantee the security of the cardinals and the liberty of the elections; and it kept its word, for the Conclave

¹ A policy of transformation or transaction, so called because the parties ceased to follow their definite and traditional policy when by so doing they might acquire power and influence.

which after three days raised Cardinal Gioacchino Pecci to the Papal Throne, under the name of Pope Leo XIII., took place in complete tranquillity and entirely undisturbed.

The Congress of Berlin and the Tunis Question

While the new State was seeking to consolidate its position at home and abroad the Congress of Berlin took place, which, after the Russo-Turkish War, proposed to settle the Eastern Question. Italy, represented by the minister Corti, intervened, absolutely unprepared and with no inside knowledge whatever of European problems. She appeared obsessed by the Irredentist question (*i.e.* the question of the Italian provinces still under Austria), so that she appeared to be aiming solely at the realisation of her own national unity. Politically isolated, however, she did not even find the means of lodging a perfectly justifiable protest. Thus her intervention was completely negative, so much so, that she hardly realised what was going on behind the scenes, where, under Bismarck's clever manipulation, Austria assumed the provisional administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, England received the possession of Cyprus, and France was given a free hand in Tunis. It proved a great disappointment for Italy, but Cairoli, President of the Council of Ministers, seemed to congratulate himself on this attitude, proclaiming that Italy had issued from the affair "with clean hands."

The regrettable results of this policy were not long in showing themselves. While on the one side the nation felt the urgent need for recovering possession of the Italian lands still subject to Austria—a necessity strongly advocated in the country by a strong irredentist

current which tended by tradition and inclination to look to France for help; on the other hand the necessity for economic expansion, already felt in a country thickly populated and possessing maritime and commercial traditions, urged it to seek new outlets for its activity on the sea, towards the north coast of Africa. Italy, united once more, naturally turned to the Dependency of Tunis, hardly 200 kilometres from Sicily and Sardinia, easily reached and geographically somewhat akin to those provinces. A strong tide of emigration had already carried over 20,000 Italians to Tunis, chiefly from Sicily; there were several shipping lines connected with Italian ports and active commercial relations between Tunis and Italy. Besides its own representatives the Government had a commercial treaty with the Bey (1868), flourishing banks and well-attended schools. Moreover, Italy felt the danger of leaving in the hands of a foreign Power a coast so near to her which might become a grave strategic menace.

But in these designs Italy came up against interests and tendencies of a no less serious, albeit different, nature on the part of France. France, settled for the past forty years in Algeria, regarded Tunis as a natural continuation of her African possessions; and if she could not boast of having a majority among the population of Tunis (4000 French) she had, as far back as 1850, expended considerable capital there, and carried out important works of colonisation, amongst which should be included a railway line between Algiers and Tunis. Moreover France found it dangerous to Mediterranean balance that the canal of Malta should be dominated on the coast of Tunis by the same nation that already possessed the other coast; for this reason she always kept an eye on the Dependency, and had

already received from England and Germany a more or less explicit recognition of her aspirations.

It may be that a frank and diligent study of this divergence of interests would have led to a settlement. Along the north coast of Africa there were still considerable spaces open to European enterprise, and French and Italian aspirations at that time might easily have been able to reach a compromise. But the time was not ripe for this kind of settlement. France, unjustly humiliated at Sedan, felt it necessary to affirm further, by a show of force, her undeniable power, and was creating for herself a vast Colonial Empire by land and sea, far and near, not hesitating to challenge the rivalry of England. Italy, on the other hand, on account of her political isolation and economic weakness, could not entertain any policy of colonial expansion that was not spontaneously suggested by her geographical position and her natural and immediate needs.

Strife was inevitable. The minister Cairoli, desiring to avenge the humiliation of the Congress of Berlin, unused moreover to diplomatic finesse and convinced that Italy was in the right, having proclaimed to the Chamber that Italy had "duties to fulfil" with regard to the Regency of Tunis (19th of April 1880), did not hesitate to commit, or to connive at, a series of most ill-advised acts in defence of Italian interests, which quite unnecessarily offended the conflicting interests of France.

Thinking these Italian aspirations clashed too much with her own, and relying on her diplomatic guarantees, France did not hesitate to take resolute action, and seizing as a pretext the necessity for curbing the frequent raids of the Kroumirs, a tribe near the Algerian frontier, sent a military expedition to Tunis and imposed

on the reluctant Bey a treaty which granted her the Protectorate of Tunis (May 1881), which was a violent blow to the expectations long entertained by Italy.

The Triple Alliance

These events had a notable repercussion upon Italian affairs, which were further aggravated by the diplomatic intrigues of Pope Leo XIII. with Republican France, and by the latter's veiled military threats. Italy, after such unfortunate experiences, understood at last that it was necessary to abandon her isolated position and turn to the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, who in 1879 had made a defensive alliance between themselves with a view to guaranteeing peace, which was at that time supported by England, the only Power which had remained a faithful friend to Italy.

It was a serious step, for it implied a tacit renunciation of Italian rights to the unredeemed lands subject to Austria, anxious then more than ever to be joined to the motherland; moreover it might create tension between Italy and France, robbed as she had been by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine. On the other hand, it had the advantage of procuring a sure support for the young nation, by automatically and immediately doing away with the ever-present menace of a proud and malevolent Austria, while safeguarding Italy against the now open rivalry of France. The minister Mancini, who had succeeded Cairoli, did not hesitate to carry out this step, and on the 20th of May 1882 a treaty with Germany and Austria was secretly signed, by which the three nations guaranteed one another military support in case that one of them should be attacked, through no fault of its own, by two or more Powers. The Alliance had even at that time a defensive and

pacific character ; but it did nothing to curb the anti-Italian policy of Austria, which continued unabated, and as soon as it became known it provoked further new distrust among the French.

One may regret that Italy should have associated herself so closely with Prussia, who in July 1866 had disloyally abandoned her Ally in the course of a great war, and to Austria, her chief enemy ; but one can never ignore the fact that the Triple Alliance was a potent factor in maintaining peace, and at that moment was for Italy the first and only political act which guaranteed her unity and the territorial integrity so wonderfully gained.

Not even this act served to give Italy the clear realisation of her political interests. The Depretis-Mancini Cabinet, which had consolidated the existence of Italy as a nation, was the same that on being invited by England, at the beginning of 1883, to participate in the occupation of Egypt, to restore order after the disturbances caused by a civil and religious war, refused to do so, thus losing a splendid opportunity for creating a useful opening to Italy's economic expansion. It was in vain that Crispi, who was then on an official mission in London, urged the acceptance of the invitation. The Cabinet, to justify its refusal, put forward the military unpreparedness of Italy, and the sentimental pretext that Italian public opinion, stirred up by the enterprises of Arab pashas, was opposed to all attempts aiming at oppressing Egyptian independence by armed intervention. These excuses, however, cannot disguise the fact that the refusal was a mistake. Italy could easily have co-operated with England in this civilising mission, and would have done it with that high spirit of justice which throughout history has guided, and still guides, her

actions ; but her rulers, who had shown their complete ineptitude in the Tunis question, forced themselves to renunciations and deplorable sentimentality, spoiling with their own hands a political situation as propitious as one could well have wished for.

Public opinion, which knew neither the motives nor the clauses of the Triple Alliance, was on the other hand agitated by the fear of a renunciation of the Italian claims upon Austria. In December 1882 a young inhabitant of Trieste, Guglielmo Oberdan, who had taken refuge in Italy to escape military service under Austria, on hearing the news of the visit of the Emperor Franz Josef to his city, tried to carry out an attempt on the life of that hated sovereign without more ado ; but he was arrested by the police while crossing the frontier for the second time, with two bombs, and was condemned to the gallows. The act seemed inspired more by the desire to provoke causes for dissension between Austria and Italy than by a deliberate wish to murder. On this account his fate aroused general regret and provoked numerous Irredentist demonstrations throughout Italy.

Financial difficulties and lack of decisive political action were in the meantime unsettling political parties in the Chamber and in the country generally. The larger issues having been settled for better or for worse, the old ideals had faded away, and there lacked the energy necessary to face calmly the new ones which had arisen. The first question was to live ; after that one might philosophise. So the old parties broke up ; there was no more Right and no more Left. Depretis when forming his cabinets had recourse indiscriminately to the various parties in the Chamber ; and by the parliamentary phenomena already referred to, called *trasformismo*, caused an active and vigilant opposition

to disappear, while majorities were gained according to the changing play of selfish interests and parliamentary opportunism. In Northern Italy, where the new-born industries had need of quiet, the order-loving and tolerant groups of moderates kept the upper hand; in the south deputies were beginning to be elected through the intervention of the Government. Many healthy energies disappeared from political life, while death was carrying off the older generation which had made Italy. On the 28th of June 1882 Giuseppe Garibaldi died in his glorious hermitage of Caprera, and about that time Giovanni Lanza, Quintino Sella, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini and Benedetto Cairoli also passed away.

Still, notwithstanding these difficult beginnings, a new life was outlining itself, uncertain as yet but full of promise. At Milan in 1881 and at Turin in 1884 the first National Exhibitions were opened; in 1883 the new Commerce Bill came into force, and in 1890 the Penal Code was published, inspired by very high principles of justice. A series of daring men—Antinori, Antonelli, Cecchi, Bianchi, Camperio—vied with the great foreign explorers in the scientific conquest of the Dark Continent.

The Triple Alliance once concluded, Italy felt the need of looking to the army and to the navy, since without sufficient forces any attempt at political action in a Europe bristling with arms would be useless. The Bill of 1882 raised the number of army corps from ten to twelve, the annual levy from 65,000 to 73,000, and the effective military forces from 330,000 to 430,000. The *cadres* of the militia were increased from 150,000 to 200,000, and a little later new forces were added to the cavalry and the Alpine troops were formed. At the same time, through the vigorous

impulse given by Admiral Saint-Bon, who found a worthy successor in Benedetto Brin, the reconstruction of the fleet was undertaken.

Conscious at last of the necessity for seeking new outlets to her activities, after letting slip the opportunities offered by Tunis and Egypt, Italy began her colonial policy in another quarter. On the 17th of January 1885 an expeditionary force of 1000 men, under Colonel Saletta, was sent out to occupy the coast of Massowah, on the Red Sea, a barren and sandy strip nominally belonging to Turkey but in reality almost totally abandoned. It had the advantage, however, of dominating commercially a very fertile plateau, as yet little known, on which opened out an important means of access towards Abyssinia. It was a timid and modest enterprise, which aroused strong opposition and never gained the sympathy of the people; still, by this first daring move, new Italy not only revealed that wish for expansion which is characteristic of any progressive nation, but it also fulfilled a trifling mission of justice. A great discussion was then raging over the question of the neutralisation of the Suez Canal; the presence of a new nation in the Red Sea alongside of England and France, then rivals, formed yet another reason for pushing forward the accomplishment of such a plan, which was sanctioned a few months later at the Conference of Paris. Italy was not seeking in the Red Sea—to quote a phrase unjustly attributed to Mancini, the originator of the scheme—the keys of the Mediterranean; but, youngest among the nations, while the Great Powers had already divided amongst themselves the most fertile portions of the world, was quietly settling herself down in the only place left, without disturbing the rights of anyone, in order, even there, to exercise her

stabilising function. Had the enterprise been kept within its just limits, and not been exalted at one moment and run down the next, Italy would have spared herself many a bitter disappointment.

The First Renewal of the Triple Alliance

The agreement with the Central Powers came to a close while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had at its head a diplomatist gifted with practical commonsense of a high order—Count di Robilant. As ambassador to Vienna in 1882 he had been the first to sign the Alliance, but he had not been extremely enthusiastic over it, because he judged that Italy had bound herself to the two empires without obtaining adequate returns from either side. Di Robilant used both his influence and his wits, and after concluding with England an agreement defining more precisely the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, the Ionian and the Ægean, he succeeded in imposing upon Austria an agreement, ratified by Germany, by virtue of which the *status quo* in the Balkans was to be guaranteed. In it the idea of freeing Albania from the Ottoman yoke, and granting her self-government according to the Italian principle of nationality, was foreseen, and it was settled that any further territorial expansion of the Balkans by either of the two Powers was to give the other a right to adequate compensation.

The Triple Alliance, renewed by this new agreement on the 20th of February 1887, and its pacific character as a reciprocal security of three Powers against any possible aggression on the part of other states—supported on the sea by Great Britain—having thus been reconfirmed, it henceforth became the chief guarantor of the

balance of power in Eastern Europe. Italy, small as she was, protected by England, succeeded in barring Austria's path in that movement eastward which was, later, to become the gravest danger to European peace. Germany, dominated by Bismarck's policy, who despised all questions dealing with the East, not yet conscious of the importance of this policy, set herself to oppose it. Before leaving the Foreign Ministry, Di Robilant could say with justice that he "left Italy in an iron cask" (*in una botte di ferro*).

The Triple Alliance did not exclude good relations between Italy and France, on condition that neither of these Powers threatened aggression against one another. But French public opinion was agitated by an unreasoning political hatred for this diplomatic agreement. For nearly twenty years France did not for one moment understand, however dimly, that her existence and her interests forced Italy to seek support from a group of Powers different from the groups to which she herself belonged—not only different but even hostile to her. France only saw the fact, to her inconceivable, that a nation which she had helped on the field of battle should have allied itself with her powerful enemy; and, whilst she claimed the right to forward her own political and colonial interests without any regard whatever for Italian interests, she was irritated beyond measure at seeing Italy obliged to seek support elsewhere. By a singular narrowness of political vision, which can however be explained by the dominating tendencies of home and foreign policy, France was induced to think that Italy could have but one policy, and only one: either to be with her, or against her.

The Policy of Francesco Crispi

Francesco Crispi, who succeeded Depretis as Leader of the Government in July 1887, found himself obliged by the force of circumstances to accentuate these tendencies of Italian policy, and for that he had to struggle more openly against France and suffer from the evils of badly conceived and badly directed African enterprises. An energetic man, worn out by patriotic conspiracies, used to the swift decisions of revolutionaries, but a sincere lover of his country, Crispi knew all the weakness and all the powerlessness of Italian politics. Wishing to strengthen them, he tried to free the country from inertia, to give it an aim, a passion, an ideal. In the friendship with Germany he sought firm support for a truly national policy, and found himself face to face with the powerful and uncompromising hostility of France; he wished to give new energy to Italian economic life, and had to struggle with the gravest financial difficulties and the most formidable party antagonism; he wished to find Italy a larger field for expansion, by trying to gain something from the African occupation, and met with the catastrophe of Adowah.

He had only recently come into power when by his journey to Friedrichsruhe, to see the old German Chancellor, he had openly shown his loyalty to the Triple Alliance, conceived as a curb upon a presumed threat to European peace, which could only be attributed, with more or less justice, to France. A little later (1888) the journey of William II. to Rome, prepared with theatrical effect, gave rise to new suspicions in French public opinion. When, owing to the need for protecting the new-born industries of the country, the Italian Government found itself forced

to apply a new customs tariff, France answered with economic reprisals aimed at the agricultural exports from Italy, which in a very few years fell by several hundred million lire, thus increasing the economic straits of the country. Relations between France and Italy became strained; at Modane (1888), at Aigues-Mortes (1892), and elsewhere, Italian workmen, emigrating into France in search of work, suffered persecution, violence, even savage murder; in July 1888, after a diplomatic incident at Massowah, the Italian minister spoke out clearly and with dignity. It seemed as if war between the two countries were inevitable.

Meanwhile Austria took advantage of this situation to impose her demands on Italy. While Crispi had vainly sought the mediation of Germany to suggest to her ally a more humane treatment of the Italian populations subject to Austria, the latter, pursuing her old way unruffled, claimed from the Italian Government a sterner attitude towards the irredentist demonstrations which stirred the country from time to time. At last she came to the point of demanding the dismissal of the minister, Seismit-Doda, who, at an electoral banquet, had listened in silence to a harmless irredentist speech (1890), and to forbidding the appointment of an Italian general hailing from the Trentino (Baratieri) as minister of the Crown (1893).

All this encouraged internal disorder among the parties. The police reaction, secretly imposed by Austria but believed to be the fatal result of Crispi's policy, which had been too subservient to the Triple Alliance, irritated popular feeling. Waves of personal hatred surged through the Chamber, where the republican Felice Cavalotti led a merciless opposition against Crispi; while as a result of this, strange party groupings and singular instances of parliamentary dissolution,

due to the prominence given to such inexplicable persons as Sbarbaro and Coccapieller, were witnessed. This political ferment was complicated by the anti-clerical struggles that were stirred up at the inauguration of the monument to Giordano Bruno in Rome (1890).

In the sitting which took place on the 31st of January 1891, after a somewhat violent harangue against the Right, Crispi was obliged to resign. He was succeeded by the Marquis di Rudinì, a deputy of the old Right, who strengthened the tendency towards *trasformismo*; and a little later (May 1892) another coalition ministry was formed by Giovanni Giolitti, a deputy belonging to the Left. Coming from a bureaucratic career, he showed himself an adept at parliamentary intrigue, but, implicated in the shady affairs of the Bank of Rome, he was forced to resign, after a dramatic and unforgettable scene in the Chamber, on the 24th of November 1893.

This was the gloomiest period of Italian history since 1870. Military expenditure, which by reason of the incessant Austrian menace represented a hard necessity, had raised the budget from 328,000,000 lire in 1886 to 553,000,000 lire in 1889, and the deficit to nearly 200,000,000 lire; the premium on gold had risen to over 16; while the *rentes* had fallen to 79. Discontent was spreading through all classes of the people. The Socialist party had made its appearance in the country, and was collecting disciples, especially in Sicily, where *fasci* (groups) had been formed with a real revolutionary character. A very sombre cloud was hanging over the people of Italy.

The African War: Adowah

Francesco Crispi seemed the only man in the Government who inspired faith, and he was once more recalled

to form a ministry. With remarkable energy and sincere faith in the healthy forces of the country he applied himself to the difficult task. He restored order in Sicily, dissolving the *fasci*; he reorganised finance, with the help of Sidney Sonnino, Financial Minister and head of the Treasury, and started to build up the political life of the country.

But after the difficulties in Italy had been overcome, very serious difficulties arose in Africa. The little colony of Massowah had soon shown its possibilities as a base for expansion on a vast scale; and, as always happens in the case of countries new to the difficult art of colonisation, many illusions had been entertained upon this subject. After the unfortunate lesson of Dogali (January 26th, 1887), when 500 men surrounded by superior forces preferred heroic death to surrender, a wiser Government, under the direction of a sagacious and prudent general, Antonio Baldissera, had been able to spread rapidly Italy's possessions. The Treaty of Ucciali, between Antonelli and the Negus (2nd of May 1889), seemed to give Italy a sort of protectorate over Abyssinia, and the colony, which had taken the name of Colonia Eritrea, in 1890 included a vast stretch of land which spread from the plateau of Asmara to Adowah in the Tigrê and Kassala in the Nile basin. Besides the Colonia Eritrea, Italy had occupied the Benadir, on the Indian Ocean, a territory which a brave explorer—Vittorio Boitego—had shown could be usefully developed.

All this seemed to hold forth to Italy a vast field of expansion which would serve to restore faith to a hesitating and exhausted nation. Under the Rudini Ministry, owing to pressure brought to bear by the extreme Left, the government of the colony had been entrusted to General Oreste Baratieri, a man of

unlimited ambition, who had easily acquired a reputation but who was destined to prove himself incapable and lacking in seriousness. Crispi made the mistake of trusting this general, who, when he came to Italy, received for some slight deed of arms triumphal honours in the Chamber. The fact remains that Baratieri found himself ruling the colony in a most difficult time, when the Negus of Abyssinia, Menelek, had denounced the Treaty of Ucciali and the numerous rulers of the various regions, till now struggling amongst themselves, had united to fight the foreign invader. He was unable to counteract this hostile attitude and the war became very serious (1895). The Abyssinian army besieged Makallè, heroically defended by Major Galliano, and a little later it also occupied Adowah.

To defeat the enemy's coalition it would have been necessary to have many men and very considerable means, whereas Italy had in Africa only about 20,000 men, and the organisation of the army, the transport service and the commissariat had to be improvised as well as possible. In the first months of 1896 the Italian troops, who had advanced far into the interior of this inhospitable country, had no other course open to them except retreat. Crispi, on the other hand, to enhance the reputation of his ministry, had need of a victory, and pressed for new supplies of men and ammunition and energetic action on the part of the leader, taking no heed either of the country's reluctance or of Baratieri's incapacity. A telegram from Crispi to Baratieri, dated February the 22nd, reproved him for the inaction of the troops, declaring that "this is not a war, but military phthisis." At the same time Crispi sent out secretly a new governor—General Baldissera. Baratieri, hampered by shortage of provisions, goaded

on by these complaints, and acquainted, possibly, through the indiscretion of a deputy, with the steps taken against him, decided on the night of the 28th of February to advance against the Abyssinian troops, which he knew were concentrated towards Adowah. The plan was to attack the enemy in three columns, which were to advance from different directions and to move simultaneously into line; but owing to ignorance of the country, and to a fatal misunderstanding over the name of a mountain, it happened that the first column penetrated all alone into the very midst of the enemy and, despite prodigious feats of valour, was cut to pieces; the same fate overtook the other two columns when they arrived. The battle, called the battle of Abba Carima (near Adowah), fought on the 1st of March 1896, against an enemy five times larger and much better armed, ended in the complete defeat of the Italian troops, who left over half their number on the battle-field.

The defeat at Adowah was not irreparable. The enemy had not dared to start in pursuit, and perhaps vigorous military precautions like those adopted by England and France after similar colonial defeats would have made a quick revenge possible. But the disaster made a terrible impression in Italy. Violent demonstrations took place in the larger towns; in some places reinforcements were prevented from setting out, and the Crispi Ministry was forced to resign (March 5th).

The new Government, under di Rudinì, proposed a policy of careful concentration. New financial measures were taken in respect of the Treasury, while General Baldissera, who with great energy and discretion had succeeded in promptly repairing the disaster of Adowah and freeing Kassala and Adijrat,

threatened by the enemy, was ordered to limit his occupation as much as was compatible with strict necessity. In pursuance of this programme a treaty was concluded with King Menelek (Addis-Abeba, 13th of November 1896), and a short time afterwards even Kassala was surrendered to the British, who from their valuable strategical position continued on their own the difficult fight against the Mahdists. In whatever way the desirability of the African expedition may be judged, it is certain that, at the defeat of Adowah, Italy had not shown a spirit equal to the disaster; thus the effects of the mistake weighed very heavily upon her for a whole generation.

Events seemed to advise a new study of the international situation. In the long African struggle Italy had found herself faced with the hostility of France and Russia, with no support whatever from Germany or Austria. Friendship with England had deepened, however, and in September 1896 the minister, Visconti-Venosta, concluded a treaty with France for Tunis, which was the prelude to a real reconciliation with the Latin nation.

Party Struggles and the Democratic Policy

The African disaster and the uncertain policy of quickly changing governments had done much to increase discontent in the country. The industrial development, favoured by the new protective tariffs, had ended by creating an Italian industry, but as a result of this a working class had arisen which bound itself ever more closely to the Socialist party, which had now its centre at Milan and organised the workers with revolutionary aims.

Meanwhile the stream of emigration had become

stronger; in ten years the exodus of workers had increased nearly tenfold, and these emigrants, who came from a despised nation, suffered great privations and persecution. The Government, which had done so badly in the colonial enterprise, was accused of being responsible for all these evils and lacked any authority. The ruling classes either lacked energy or, fearing the new popular currents, took up an indifferent or a cowardly attitude. The Intellectuals united indolently with the Socialists in deploring military expenditure, with the result that the army was left to itself or else served as a hated instrument for quelling riots.

In May 1898, using as a pretext the increase in the cost of bread, serious disturbances broke out at Milan, accompanied by strikes, barricades, plunder, and even bloodshed. Rudinì, up till then so feeble and vacillating in his conciliatory policy, immediately had recourse to violent repressive measures, and to General Bava Beccaris, to whom full powers had been given when the state of siege had been declared, he recommended firmness and prompt action. Numerous were those arrested and condemned, but the prestige of the Government did not gain by it.

New disorders were also breaking out in the Luni-giana and at Naples. General Pelloux, who succeeded Rudinì, had recourse to even more energetic measures; but he roused discontent in the country. The reaction appeared to be excessive, and when the Government brought before the Chamber a proposal for new and more effective police measures (Special Decrees) the extreme Left objected and began a violent campaign in Parliament, consisting largely of speeches and loud protests, that was called *ostruzionismo* (obstruction).

The struggle was bitter, and regrettable excesses occurred, but on the other hand it had the advantage

of keeping Italian policy in a democratic direction, preventing a further widening of the breach between the Government authority and the popular currents which should have supported it. The Chamber was dissolved, but the elections showed the country opposed to the reactionary leanings of the Pelloux Ministry. The extreme parties (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals) had joined together, and saw their votes doubled; the Constitutional opposition was strengthened and the ministerial candidates remained in the minority. Pelloux resigned and the old but liberal Saracco took his place (24th of June 1900).

Shortly after, amidst all this party strife, a tragic event took place. The kind and gentle King Humbert, on the night of the 29th of July, was murdered by an anarchist while entering his carriage at Monza, after assisting at a gymnastic festival, amid the acclamations of his people. His successor, Victor Emmanuel III., on ascending the throne, declared in his speech that he wished to adhere to a system of government both liberal and democratic; and on the fall of Saracco he deliberately called Giuseppe Zanardelli, the outstanding figure of the Democratic Left (February 1901), to form a Government. Thus he revealed his intention of following a policy of tolerant liberty on a democratic basis, and from this moment the extreme parties for the most part ceased from their revolutionary activities and drew closer to the Government.

Italy and the Balance of Power in Europe

Italy was also fated at this time to follow a good foreign policy. In opposition to the Triple Alliance, from 1891 onward, France had drawn closer to Russia. But Italy, who had always taken care to give a sincerely

peaceful tendency to her international agreements, had not hesitated to conclude with England and France special clauses that further guaranteed the peace of Europe. The Foreign Secretary in the Zanardelli Ministry, Senator Giulio Prinetti, who had to face some of the gravest problems in Italian foreign policy, was able to solve them all with great sagacity. At that moment the Triple Alliance Treaty was about to lapse, together with the commercial treaties with the Central Empires.

Italy, strengthened politically and economically, put forward the explicit demand that, in any new treaties, economic interests were to be in accordance with political interests, and she also requested that a greater regard should be shown towards her interests. At the same time, continuing the policy traced by Visconti-Venosta, who in December 1900 had favoured the exchange between France and Italy of pledges regarding Morocco and Libya which should be mutually binding, Prinetti drew up a new agreement with France by which these pledges were extended to the whole of the Mediterranean (December 1901). A short while after the consent of England was secured for an eventual occupation of Tripolitania (May 1902). When the Triple Alliance was renewed (June 28th to July 8th, 1902) the interests of Italy were entirely safeguarded; the right of Italy to agreements with France and England was recognised; the wholly pacific character of the Alliance was confirmed; the Balkan interests of Italy were guaranteed by Germany; and Italy's right to the occupation of Tripolitania was admitted with the sole reservation that Italy was not to take the initiative in the infringement of the *status quo*.

The German Chancellor, von Bülow, referring at this time to the agreements between Italy, France

and England, defined them as an innocent "waltz" with a stranger, that in no way detracted from the solidity of Italy's legitimate union with the Central Powers. It was a superficial definition. Italy was henceforth a decisive element in the balance of Europe. Between the two groups of Powers upon which pivoted the system of armed peace; between Germany and Austria on the one side and France and Russia on the other—at a time moreover when England was already tending to lean towards the latter group—Italy held a position, not duly appreciated but none the less real, in favour of peace. Following upon the agreements with the various Powers, carried out with great finesse and a deep sense of justice, Italy found herself temporarily allied to Germany and Austria, while at the same time the friend of France and England, for the preservation of the peaceful equilibrium of Europe. Whenever the peace should be broken by any of these Powers, Italy was to be free from every pledge towards the group which had provoked war and was only to keep its pledges towards the group unjustly attacked. The Triple Alliance, which had begun with pacific intentions, could not be transformed into an instrument of aggression without losing *ipso facto* the adherence of Italy; and the latter, though constrained to abandon one of the two groups of Powers, was sure not to find herself cut off from all support. Europe had gained a new force, and this force was placed at the exclusive service of Europe and of peace.

But at this time European balance of power had become somewhat more difficult. Germany, under the impulse of William II., had begun a series of noisy demonstrations in world politics which had the effect of bringing England once more close to France and to Russia.

Differences now began to appear between Germany and England, and Italian policy, based on alliance with the Central Powers and on close friendship with France and England, had to steer its way amid dangerous rocks. When the visit of William II. to Tangiers provoked the Morocco question, Italy, represented at the conference of Algeciras (January to April 1906) by the authoritative and venerable person of Visconti-Venosta, adopted the attitude required of her by her international agreements; without departing from the fidelity she owed to her ally, she adhered in substance to the French thesis to which she was bound by a special agreement well known to Germany. Such an attitude roused some discontent in German diplomatic circles and in the German Press, but it was perfectly legitimate, and the new agreements of the Triple Alliance could not but sanction it.

Irredentist Agitations and the Problems of Internal Policy

Yet more serious unpleasantness was to rise in connection with Austria. Inspired by an obscure policy of violence, far from seeking to solve her differences with Italy, the latter seemed only bent on rendering them more acute. The refusal given to the demand for an Italian university at Trieste; the barbarous treatment to which Italian students at the university of Innsbrück (16th of May 1903) were subjected; the continued persecution of the Italian population in the unredeemed territories, systematically organised by the Austrian Government; the constant increase of troops and fortifications towards the Trentino, inflamed public opinion in Italy and gave rise in most of the cities to new and noisy demonstrations by the Irredentists, making relations between Italy and Austria less cordial

than ever. The Italian Government however, convinced of the necessity of the Triple Alliance to safeguard European peace, tried on its side to eliminate every possible reason for suspicion and hostility. The Irredentist demonstrations were severely repressed and the relations with the Central Powers were animated by the highest sense of loyalty.

On the other hand the life of the country was frequently agitated by a profound political and moral discontent, which followed upon the unhappy events of the first decades of national unity. The army was deteriorating amid general dislike, and scarcely served to repress the frequent riots, in which it appeared as an instrument of the will of the Government as opposed to that of the People. Justice was slow, and the notorious Palizzolo trial and that of the Murri brothers, accused of common offences, and the trial of the ex-minister Nasi, accused of peculation, dragging on among incidents and exhibitions of rhetorical skill, seemed purposely made to diminish further its dignity. Strikes spread from office to university and public services and revealed the universal feeling of unrest and discontent.

The Roman Church, which had seen the Papal prestige immensely enhanced by the fall of the Temporal Power, had done nothing to lessen its official hostility against the Italian state; but the uncompromising Leo XIII. had been succeeded by the kind-hearted Pius X. (4th of August 1903), and the latter, at the elections in 1904, removed the *non expedit* rule which prevented Catholics from participating in the elections of the deputies and initiated a rather less difficult *modus vivendi* between Church and State.

Italian political life lacked sincerity and courage. A wide system of liberty ensured the greatest amount

of independence to parties, classes and individual citizens, but the discontent that prevailed amongst the cultured classes, the general distrust of the popular classes, and an easily recognisable difference between speech and action encouraged absenteeism, scepticism, suspicion, lack of discipline in every branch of national life. The lack of a great ideal, the ever-present memory of mistakes old and new, the sense of an irremediable scarcity of national forces, all contributed to keep Italian political life in a state of profound unrest.

In November 1903 Giovanni Giolitti had returned to power. By the system of wide toleration in the conflicts between Capital and Labour which he had daringly followed in 1901 when Minister of the Interior in the Zanardelli Cabinet, and by his alert and serious plan of effecting a pacific development of national energies, he had gained at one and the same time the confidence of the extreme Left and of the Conservatives. Imbued with the doctrines of imperturbable political empiricism, and versed in the subtleties of parliamentary tactics, Giolitti renewed the policy of *trasformismo* started by Agostino Depretis, thus becoming a sort of dictator of Italian political life. As a matter of fact he led the Government for over ten years, until March 1914, except for short interruptions consented to or engineered by himself (the Fortis-Sonnino Ministry, March 1905 to May 1906; the Sonnino-Luzzatti Ministry, January 1910 to March 1911).

In the general elections in November 1904 he perfected the system of Government interference, systematically fighting all the deputies who had not voted for the ministry. In the frequent senatorial elections (*infornate*) he was guided by the most obvious principles of opportunism; in his Government policy he remained bound to the principle of disturbing as

little as possible the natural course of events. These methods brought Italian political life down to a still lower level, but on the other hand it must be admitted that they served the purpose of giving the country a peace extremely helpful to its economic development.

It was at this period indeed that economic and civic progress, already perceptible at the end of the nineteenth century, became unexpectedly more rapid. As a field, long harried by the north wind, under the rays of the new sun awakens in an unforeseen burst of vegetation, so Italian economics, long hampered by foreign tyranny and the initial difficulties attending their rebirth, awoke once more with a magnificent show of new energy and prosperity. Agriculture, which in the period of thirty years between 1870 and 1899 had remained almost stationary, between 1900 and 1911 received a new impulse by *bonifiche* (drainage of marshy lands) on a large scale, by the use of machinery and by new agricultural developments. Then too a rapid progress in industry became evident, favoured by the wide use of electric power, which in 1911 amounted to a million horse-power, representing about a third of the hydraulic energies of the country. The new sugar, cotton and iron industries had developed side by side with the old ones of silk, building and the minor arts, all of which had been further improved and enlarged.

This economic progress had its effect on the growth of the population and on the wealth of the country. The population, which in 1876 had been 26,801,154, in 1911 reached a total of 35,845,048. The emigration movement, which in 1875 reached only 100,000 emigrants every year, after 1901 rose above 500,000, and in 1910 reached the figure 651,475. The phenomenon doubtless meant a regrettable loss of nearly 5,500,000 citizens who, though far from their country,

still preserved their Italian nationality; but it also meant great advantages to the mother-country—the receiving of 400,000 lire in gold a year, represented largely by savings.

The increase in private wealth was accompanied by a corresponding and continuous improvement in that of the State. Notwithstanding the increase in public expenditure (nearly 2,000,000,000 lire a year) the finances of the State, which in 1898 had balanced, had progressed from 1899 onwards to the tune of 700,000,000 lire in twelve years. The premium on gold disappeared, the public *rentes* rose above par and a series of daring financial operations (1902, 1903, 1906) led to the conversion of the *rentes*, assuring the State an annual saving of over 400,000,000 lire.

At the same time a series of wise social laws for the protection of labour and labourers were being enacted; the latter obtained recognition for their organisation as a class (Chamber of Labour, General Confederation of Labour, Syndicalist Unions), by which an impetus was given to the energies of production and of trade.

CHAPTER VIII

ITALY'S PART IN EUROPEAN POLITICS AND IN THE GREAT WAR (1908-1918)

The European Crisis at the Annexation of Bosnia- Herzegovina

THE European balance of power was already seriously shaken by the decree of October the 7th, 1908, in which Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The decree was a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, which had conceded to Austria nothing more than a temporary occupation of these provinces. This act offended the national sentiments of Serbia, who saw her hopes of reclaiming the rich provinces of Bosnia shattered. It also marked another step in Austria's eastward march, and by threatening international equilibrium in the Balkans seriously endangered European peace as a whole.

Turkey, who, a few months before, had accomplished a peaceful constitutional revolution, protested against the insult to her rights of sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina; Serbia was shaken by violent nationalist movements; Russia, as the protector of Serbia, took diplomatic action against Austria, asking that the question should be settled by a European conference, and was supported in this by France and England. Austria, however, refused to allow the question to be treated as an international one, and was firmly backed up by Germany, whose intimate relations with Turkey were not at all friendly, and who did not hesitate openly to side with her ally. Following upon an agreement between Austria and Turkey (February 26th, 1909), and after a renunciation by Austria to her rights

to the Sanjak of Novibazar, the question was formally settled ; but it left a feeling of uneasiness in European diplomacy which contained the germs of the terrible crisis that was to break out five years later.

Italy during the European Crisis

Italy, bound to Austria by a definite Balkan agreement, could not oppose herself diplomatically to an act which did not substantially alter the real state of affairs ; but she at once felt the gravity of this violation of an old-established European treaty. Public opinion was deeply moved, and refused to be quieted even when the Foreign Minister, Tittoni, announced, as a compensation to Italy, the renunciation by Austria to her rights of patrolling Montenegrin waters.

Italy had understood the warning afforded by the European crisis. Although her attention, in the gravest moment of the crisis, had been diverted by the terrible disaster of the Messina earthquake (December 28th, 1908), none the less she had actively co-operated in the interests of European peace. She realised that it was threatened principally by Austria, who, disturbed by national struggles, seemed to keep herself standing only by violently binding together the various racial elements contained in her. It was necessary to strengthen the pacific character of the Triple Alliance, and moreover it was necessary to protect herself against the Austrian danger.

Giolitti was now in power ; in the elections of November 1909 he had ranged himself against the extreme Left, but although he issued triumphantly from the elections he abandoned the Premiership (December 1909). He was followed by a new Sonnino Cabinet, which, conscious of the urgent need for a

renewal of Italian political life, proposed a daring programme of reforms, but was unable to keep afloat on the treacherous waters of the Giolittian majority, and after a hundred days it gave up the government in favour of a Ministry presided over by Luigi Luzzatti, which timidly continued the policy of reform. These ministries proclaimed their firm determination of remaining faithful to the Triple Alliance, as a guarantee of European peace; but at the same time they at last began to take some military precautions to counter-balance the continual strengthening of Austria's positions round the Trentino by providing a somewhat less undefended frontier.

The cry of alarm had been raised in the Chamber in a memorable sitting in December 1909, when Alessandro Fortis revealed the unusual armaments which Austria was preparing in the Trentino, and made an eloquent appeal for vigilance. The cry sounded strange to a Chamber which, for a long time, seemed to have forgotten everything connected with military affairs. But it echoed throughout the country, where in the meantime a vast and active movement, chiefly amongst the educated classes, was preaching a Nationalist doctrine and proclaimed itself the zealous defender of national rights and national interests. The measures subsequently taken to strengthen the army, which for some years had been sadly neglected, and the new fortifications on the Venetian frontier, all date back to this time. These were the first signs of a new-born will directed towards the vigilant protection of national territories.

The Moroccan Question and the Tripoli Expedition

Italian political life however was still in the grip of the old currents which had formed the whirlpool

of the few last regrettable years. In March 1911 the Luzzatti Ministry fell over the question of a slight extension of the vote, and Giovanni Giolitti returned to power. Identifying himself once more with the extreme Left he proposed universal suffrage and the State control of life insurance. Although the advent of the new Government caused vigorous parliamentary disputes, it guaranteed to the country a fruitful period of peace, which was however destined to be broken by an unexpected international occurrence.

In July 1911 Germany, having once more recourse to the mailed fist, sent a vessel of war to Agadir, thus reopening the Moroccan question. A new European crisis broke out and for a moment war seemed imminent, but Germany, hindered perhaps in the carrying out of her warlike plan by a powerful economic shock, brought about by the French banks unexpectedly withdrawing their capital, showed herself disposed to come to terms on the basis of compensations. By these means France obtained, unhindered, the control of the vast empire of the Sherif. The Mediterranean balance having been once more destroyed without any fault of Italy, conditions arose, foreseen by the treaties, which authorised Italy's occupying Tripolitania. Italian public opinion, now jealous of its national rights and conscious of the fatal consequences of a policy of renunciation during the past, became violently agitated; the Press of the various constitutional parties urged the Government to act, and patriotic demonstrations even took place.

The Government, which under the leadership of Giolitti had during the last few months drawn closer to the Socialist party, opposed to any colonial enterprise, seemed to hesitate, but later, about the middle of September, it began to make preparations for an

expedition. It realised that, if Italy were again to delay, the last strip of the African coast still available would be occupied by a foreign Power; and it knew perhaps, as it was later hinted, that this Power would be Germany, who was at that time very friendly with Turkey and was arranging to lease Cyrenaica for ninety years, with a view to economic development. Any hesitation would have proved fatal, as when, in 1902 and 1908, the Tripoli enterprise, although prepared, had been prevented either by a wavering internal policy or by unforeseen international events. On the 28th of September 1911 the Foreign Minister, di San Giuliano, sent an ultimatum to Turkey, declaring Italy's determination to occupy Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and preparations for the expedition were hurried on. After long delays and continued renunciations, relying on her international agreements with France and England, and safeguarded by her alliance with Germany and Austria, Italy dared for the first time to use force. Great enthusiasm swept the country. The departing troops were saluted in Rome, Naples and Sicily by warm popular demonstrations; it seemed as if the weight which had oppressed the nation since Custoza and Adowah had been removed. After a vigorous bombardment by the naval squadron on the 4th of October, the Tripoli garrison retreated to the interior, and a small group of Italian sailors (1700) made a daring landing at Tripoli and held the town, which was occupied a few days later by an expeditionary corps commanded by General Caneva. Further landings during the following week assured for Italy other strategic points on the coast, such as Tobruch, Derna and Homs, while on the 19th of October, after a brilliant infantry charge, Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica, was also occupied.

Difficulties of the Libyan War

The enterprise seemed well started, and gave hopes of a rapid completion: not only in the interests of Italy, but also in the interests of European peace, which, after the Moroccan crisis, wished for the elimination of the troublesome question of Tripoli. But things soon became difficult. The expedition offended the susceptibilities of a new party of Ottoman Nationalists, the "Young Turkey" party, which aimed at awakening, by a brutal show of strength, the decrepit energies of the old Kaliphate. Moreover it annoyed the great European Powers, accustomed as they were to acquiescence on the part of Italy, and unaware of the latent energies of the newly risen nation.

Austria, with the pretext of maintaining the balance in the Balkan States, which was not really threatened by Italy, at once prevented the Italian navy from attacking the Turkish ports in the Ionian Sea, thus acting more or less as the defender of the Turk. Germany, finding her recent friendship with Turkey shaken, showed openly, in the Press and by diplomatic action, active leanings towards the "Young Turkey" party. England and France, bound by a definite treaty to Italy, limited themselves to a strict neutrality, but did not successfully prevent the smuggling of arms. Turkey understood that it was time for action, and with a few troops, rousing Arab hatred against the infidels, prepared to defend the distant and neglected region which served her no more than as a pretext. On the 23rd and 26th of October the Italian troops at Tripoli were treacherously attacked by Arabs hidden in the oases, and a few who had made friends with the natives were subjected to the most appalling tortures. Arab

hostility seemed stimulated by an indolent European coalition averse to Italian enterprise.

The decree of annexation (4th of November, 1911), published a few days later, by which Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were placed under Italian sovereignty, was above all meant to be a decisive warning to Turkey and to the Powers of Italy's deliberate intention to gain possession of the Libyan territory. But the warning went unheeded, and it was a mistake fatal to Turkey, and also, perhaps, to European peace. Turkey had the illusion of being able easily to oppose Italy's aspirations, and was instead dragged into a long war, in which she was to betray her natural military weakness and to draw the Balkan League upon herself. It was without any doubt a hard war for Italy, who had to make a by no means light effort, infinitely superior to the importance of the enterprise; but it was more terrible for Turkey, who dug the chasm into which she herself was to fall a year later. As to Europe, which had judged the action of Italy lightly, it felt very considerably the effects of the long war, whence arose the fatal Balkan war, followed shortly afterwards by the European conflagration.

*The Last Phase of the Libyan War and the
Peace of Lausanne*

A brilliant battle (Ain Zara) on the 4th of December freed the oasis of Tripoli, but soon the war, which had died down in Tripoli, was kindled again in Cyrenaica, where a Turkish official, Enver Bey, had established his headquarters and organised the Arabs with the intention of driving out the Italians. But the Italian soldiers, especially the stalwart Alpine troops, repulsed

every attack between December 1911 and March 1912, while the fleet accomplished brilliant operations in the Red Sea (January 1912) and at Beyrouth (24th of February 1912). At this time the expeditionary force in Libya, which had been growing continuously, amounted to over 100,000 men. But the Italians came up against an insidious and obstinate resistance which Turkey, supported by Germany, kept alive with a few officers and a stream of contraband of war across Egypt and Tunis. It is well known that, while doing patrol work off the coast of Tunis, the visit and seizure of two French liners, the *Manouba* and the *Carthage*, gave rise to an acute diplomatic incident with France, in which the susceptibility of the sister nation, though formally justified, appeared somewhat excessive. This attitude later showed itself as having been prompted mainly by reasons of internal policy, directed at reawakening in the French people the military spirit which at that moment was well-nigh asleep.

It was now evident that the war would not end until an attempt was made to strike Turkey nearer home, and Italy tried to aim a few blows here and there, seeking to overcome the difficulties opposed to decisive action by the unfortunate European coalition. In April 1912 the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles were bombarded by Italian ships, and in May an expedition, led by General Ameglio, surprised and wiped out the Turkish garrison at Rhodes and occupied the island, and subsequently the whole of the Dodecanesus. Only the hostility of Austria prevented a vigorous attack against Salonika, as later she prevented other islands, Chios in particular, from being occupied by Italian troops. Notwithstanding the obstacles opposed by the Powers, a group of five

Italian torpedo boats, during the night of the 18th-19th of July, passed the barriers of the Dardanelles, and reached the Turkish fleet anchored in the straits of Cianak. Meanwhile new operations by land, at Zuara, Lebda and Misurata, were beating down the last Turkish defences.

The fear of new Eastern losses ended by bringing Turkey to reason. Peace negotiations were secretly opened in a Swiss villa, at Ouchy, during the summer and autumn of 1912; but these did not bear fruit till the 14th of October, when imminent action by the Balkan League caused Turkey to conclude a peace at Lausanne by which Italy gained rights of sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, while the Sultan of Constantinople preserved the recognised though badly defined religious sovereignty over these provinces (15th-18th of October 1912).

The Balkan Wars

The Libyan war had lasted a year, and although it had not entailed heavy losses (2000 men had fallen, with 5000 wounded; besides 1800 dead from disease) had required a great effort on the part of Italy, and had cost more than 1,500,000,000 liras. Peace had not brought quiet to the new colony, in which Turkish intrigues continued unchecked, justifying thereby the prolonged Italian occupation of the Ægean islands.

But this war had revealed the military impotence of Turkey, and marked her downfall. On the 20th of April 1912, two days after the Italian cannons had opened fire against the forts guarding the entrance to the Dardanelles, a secret agreement was signed at Sofia, between Serbia and Bulgaria, for a war against the Ottoman Empire. The agreement was also signed

a few days later by Greece and Montenegro, thus forming the Balkan Quadruple Alliance. At the very time in which the Peace of Lausanne was being concluded, war broke out in the Balkans, and the Turkish army in a few weeks was routed by the fierce attack of the young nations allied against it (November-December 1912). It is well known that from then onwards Turkey's fate seemed sealed. A tragic rivalry between Bulgaria on the one side and Serbia and Greece on the other, stirred up by the secret Austro-German policy, led to the Second Balkan war. In this new struggle a momentary recovery of Turkey was rendered possible by the intervention of Roumania, with the result that, openly supported by Germany, she succeeded in recapturing Adrianople and saving yet another part of her European empire.

During the long controversies which followed after this war Italy found herself once more in her old position as an element of equilibrium in the preservation of European peace. The Libyan War had shown Italy how little one can pin one's faith to alliances and friendships, and with great difficulty she had gained the loyal support of Russia. But, on the other hand, in this more or less general veiled hostility, Italy was afraid of finding herself isolated, and for this reason consented to anticipate by one year the renewal of the Triple Alliance (December 5th, 1912). Thus in the London negotiations over the Albanian question (March 1913) Italy found herself side by side with her old allies, and in obedience to the treaty upheld the principle of Albanian independence, while for reasons of equity she maintained, together with England and France, the right of Serbia to a commercial outlet in the Adriatic. This was opposed by Austria, and Italy only yielded to an alternative solution of the problem

when she saw that Austria was determined to have her way—if necessary, by force.

Austria, shaken by the internal struggles of her various nationalities, having seen in Serbia, who had so rapidly developed, a danger to the unity of the State, pursued her sinister and devious policy of violence, thus preparing a war against this small nation, convinced that war alone could solve her own internal political difficulties and reopen the way to the East which had been obstructed by the triumph of the Balkan Coalition. On the other hand Germany, drawn by overweening pride into a world-policy, and ill tolerating any restriction placed on her by conflicting European interests, saw in the war, which had been in preparation for twenty years, the only means of breaking what she called her “encirclement” and of gaining for her people a real and useful world-domination. At the end of 1912 Germany, by means of an extraordinary war-tax, completed her last military preparations, while in August 1913 Austria showed Italy her plans for a war against Serbia, secretly asking if she might rely on Italian support, but received the refusal which she might have foreseen. The warning could not have been clearer, yet rose-coloured illusions still hid the imminence and the inevitability of an international European conflict.

Italy and the Outbreak of the European War

Not even Italy at that time was capable of realising the full import of these warnings. Worn out by the long Libyan War, which had met with the hostility of the extreme parties, and weakened by revolutionary movements and a serious economic crisis, Italy was pre-occupied to the exclusion of all else with the difficulties

of her internal policy. The Giolitti Government had been able to establish itself by a long series of concessions to the extreme parties, chiefly to the Socialists; not only by granting universal suffrage and by State control of insurance, but also, and more especially, by a policy of continual surrender. By this acquiescence the Official Socialists had obtained large gains and an easy and decisive dominion over public administration, public works and the Chambers of Labour (*Camere di Lavoro*).

Questions of foreign policy practically ceased to exist. It seemed an unknown fact that a strong party in Austria, that of the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, was inclined to make war against Italy as a means of solving the Austrian difficulties and strengthening Austrian dominion over Europe; the Government seemed to have forgotten that, in November 1912, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff (General Conrad von Hötzendorf) had actually suggested and prepared for a war against Italy, then engaged in Libya. The Alliance, acting as a lightning conductor, had saved the situation, and von Hötzendorf had been dismissed, and a little later the Triple Alliance had been renewed. But the threat was still impending. Hardly had the signatures been put to the treaty when General von Hötzendorf was restored to his post (December 10th, 1912), and a series of hostile acts against Italian subjects of Austria (the decrees of Prince Hohenlöhe, which forbade the licensing of clerks of Italian nationality, August 16th, 1913; and the obstacles placed in the way of Italian commerce at Trieste and Fiume) revealed once more Austria's desire to oppose every Italian interest.

When in October 1913 the new electoral system, sanctioned a few months before, was put to the test,

the President of the Council of Ministers, who found himself Premier for the fourth time, was only able to apply on a larger scale the old methods of electoral compromise, resulting in a Chamber closely bound to him, in which the divisions of parties and groups were barely overcome by the will of a "benevolent despot."

In March 1914 Giovanni Giolitti left power, with the certainty of being able to return to it whenever he wished. He was succeeded by a man from the Right—widely esteemed in the Chamber, but adverse to parliamentary intrigue—Antonio Salandra. Salandra felt immediately the necessity of adequately strengthening the defences of the country, totally neglected since the Libyan War; but he dared not, or could not, put his plans into execution. He had hardly been in power three months when, in the June of the same year, an insignificant labour insurrection broke out in the Marches and in Romagna, called the "Red Week"; it was crushed almost without any bloodshed, but it showed the rottenness of the political structure, left to itself for so many years. Nor would the Salandra Ministry, which like the Sonnino Ministry, and that of Luzzatti, had no majority in the Chamber, have lasted long if it had not been unexpectedly consolidated by international events which led ultimately to the European War.

On the 27th of June 1914 the heir to the Austrian throne, Francis Ferdinand, was murdered at Serajevo by a few Serbian patriots. While all Europe was moved to horror by the mad act, a violent campaign against Serbian patriotism was begun in the Austrian and German Press. Later it seemed as if the actual storm had blown over, for the Press, after the first outburst, became calm once more; but it was a studied and affected calm. Unexpectedly, on the 23rd of July

1914, to the surprise of all Europe, Austria presented an ultimatum to Serbia which, by making a People responsible for a private crime, obliged that nation to submit its independence to the control and policy of the offended party. The European crisis then became graver than ever, more serious even than it had been in 1908 at the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia, smarting under the insult to its small sister nation, protested; Germany, who had decided at the Council of Potsdam (July 5th) to wage war, took Austria's part; England, France and Italy made endless efforts to preserve peace. On the 27th of July Austria declared war against Serbia; on the 31st of July, after a pretence at diplomatic negotiations, Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia, and shortly after declared war against Russia and France. The tragedy of blood had begun.

Italy during the Period of Neutrality

The swiftness and gravity of events agitated diplomacy and kept in suspense the feelings of the Italian people. The Government in that last terrible week of July had made every possible diplomatic effort; then, taking no notice of the sly German offers to give Italy unparalleled colonial advantages if only she would unite with Germany, and judging the war to be provoked by the Central Powers, she took advantage of the definite clause in the Triple Alliance and declared her neutrality. The declaration exactly tallied with popular feeling, which, surprised by and ignorant of the deep motives which had provoked the war, still understood perfectly, if confusedly, the nature of the aggression. The criminal occupation of Belgium immediately roused sincere indignation; the

invasion of France was looked upon as a national menace; the war of Austria against Serbia was understood as an act of open hostility against Italian interests. But all this could not immediately shake the party in favour of neutrality, either because of a still existing sense of duty towards the long-established Alliance or because of a knowledge of the country's complete military unpreparedness.

Meanwhile, in September 1914, the sincere if simple-minded Pope Pius X., driven to his grave by bitter grief for the war, was succeeded by Benedict XV., inclined to diplomatic finesse, who showed himself at once favourably disposed towards the principle of neutrality.

But public opinion was in September already beginning to discuss openly the question of neutrality. The Nationalists, the Reformed Socialists and the Republicans, with the exception of a section of the Liberals and of the Radicals, declared it to be the nation's duty to intervene against Austria and Germany; above all with the aim of hindering the brutal German rule, now revealed in all its cruelty by the war, from cutting short national development, and furthermore with the aim, no less vital to Italy, of liberating from the hated foreign domination the lands subject to Austria. Numerous syndicalists and a few socialists obliged to leave the official party—which had declared its rigid opposition to war—did not delay in joining this movement.

But other currents counselled a policy of patient waiting. The Government, at once energetic and prudent, gained prestige in the Chamber and in the country generally, and further enhanced it when, after the death of di San Giuliano (October 14th), Sonnino, a convinced Triplicist, but to all well

known as a jealous guardian of justice and of his country's interest, was appointed Foreign Secretary.

Meanwhile the war had been rapidly developing. In spite of the invasion of Belgium, the march of the German armies had been checked by the French on the Marne; the certainty of a swift victory had vanished for Germany, and the Central Powers were forced into strenuous warfare against France, England, Russia and other nations allied to them. Austria, who was fighting chiefly against the Russian army, suffered terrible defeats. It was evident that Italian neutrality, by freeing a part of the French army, had rendered the victory of the Marne possible; it was evident also to Germany and Austria that Italian neutrality accounted for the misfortunes of a war so different from the one dreamed of and prepared for by them. On the other hand, it was clear that if Italy remained outside the conflict she would have to renounce for ever the idea of freeing the Italians subject to Austria and of acquiring the prestige of a great nation. Already Italian neutrality, which the German and Austrian Press had defined, in the enthusiasm of the first triumphs, as a violation of faith, was becoming, for fear of dragging upon themselves a new enemy, an advantage to be preserved by threats and blandishments. In December 1914 Prince Bülow, ex-Chancellor, famous as a great diplomatic authority, was sent to Rome as ambassador-extraordinary. He at once began his subtle task of maintaining Italian neutrality, revealing, for the first time since the formation of Italy as a nation, a German diplomatic attitude which was courteous, almost humble, towards the Italians.

At this moment the tragic question of Italian neutrality reached a head. Two opposite currents

had been formed, "Interventists" and "Neutralists." These currents destroyed the old parties, still bound by old ideas and old methods of petty opportunism. The Interventists argued that it was the duty of Italy to enter the struggle in which the fate of the world was being decided, whether in the name of the ideal interests of civilisation, threatened by German predominance, or in the name of Italian interests, which demanded the unity of the country and the destruction of the fatal Austrian supremacy in the Adriatic and in the Balkans. The Neutralists objected that not only was it the duty of Italy to prevent the bonds of an old alliance being broken by war, but also drew attention to the military unpreparedness and the economic poverty of Italy. Furthermore they put forward the possibility of obtaining considerable advantages by successfully maintaining a state of neutrality. The former views were agitated by the new parties, and were supported by many elements desirous of stirring up the Stygian marsh of Italian political life; the latter, by the old dominating parties, Giolittian Radicals on the one side, Conservatives, Catholics and Official Socialists on the other. These were further strengthened by numerous parliamentarians, who, to quote a phrase publicly used in a letter of Giolitti's (March 1915), expected Italy to gain "a great deal" by prudent neutrality.

The great majority of the people wavered uncertainly between these two currents: one part fearing to jeopardise by war the existence of Italy as a nation; the other remaining undecided through indolence or through ignorance.

Meanwhile the Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino, had opened secret negotiations with Austria, on the basis of the seventh article of the Treaty of Alliance, to guarantee for Italy the compensations due to Italian

interests in the East damaged by the Austrian war (January 7th, 1915). Germany had recognised the legality of these demands and had declared her intention of supporting them. The demands, presented a few months later, were extremely moderate, and had as their aim the satisfaction of national feeling by the annexation of the Trentino and the promotion of Trieste to the rank of Free-City, and the removal of the crying strategical inferiority of Italy in the Adriatic by the possession of a few islands and other advantages (April 8th). But Austria refused any concession whatsoever (April 16th), and later, although she consented to a few small surrenders, she declared her wish to postpone their execution till after the war (April 24th).

Party Struggles for Intervention

But the new parties were already clamouring for the intervention of Italy; free fights even had taken place between Interventists and Neutralists, which had shown the latter's inferiority. The Neutralists, in fact, were considerably damaged by a shameless and cunning propaganda on the part of foreign elements, some of whom—the German Socialists in particular—had not hesitated to offer money, which had been publicly refused by Italian Socialists.

The Government, convinced that nothing except ill-will could be expected from Austria, had opened negotiations with the Entente, to guarantee Italian interests in case of intervention, and had at London concluded a treaty (April 26th) by which it reserved to itself the right of intervening in the war, subsequent to certain guarantees, within the space of one month (Treaty of London). A short while afterwards, declaring

it would no longer, as an ally, stand the continued prejudicing of its Balkan interests by Austria, it denounced the Triple Alliance at Vienna, on the 3rd of May. This action took Germany and Austria by surprise; they had not taken the Italian menace seriously, and hurriedly tried to repair this danger. A violent Neutralist campaign was promoted at the beginning of May, and the announcement was made that Austria was ready to make large concessions, on condition that Italy should remain neutral.

At the same time, on the 9th of May, the ex-Prime Minister, Giolitti, who had declared himself favourable to neutrality, arrived in Rome, but had been received with demonstrations of hostility. It was certainly upon him, officially designated by the Austrian ambassador as "the man of the future," that the hopes of the old allies were centred. Immediately afterwards news arrived that, in a conversation between the present and the former head of the Government, profound differences of opinion had arisen, and a very large number of deputies, by leaving their visiting-cards at the house of the one (Giolitti) had made clear their preference for the policy of the other. In the uncertainty of obtaining a majority in the Chamber, the Salandra Ministry placed its resignation in the hands of the King (May 13th).

The news of these events, rapidly circulated by the newspapers, stirred the Italian people deeply. Suspecting that, under the pretext of a parliamentary manœuvre, Italy was being led into a shameful path, the people rebelled against it with an energy that will not be soon forgotten. Popular demonstrations swept through most of the large cities, and even many smaller ones; at Rome the best-known Neutralists were picked out and insulted in public; at Rome, at Milan, at

Genoa, at Naples, all the Interventist parties—which had gathered themselves together a few months before into one organisation, with the aim of forcing Italy to enter the war—openly proclaimed their watchword “War or Revolution.” The wobblers, the pacifists, the absentees, silent until then, went out into the squares and streets and joined their voices to those of the demonstrators. The *Giornate di Maggio* (Days of May) were thus a real revolution, for, awakening the slumbering energies of the great majority of the Italian people, they showed that the latter was now conscious of its strength and jealous of its national dignity, and could rise as one man against secret plots and political speculation. The King refused to accept the resignation of the Salandra Cabinet (May 16th); Parliament was called, and full powers, demanded by the Government in the event of war, were granted to the Chamber of Deputies by an overwhelming majority, and unanimously to the Senate (May 20th-21st).

The War against Austria

On the 23rd of May 1915 Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary. In the first hours of the 24th of May, the day chosen for the opening of hostilities, the Italian troops, which had been concentrated little by little on the Austrian frontier, crossed the old frontier singing, amidst indescribable enthusiasm. The Austrian ships, slipping in safety out from the near recesses of the eastern coast of the Adriatic when the Italian fleet, coming from distant Taranto and Syracuse, could not yet be ready, presented themselves before Ancona and Barletta, open cities, and mercilessly bombarded them. Here then two souls, two types of mind, two methods, found themselves face to face and continued, under

new conditions, the gigantic duel which had begun on the fields of Flanders, and from the very beginning of this duel caused the high idealism and sense of justice of the Italian people brilliantly to shine out.

The Italians understood that this tragic struggle would decide the fate of civilisation, and that they could not keep out of it without ruining their own interests and losing their dignity. Doubtlessly it was a terrible war—Austria was prepared, Germany powerful; without doubt the frontier given to Italy in 1866 afforded the enemy a formidable advantage; no less true was the fact that Italy was endangering her whole national existence while as yet she was not solidly welded together, and perhaps at the least propitious moment for her civic life. But there are moments in which a people, like an individual, cannot waste time in too subtle calculations, and, because of its conception of justice, is bound to place its energies, its goods, its very existence in the greatest jeopardy; to enter into a trial involving the loss of its own life, in order to show itself worthy of that life. At the moment in which Italy entered the struggle the Russian army, beaten all along the line, was, after the battle of Gorlitz, in full retreat before the formidable German advance. Germany was sure of victory and Austria had almost entirely recovered from the defeats of the first few months. Thus Italy could repudiate the enemy's insinuation that she was waiting to throw in her lot with the winning side, and threw her weight into the balance of war without looking to see which way it weighed.

Having collected an army which in a few months numbered about 3,000,000 mobilised men, of whom more than 1,000,000 went straight into battle, Italy began her difficult task. The supreme command was

taken by General Luigi Cadorna, a man of great energy and of recognised authority, son of that General Raffaele Cadorna who, in 1866, had fought with Cialdini on the Isonzo and had in 1870 led the advance on Rome. Convinced that the Italian front could be defended only by an attack, he had sketched out a plan which aimed at bringing strong pressure to bear against the undefended line of the Isonzo, thereby threatening the enemy's vital centre, while limiting himself, in the less secure mountain lines of the Trentino and Carnia, to a strategic defence. To this end, with daring and brilliant movements, the left wing of the army, marching beyond the old frontier, took possession of Monte Nero, which was to be the centre of the vast manœuvre aiming at forcing the line of the Isonzo. The main body of the army subsequently charged the bridge-head at Tolmino, slipped thence beyond the Isonzo to Plava, attacked the formidable bridge-heads of Gorizia, from Mount Sabotino to the Calvario, and then threw itself forward to conquer the terrible tableland of the Carso.

But Austria had had time to take defensive measures. The German victories on the Russian front, and the cleverly conducted negotiations to free the Austrian army and to delay Italian intervention for some weeks, had rendered possible the quick defence of the forts and trenches in the Trentino and on the Isonzo, with cannons, machine guns and soldiers (twenty-five divisions had been moved into the line since the beginning of hostilities). Thus the Italian attack was turned into a long and difficult warfare of position, which wore out the pick of the soldiers and of their leaders.

Italy lacked everything needed for modern warfare. It had been impossible, on the other hand, to repair the deficiencies of material and machines of war during

the nine months of neutrality, either because these cannot be improvised or because the watchful German espionage, widely spread through the whole country, had prevented active preparations. At every point of the vast front (about 600 miles in length) the Italian soldiers were faced by dominating positions strongly defended by bastions, dug-outs, trenches and barbed wire, constructed in times of peace and neutrality (in part, by the labour of Italian emigrants), and were forced to a standstill.

There were no heavy guns, no ammunition, no lines of defence. But, as always happens when arms are lacking, the courage of the citizens had to make up for it. With magnificent impetus, with prodigious feats of valour, the Italian soldiers, led by their officers, hurled themselves into the struggle, leaving scraps of flesh on the barbed wire; threw themselves upon the trenches; forced the enemy to bring up new material of war, new weapons and new men, and to wear themselves out in a deadly struggle. During the first year of the war the Italian army threatened the fringe of the Carso, from S. Michele to Monfalcone, to the slopes of the Calvario and the Sabotino, to Oslavia, to the Merzli, to Monte Nero, as far as the Conca di Plezzo, until it came into close contact with the enemy, resisting counter-attacks from positions generally considered untenable. Italy had found the soldiers and the leaders which Garibaldi, after Custoza and Lissa, had wished the country might have in order to overcome the insolence of the hereditary enemy (see Map, p. 191).

The value of Italian intervention was revealed in March and April 1916. The German efforts against Verdun becoming more intense, the Italian army, now better equipped and with more experience at its back,

was in a position to launch a strong offensive along the whole front, with victorious attacks against the defences of Gorizia, in Carnia, in the Cadore (capture of the Col di Lana, April 18th). It also prevented Austria from transferring troops and guns to the French front—a transfer which had been prearranged by the German General Staff.

Meanwhile in the workshops new arms were being prepared, the naval guns were being adapted for land warfare, a powerful air fleet was in process of formation, the navy was being organised to defend itself against the insidious submarine warfare which at the beginning had caused the loss of two ships (the *Garibaldi* and the *Amalfi*) and to attack the enemy with daring in its secure retreats on the Istrian and Dalmatian coast.

The Austrian Offensive in the Trentino

But while the weapons necessary for a decisive push forward were being sent to the Isonzo, the enemy unexpectedly began an offensive from the fortified bastions of the Trentino. On the 14th of May 1916, from the Vallarsa, from the plateau of Folgaria, from that of the Sette Comuni and of the Valsugana, a mighty concentration of artillery (1800 cannons, which included forty "305's," four "380's," four "420's"¹) opened a fierce bombardment against the Italian lines, and shortly afterwards eighteen picked divisions (400,000 men) swept forward to the attack under the command of Marshal von Hötendorf—a "punitive expedition" it was called.

The strong line of Monte Maggio, by way of Toraro

¹ The 305 is approximately 12'3; the 380, 15 $\frac{2}{8}$; and the 420, 16 $\frac{5}{8}$.

and Campomolon, surprised by the violence of the impact, fell into the hands of the Austrians, and in a few days the body of the enemy pushed forward against the Pasubio and penetrated into the Astico valley and on to the plateau of Asiago. But it was only for a moment. The Italian troops, swiftly reorganised, making a formidable resistance at the very last fortification facing the plain, covered themselves with glory by their defence of their positions on the Pasubio, the Novegno and the Cengio, and of the Borcola and Buole passes. The Supreme Command, with a rapid manœuvre along supporting lines, moved up reinforcements very swiftly from the Isonzo to the points most in danger, and succeeded in carrying out a brilliant strategic movement, which, extending from the Coni Zugna and the Pasubio on one side and from the Lisser and the lines of the Valsugana on the other, threatened to encircle the enemy advancing along the Astico and over the plateau. On the 2nd of June the enemy, notwithstanding formidable attacks, which cost it very heavy losses, was brought to a standstill.

Meanwhile the Russian army under General Brusiloff, called upon, according to the Pact of London, to attack along the Galician front, which Austria had completely deserted in order to throw herself upon Italy, began a powerful offensive on the morning of the 4th of June which overwhelmed the scanty and inexperienced Austrian troops, and led to the loss of the Bukovina, together with nearly 500,000 men. On the night of the 23rd of June, under this double pressure, the Austrian army was forced to retreat, followed by a hot Italian counter-attack which restored, at least in part, a somewhat safer line of defence.

During these actions Cesare Battisti, Socialist deputy for Trent, who for the noble ideal of his

country's redemption had himself advocated Italian intervention, and had enrolled as a soldier in the Italian army, was made prisoner by the Austrians on Monte Corno, and two days later was hanged as a traitor. Thus, like so many others, he added one more martyr to those who had sacrificed their lives to the rebirth of Italy.

The National Ministry and the Capture of Gorizia

The violence of the onslaught, the rapidity of the surprise, which had brought the enemy right to the edge of the plain of Vicenza, soon reacted upon the parties in the Chamber, upon public opinion and upon the Government. The latter, led by a man of singular energy and high moral character, when the first months of national enthusiasm had passed, found itself faced not only with the difficulties of rapid preparations for war, but especially with passive resistance from hidden forces averse to war and a close network of espionage subsidised by the enemy.

In the daily and silent struggle the strain began to tell; the consciousness of the need for great energy in order to beat the enemy seemed to dissuade the country from extending the parliamentary basis of the Government, which, while adding new members to the ministerial machine and satisfying a few ambitions, might greatly hinder the rapidity and vigour of its action. In the sitting of the 10th of June, Salandra, the Prime Minister, openly criticising the conduct of the Supreme Command in the surprise attack in the Trentino affair, found himself in the minority and handed in his resignation.

A new Cabinet was then formed, the "National Cabinet," presided over by the irreproachable veteran

minister, Paolo Boselli. It numbered twenty ministers, amongst whom were several important members of the Republican party and of the Reformed Socialist party (*Partito socialista riformista*).

The Battle of Gorizia

General Cadorna, having reconstructed the line of the Trentino, promptly started to prepare once more for the Isonzo campaign. Convinced that modern warfare, being based on the clashing of large forces of men, should be carried on by frontal attacks so as to preserve contact with the other sections of the army, he had prepared a strong mass of men and guns and had cleverly trained it for a decisive attack. In order to destroy the wire entanglements which were the chief obstacle to an advance, and could not be attained by artillery fire, he had perfected the petard (*bombarda*), an old Italian instrument of warfare which was destined to play a very prominent part in the coming struggle. By a diversion towards the Monfalcone zone (4th of August), after a violent bombardment by heavy guns and *bombarde*, the Italian infantry on the 6th of August stormed the Sabotino and the Calvario, which protected the bridge-head of Gorizia, and subsequently obtained possession of Monte S. Michele and the whole of the Western Carso, which had for more than a year been contested with much bloodshed. The struggle lasted uninterruptedly for two days. On the 8th of August the Italian troops entered Gorizia, and soon after victoriously advanced. They might perhaps have been able to win even greater success had there been a supply of fresh supporting troops. At the battle of Gorizia about 775,000 men and over 2000 guns had been engaged on the Italian side, which, it must be

admitted, after barely a year's preparation, was almost a miracle.

The Austrians had left about 50,000 men on the field, and lost 20,000 prisoners. The Italian losses had been remarkably small; but it must not be forgotten that the victory of Gorizia was the result of 400 days of continuous and fierce attacks against dominating Austrian positions, from the Sabotino to the Carso. This warfare, which was to continue and preserve the same character on very difficult ground, had entailed indescribable prodigies of individual and collective valour and appalling losses.

Meanwhile the Italian fleet, assisted by a few Allied vessels, kept the mastery over the Adriatic, defying the enemy protected by the islands which fringe the eastern coast of this sea. It was in one of these ventures (his sixty-first) that Nazario Sauro, a daring Istrian sailor, who had joined the Italian ranks at the beginning of the war, after torpedoing an Austrian destroyer, was made prisoner and condemned to be hanged (18th of August).

The victory of Gorizia—the first great Italian victory—gave Italian intervention its rightful place in the great European struggle. A few days later, on the 27th of August, Italy, already at war not only with Austria but also with Turkey (August 21st, 1915), and Bulgaria (October 19th, 1915), declared war against Germany.

The Declaration of War against Germany

This act only confirmed what was actually a fact; since by fighting against the Austrian Empire—which was no longer anything save a tool in the hands of Germany—Italy had also been waging war against the

Kaiser; while the latter, on his side, by helping Austria in every way, and without any scruples, had been, in practice, fighting against Italy. But Italy had not been able suddenly and without a justifiable reason to declare war on Germany. Although the old alliance had been broken by Austria by the premeditated disregard of Article 7 of the Treaty, Italy did not wish to become guilty of an open rupture of the other alliance which, during the period of negotiations, had given the required diplomatic support to Italian demands. She had to wait for a serious and adequate reason if she did not wish to be taken for one of those nations who consider treaties as "scraps of paper."

Then the cause arose. When it was seen that Germany had no scruples about sending Bavarian troops to fight against Italy; when it was proved that German far more than Austrian submarines were sinking Italian ships in the Mediterranean; when it was evident to all that Germany wished to conduct a ruthless and brutal war of aggression against free nations: then Italy did not hesitate even formally to take definite action against her (August 27th, 1916). A few days previously the Italian troops, who were already holding the naval base of Vallona, had extended their occupation to Southern Albania (August 2nd), and a strong contingent had landed at Salonika (August 23rd). Italy was resolutely carrying the war on to the Balkan front as well, where a fierce battle was being fought for the mastery of the East.

When, on account of Roumanian intervention, the Central Powers concentrated their forces on the Danube against that tiny nation, Italy did her best to bring pressure to bear against Austria's eastern front in order to attract the main body of the Austrian

armies, and in the months of September, October and November three new and great battles were fought—on the Isonzo front, to the east of Gorizia and on the Carso, which resulted in three further Italian victories which inflicted very severe losses on the enemy.

The Campaign of 1917 on the Isonzo

Italy's military effort had now reached vast proportions. National industries, called upon to carry out work very rapidly in every field, had made magnificent strides. The winter of 1917, which was very severe, and especially terrible for the troops in the mountains, and imposed heavy sacrifices on the nation by reason of the increased difficulties of supplies, found Italy at the height of her military efficiency. This was lucky, for in the spring the Russian Revolution had caused the greater part of the Eastern Front to collapse. Yet notwithstanding all these difficulties Italy found herself, in May, in a position to fight two important battles on the Isonzo, one for the possession of Monte Cucco and Monte Vodice (May 12th-20th), the other to make a new advance on the Carso (May 23rd-24th). These two actions forestalled the offensive planned by Austria, and gave Italy two costly but splendid victories. After a fierce struggle on the Asiago plateau she was able, in August, to carry out a victorious offensive on the Isonzo which led to the capture of Monte Santo and of the Bainsizza plateau (August 19th-26th).

These victories, won in the darkest hour of the European war, when Russia was helpless, Belgium, Serbia and Rumania crushed, the great Anglo-French offensive almost paralysed on the Somme because of Hindenburg's strategic retreat, the American inter-

vention decided but not yet in a position to make its weight felt on the battlefield, afforded Italy the possibility of fulfilling a vital task in the World War. They showed the young nation, crowned with glory, daringly advancing eastward along the road to Laibach and Trieste, determined to aim a decisive blow against the proud dream of Teutonic supremacy. She at last felt capable of overcoming the old and powerful Hapsburg Empire, which in vain opposed the whole of its mighty army now released from the Russian front. But the terrific effort entailed by a war the end of which seemed nowhere in sight was sapping the country's energies and reawakening old party strife.

The taxpayers had borne with considerable difficulty the financial weight of the war—which had caused the balance-sheet to be doubled by military expenditure alone, which had to be met by new taxes and war loans. A total military expenditure of over 14,000,000,000 lire was budgeted for 1917 alone, while the war debt had risen to 26,000,000,000 lire. The mobilised army had reached the total of 5,000,000 men, and was fighting on every front; not only along the difficult frontier, but also in Albania, Macedonia, Libya and Palestine. Though all this enhanced the nation's prestige, it wore out its resources. Moreover, the Allies did not give either sufficient aid nor sufficient attention to the Italian war, vital and deadly though it was.

*Defeatist Propaganda in the Country and in the Army,
and the Austro-German Offensive*

The losses suffered in the last battles had been appalling—about 100,000 men had fallen in the May

offensive alone, without apparently producing adequate results. The damage done by submarines had been considerable; even more considerable had been that done by a few traitors, imported by the enemy, who had blown up two large ships as they lay in port (the *Leonardo da Vinci* at Taranto and the *Benedetto Brin* at Brindisi) and damaged several of the munition factories. The very serious lack of foodstuffs, borne patiently by the majority of the people, furnished a good pretext for agitators.

Profound discontent was circling among the people, which found a vent in party strife. Under the pressure of the pacifist offensive, provoked by the Central Powers, the Neutralists had once more raised their heads and, pointing to the uselessness of the efforts made, attributed the sacrifices and the carnage of the war to those who, they said, had provoked it. The union of the parties had not been maintained intact, and several defections had created uneasiness. Disturbances broke out in Turin (August 23rd-27th, 1917) as a revolutionary protest against the war; and this discontent, which had spread through the army, expressed itself on one side by a fierce campaign against dug-outs (*imboscanti*) and on the other by numerous desertions.

A Socialist deputy had, in the Chamber, invited the soldiers not to remain in the trenches for another winter (July 12th), while the reference to "useless massacre" and the invitation to universal peace made by the Pope to the Powers at war (August 15th) had been interpreted by some as a pessimistic and despairing definition of the Italian war.

It was in these circumstances that Germany, yielding to Austria's repeated requests, thought of an offensive against Italy on a really large scale, in order to crush

the only Power that had succeeded in victoriously holding her ground on enemy soil, and to make sure of the collapse of the Italian front, now thought to be reduced almost to extremity (see Map, p. 199).

While Austria-Hungary was carrying out a vast concentration of artillery and soldiers along the whole front (there were now no less than seventy divisions and 6000 pieces of artillery), the German Command drew up a plan of attack between the Plezzo valley and the bridge-head of Tolmino in an attempt to surround the Italian army from the most advanced positions on the Austrian line. After simulating an offensive against Riga, to distract the attention of the Allies, it swiftly sent towards Italy an army (six German and seven Austrian divisions), commanded by General von Below, and entrusted to the latter and to General Krobatin on his right the execution of the plan, whilst Boroevic was to deliver a frontal attack from Tolmino to the sea. On the night of the 24th of October a violent hurricane of fire was directed against the Italian front. A few hours later a German division, taking advantage of a sudden fog, and perhaps also of sectors where Italian soldiers had made friends with the enemy, overcame the defences in front of Tolmino and penetrated into the upper valley of the Isonzo, and, shortly after midday, entered Caporetto.

Although this event, which cut off the advanced troops on Monte Nero and threatened the flank of those beyond the Isonzo as far as the sea, was not irreparable, it had a profound moral effect on the defenders of the Upper Isonzo, and would have had serious results if a heroic stand on the Globocak had not restricted the enemy's advance. But on the dawn of the 25th, the formidable defences of the Jeza having fallen and resistance on the Globocak having



THE BATTLE OF THE PIAVE AND (INSET) ITALY'S NEW FRONTIERS

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thus been rendered useless, the Italian command was obliged to order the retreat of the troops on the Bainzizza and to provide for a possible retreat on to a line much farther back. On the following day an attempt was made to hold the enemy on the old frontier line, between Monte Maggiore and Auzza, but by now even the gorge of the Saga had given way, and the enemy, creeping down the Resia valley, was threatening the Tagliamento and the whole eastern front of the Italian army.

A tragic feeling of despair had taken hold of the troops of the glorious Second Army, which was holding the front from Plezzo to Gorizia. What was the use of struggling against fate? Even the victorious offensives had borne no fruit, and now only by giving up the fight could the war be brought to an end. Moreover each mistake committed by the Nation, by the Government and by the General Staff now brought forth its tragic result. Italy was paying for not having made her working classes clearly realise the demands made upon them by modern life, and that the greatness of the country was indispensable to its defence and to social progress, while at the same time demanding at any moment, even from the humblest of its sons, the silent sacrifice of their lives. The weakness of the Government had made it possible for a poisonous propaganda of defeatism to spread through the ranks of the army, which had been left insufficiently supplied and equipped in positions of the greatest danger. The army commanders, too, had lacked the gift of foresight, the only safeguard against any surprise.

Nothing remained to be done except to retreat all along the line, and to withdraw on to a shorter one, which, by restoring energy to the shattered army, would save it from the possibility of being caught in

the rear by the ever-present menace of an offensive from the Trentino—in other words, to retreat on to the line of the Grappa and the Piave. The order was sorrowfully given, for it meant abandoning places hallowed by thirty months of sacrifice, martyrdom and victory. But the retreat, far from diminishing this tragic feeling of despair, only deepened it. The roads were blocked by the retreating troops, by fugitives seeking safety, by soldiers in disorder. The enemy advanced victoriously upon Cividale (October 27th) and on Udine (October 28th), putting all to fire and sword in an outburst of savage joy. It seemed as if not an army, but a nation, were crumbling.

Meanwhile the Third Army, on the Lower Isonzo, was also retreating from the Carso, and succeeded in reaching the Tagliamento in safety (October 31st); while the Fourth Army, moving from the Carnia and the Cadore, sought to reach the line of the Piave. Sublime pages of heroism and sudden fits of despair and incredible hardships accompanied the bitter hour of defeat. The enemy captured nearly 300,000 prisoners and 1000 guns and valuable war supplies. But during the night of the 6th of November the divisions of the Italian forces saved from disaster—mainly the Third and Fourth Armies—reached the line of the Grappa, the Montello and the Piave, and joined the First Army of the Trentino, which had remained safely on its old line. At the same moment the supporting troops, which had remained intact, moved up rapidly to man the new line of defence.

The violent and impetuous offensive which in less than two weeks had given the whole of Friuli, Carnia, Cadore, and a part of the provinces of Treviso and Venice into the hands of the enemy, suddenly found itself met by an unexpected and formidable resistance.

The Reconstruction of the Army and of the Country

The news of the defeat ran with tragic swiftness through Italy, causing a sense of bewilderment that was deepened by the sight of the fugitives and the routed soldiers. But it lasted only for a moment. The imminent peril, the feeling of the justice of the cause, the manifest cruelty and treachery of the enemy, in one flash gave new strength to the nation. Party differences disappeared, hesitancy was overcome, the will to stand firm sprang up in every heart. Meanwhile, called by a cry of agony, the Allied troops swept down from France, and their fraternal help gave, above all, great moral support to the Italians.

The Italian line however, consolidated by now between the Melette and the Grappa, the Montello and the Piave, had regained its vigour; the young troops of the latest classes, just arrived from training or rest camps, accomplished the miracle of an unshakeable resistance. When, on the morning of the 10th of November, Marshal von Hötzen, after a fatal delay of ten days, launched his troops to the attack of the Asiago plateau, sure of reaching the plain and of taking the new Italian formations in the rear, he found that these raw Italian troops reacted with unforeseen energy. The terrible battle lasted over two months; a few peaks on the plateau were lost and regained several times; the northern buttresses of the Grappa were contested with indomitable fury and then partially lost; the Venetian cities were cruelly bombarded by the enemy's aeroplanes; the Piave line was attacked with formidable violence. But the Italian resistance was immovable. The Allied reinforcements (six French and four English divisions), which had been placed on the line of the Mincio and the Adige,

at the end of December, came to the aid of the more exhausted Italian divisions and accomplished further glorious deeds of valour. But the Austro-German advance had now been stemmed definitely, and Italy was saved.

Meanwhile, just at the time of the Caporetto disaster, the Boselli Ministry had been succeeded by a more homogeneous Cabinet presided over by Victor Emmanuel Orlando (October 30th). The threat of the enemy had silenced even parliamentary dissension, and on the 14th of November the Chamber gave a solemn manifestation of energy and unanimous agreement.

The admirable defences on the new front brought faith to life once more, and with it the old habits made their reappearance. In the middle of December the Chamber held a secret council and, under the pretext of seeking to ascertain the persons responsible for the disaster, gave vent to the bitterest accusations and recriminations. But as a counterblast to defeatist intrigues, with a burst of healthy energy a great number of deputies and senators formed the *Fascio della Difesa Nazionale* ("The Group of National Defence"), which, renewing in Parliament the "sacred union" of all parties, revealed the maturity of the Italian political consciousness.

The ravages caused by the defeat were for the most part repaired; deficiencies were made good, and all energies were concentrated upon united action. Some still remained outside, but they were few and timid. The terrible trial had given new life and strength to the Nation.

Further help was lent to this task of reconstruction by the daring and successful activities of the fleet. In December 1917 a torpedo boat, commanded by Luigi Rizzo, sank the Austrian ironclad *Wien* in

Trieste harbour; on the night of the 13th-14th of May Mario Pellegrini and three others penetrated into the port of Pola—supposed to be unassailable—and there sank a large ship; two months later (July 10th) the same Rizzo, with two submarine-chasers and thirty men, in the open sea faced a naval division of the enemy, composed of two dreadnoughts and ten torpedo boats, and sank one of the two ships. It was not only a revenge for Lissa, but also a new revenge for Caporetto.

*The Failure of the Enemy Offensive and the Battle
of the Piave, 1918*

The supreme command of the army had been entrusted to a young and esteemed general, Armando Diaz (November 9th). If Cadorna had given the army an iron discipline which had eleven times brought victory, General Diaz gave it the enthusiasm of faith. Provisions on a large scale were made for the soldiers; the Commands were organised so as to ensure greater freedom and cohesion; the task of each one was assigned with greater precision and carried out more thoroughly. The Italian army, which in the face of the unpreparedness of the first two years had done miracles, became in the hour of trial one of the most important factors in the Great War. The enemy was destined to discover this a few months later. The easy victory of Caporetto had given to the Central Powers new and overweening pride, which was the chief cause of their ruin. The victory, which had gained for them the dominion over a rich stretch of country—promptly sacked and devastated—had produced an effect similar to that of wine on a tired physique: it gave them the illusion of invincibility.

In February the German reinforcements, having finished pillaging, returned to Germany to attempt new moves on the Western Front. The Austrian army, now brought up to seventy divisions, about 8000 guns, and an incalculable number of machine guns, strengthened by the shorter line from the Stelvio to the mouth of the Piave, was quite sure of victory.

The new offensive, very carefully prepared, was started by General Boroëvic on the 15th of June 1918. It included an attack against the mountain line from the plateau of Asiago to the Grappa, and a frontal attack from the Montello to the sea. But it was faced with a well-prepared defence and a prompt and unexpected Italian reaction which frustrated every attempt at surprise. Along the mountain line the assaulting troops suffered such losses that their impetus was spent in twenty-four hours and they lost all desire for an offensive action. At the outset, cleverly overcoming the obstacle presented by the river, the defences of the Montello had been forced, and in the south, between the 16th and 20th of June, the enemy had succeeded in penetrating several kilometres into the interior. But even at these points the enemy had been beaten back by hundreds of counter-attacks and, as it were, seized by the throat. A violent Italian counter-offensive by the Third Army and the arrival of reinforcements had promptly brought about the recovery of the ground lost. A firm faith filled the hearts of the Italian soldiers; the enemy was forced to retreat with very heavy losses, increased by an unexpected flooding of the river, which swept away the bridges and the fugitives. Over 100,000 Austrians remained dead on the field, and more had been wounded or captured, while on the Italian side the losses amounted to over 90,000 men. Such a struggle had rarely been witnessed in the whole of

history; but the enemy's advance was completely and permanently broken.

The Battle and Victory of Vittorio Veneto

The magnificent resistance of the Italian army, cutting short the hopes of the proud enemy, marked the beginning of the great Allied victories. In the second battle of the Marne, begun on the 15th of July with formidable violence on the part of the German army, an Italian army corps on the line of defence resisted fearlessly side by side with the other Allied troops. Three days later General Foch, aided by strong Allied detachments, including the new American troops, who distinguished themselves by brilliant tactics, began his series of victorious offensives which proved the rapid undoing of the German armies. On the 5th of October, the Bulgarian front having crumbled before the united offensive of the Allies, Germany and Austria brought forward, through the President of the United States, an insidious proposal of peace.

It was the beginning of the end; but this end threatened to find Italy on the Grappa and the Piave, so that even then the just Italian aspirations seemed, as in 1866, as if they were to come, not as a deserved prize, but as a gift due to favourable circumstances. But the army was ready for an offensive. The enemy occupied dominating positions and were superior in numbers, if not in equipment (sixty-three and a half divisions, as against fifty-one, besides three English, two French and one Bohemian; 7000 guns on the Austrian side and about 9000 on the Italian), nor could the Allied help have been larger at the time. The hour had come and there was to be no hesitation.

On the 24th of October—the anniversary of Caporetto—a resolute offensive was launched against the heights of Valdobbiadene, with the object of coming down on Vittorio, closing the Feltre-Belluno and the Vittorio-Salice roads, and cutting off the Austrian army on the mountain from the one on the plain, thus making sure of its defeat. While violent assaults were hurled against the mighty fortifications along the whole of the Grappa region, the crossing of the river was prepared at Pederobba, at the Ponte della Priula and at the Grave. But between the 24th and the 26th the enemy's resistance, which had shown itself to be formidable, found an ally in the unexpected rising of the waters of the river; thus rendering the crossing difficult and isolating the troops which had already crossed to the left bank. One of the most terrible moments in Italian history followed. The Viennese newspapers celebrated the bravery of the army which resisted victoriously the fury of the attack; while the diverging tendencies of the various Austrian nationalities, which, impressed by the German defeats, had already become apparent, seemed to settle down permanently into their various channels and a new Federal Constitution seemed to be in process of formation at Vienna. The old and disciplined army, strange to the life of the country, seemed destined to be once more the magic mortar binding together the ill-fated Hapsburg Empire.

But on the night of the 28th new troops crossed the river at the Grave and hurried on to Conegliano, obliging the enemy to abandon the heights of Valdobbiadene; a little later the Eighth Army continued its march on Mount Cesen and on Vittorio Veneto. Threatened on the flank and at the rear, the two divisions of the enemy's army, now cut off, yielded all along the line. The strong defences of the Grappa,

which until then had stood firm, were stormed (30th-31st October). At the same time, while the Third Army was reaching the Livenza, and was scattering the army of the plain, the troops of the First Army, breaking down with lightning rapidity the defences of Valle Terragnolo and Valle Lagarina, forced the Austrian army to retreat upon Trento. Half-a-million men, 1000 cannon and machine guns, and war material of every sort and size were the booty which fell to the victors. But as if this were not sufficient, during the night of the 31st of October two daring sailors, having slipped once more into the port of Pola, there sank the dreadnought *Viribus Unitis*, dealing the last blow to the dying Austrian navy.

The Realisation of National Aspirations

Italy had won her battle. On the evening of the 3rd of November, at Villa Giusti, near Abano, the armistice which marked one of the greatest victories in history was signed. Italy, despised and humble, sixty years before, had been under the undisputed domination of a rapacious Austria; later she had actually become her ally, and had been subjected to the cruellest of humiliations. Now, after having worn out the energies of her adversary in a long war, after having, at Caporetto, given her the illusion of victory and beaten her in the battles of June, Italy had risen to her feet and in the name of a higher civilisation, and a stricter sense of justice, had built up again her material and moral forces, and brought the monster crashing to the ground. On the ruins new states were arising—Bohemia and Poland—and the old ones—Serbia and Roumania—were strengthened or transformed. Italian aspirations had

been for the most part realised, and the troops entering Trento, Trieste, Belluno, Udine, Pola, Fiume and Zara on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of November—the great days of victory—met with wild acclamations and with scenes of silent sorrow. The spectacle of destruction, dirt and neglect which the soldiers had witnessed in the regions invaded by the enemy suddenly revealed the fact that civilisation is not merely a well-balanced combination of disciplined and assimilated forces, but consists rather in a deeply rooted conscience, in sober and diligent habits, and in a living and fully developed tradition. The Hapsburg Empire was crumbling, leaving behind it a gloomy heritage of treachery, shame and crimes which for long years had remained hidden under the veil of an apparently correct administration but now stood out in all their loathsome reality. Italy had acquired on the Alps the frontier designed for her by nature and history. For the first time since the fall of Rome she reached the Brenner, Toblach, Tarvis and the Pass of Idria. In the Adriatic—which had witnessed the almost legendary deeds of the daring fleet—the possession of Pola and Vallona, of Zara and Sebenico, besides numerous islands of the Quarnaro and Dalmatia guaranteed once more for Italy, as in the times of Venice and Rome, that predominance over the Gulf of Venice which history and nature showed to be vital. It is true that not all Italian aspirations were satisfied: purely Italian centres like Fiume and centres prevalently Italian, like Spalato, were contested by the heirs of Austria with malevolent and wily intrigues. Fiume, on the other hand, vindicating the principle of self-rule, proclaimed the right to be united to Italy with the resolute words “Italy or Death.” The traditional Italian rights upon Dalmatia were clear, and assured just recognition. At

last mistress of her frontiers and of her seas, Italy was raising herself up amidst the glories of victory, truly reborn.

Italy and the League of Nations

Italy's sense of justice, her noble traditions, her aspirations and the unsparing energy of her people, enabled her now to enter amongst the elect members of a future and equitable League of Nations. Having recovered her unity and independence by the gigantic effort of her people, she had not hesitated in the hour of danger to risk her very existence for the ideal of justice, and to co-operate towards the victories of the free nations against the despotic tyranny of a whole race. She had voluntarily thrown her whole weight into the terrible war, and had withstood the difficult test successfully through the devotion both of her soldiers and of the nation. In the Wars of Independence the losses had been slight by comparison, and the winning of unity had seemed a marvellous stroke of good fortune; but to-day, to confirm her own right to live, to crush her unworthy adversary and to regain her natural frontier, the nation had endured the cruellest losses: over 1,500,000 men had fallen on the field, men of the purest Italian blood; while the dead reached over 600,000.

Just as her National Revolution had been kept free from any stain, in the days of disaster no less than in those of triumph; so too, the bitter war, which had lasted for forty-two months of untold sacrifices, had been conducted with a rigid spirit of justice which corresponded exactly to the feelings of the Italians. In the observance of international conventions, in the treatment of prisoners, in the government of enemy territory

(for fifteen months the occupation of Gorizia had been a model of respect for international regulations), Italy had not hesitated, however hard or costly it proved, to remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of Right, and had offered an example of moderation and justice. In victory as in defeat she showed the wisdom of maturity and an unequalled magnanimity and seriousness of aim. In her relations with the Allies, in the government of the people, she had remained faithful to the principles of loyalty and liberty even when it was seemingly impossible to do so.

It was not by a mere chance that, at the Peace Conference in Paris, Italy was placed on the same footing with Great Britain, France and the United States, who formed the powerful nucleus of the new League of Nations; nor was it fortuitous that the sublime ideal of Mazzini should find an echo in the words of Woodrow Wilson.

In 1815 Italy had been divided into seven states, dominated by cruel tyrants, and was impoverished by centuries of foreign servitude. After becoming a free nation, and destroying for ever the Temporal Power of the Papacy, perhaps the most ancient obstacle to her unity, Italy had played one of the leading parts in the great struggle in the defence of free nations, and by virtue of her victory over the Hapsburg monarchy had shown herself worthy of a great destiny, and of the high ideals for which Gioberti and Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi, and thousands of heroes and martyrs, had unceasingly laboured and suffered.

Clearly there was still much to be done in order to instil a complete knowledge of modern conditions among the working classes, and to make the governing classes as well as the people strictly realise their duties, so as to be able to fight the plots, being woven in the dark,

against the just balance between these all-important forces.

The Italian People, however, after having assured its unity and done its duty in the war, in pursuance of its deep-rooted tradition of justice, was now able to become the solemn champion of the rights of nations in the name of an ancient and glorious civilisation reborn for the third time in history.

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This does not in any way presume to be an exhaustive bibliography of the subject. The choice has been made (a) from works of a general character, and documents relating to the Risorgimento period; (b) from more specialised works, mainly English; (c) from the most important works by the prominent figures of the Italian Risorgimento. The works are grouped under the different chapters to which they are more closely related.

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